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ABSTRACT 
Lower Canada occupied a strategic position in Britain's 
policies for the defence, trade and settlement of British 
North America. The smooth development of these three 
interests was threatened by the autonomist ambitions of the 
colony's French-speaking (Canadien) leaders. Between 1820 
and 1841 British policy had to cope with the collapse of 
traditional canadien elites as reliable supporters of 
imperial interests, the persistent hostility of the new 
canadien leadership towards commerce and immigration, and the 
increased restlessness of the growing minority of English- 
speaking colonists. 
During the 1820s, the Governor alienated the bureaucracy, 
the traditional social leaders of French Canada, and the 
elected Assembly by his encouragement of diverse efforts to 
anglicize the colony's administration, institutions and civil 
law. The political divisions of the British colonists encou- 
raged the Canadiens to seek greater autonomy for tie colony, tb 
and British policy after 1828 favoured concession e the 
Canadiens as the best way to smooth out political obstacles 
to social and economic change. But increased immigration 
alarmed the Canadiens, created a larger and more complex 
British community in the colony, and made the imperial 
government more anxious to conciliate the British than the 
French colonists after a few of the latter revolted in 1837-38. 
Economic and demographic pressures were important but 
the debate over political legitimacy was a major element too. 
Belief in prescriptive legitimacy faded during the 1820s; 
the growth of liberal attitudes in the British part of the 
population brought impatience towards the colony's antiquated 
civil law and hastened the creation of suitable conditions 
for the growth of a modern commercial state. Britain imposed 
a new constitution giving greater powers to the fast-growing 
colony of Upper Canada and to the British merchants and 
settlers of Lower Canada. 
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Preface 
This thesis grew out of a belief that the study of Lower 
Canada before 1841 could profit from further scrutiny of the 
imperial context in which Canadian society evolved, and 
that the devolution of the formal Empire can be better under- 
stood through studies of groups in the colonies who resisted 
decentralization. The thesis traces political movements 
among English-speaking colonists in Lower Canada during two 
of the three decades before the granting of responsible 
government, in an effort to explain why colonial autonomy 
was a socially divisive issue, yet self-government soon 
began to work with the active co-operation of a majority 
of both the ethnic communities into which the colony was 
divided. 
To write the story of the "losers" in a long-dead 
historical controversy is to risk criticism for espousing a 
lost and perhaps disreputable cause. Much that was said 
and done by the advocates of British hegemony in the valley 
of the St. Lawrence before 1841 strikes the modern reader 
as strange and disagreeable. In this study, such attitudes 
are frequently quoted or paraphrased at length. This has 
been done in no spirit of retrospective partisanship, but 
because the British of Lower Canada spoke and acted out of 
conviction as well as self-interest; and because their 
attitudes were not illogical or extradordinary in terms of 
contemporary ideas and experiences in the English-speaking 
world. This is not a work of advocacy, but chiefly a study 
of attitudes and the contexts in which they evolved. 
Most of the terms used in this study were current in 
Lower Canada or in Britain before 1841. "Can'adiens" were 
French-speaking natives of the colony who had at least one ne-es6ar 
t- born there before 1759; "Britons" or "British 
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colonists" were terms loosely applied to English-speaking 
colonists of all other origins, including those born in the 
United States and Canada itself. The terms "tories" and 
"reformers" have been used sparingly; until about 1834 they 
were widely used in the colony to refer respectively to 
supporters and opponents of the colonial executive. 
"Patriotes" after 1826 were advocates of colonial autonomy 
and of the deliberate preservation of the French language 
and civil law of Lower Canada. "Bureaucrats", a term of 
even greater abuse then than now, were colonists of any 
origin who held executive or judicial office, or had 
profited conspicuously from advocating the executive's 
prerogatives rather than the claims of the elected Assembly. 
An MPP is a member of the Provincial Parliament, as it was 
called by most contemporaries. 
The writer has profited greatly from the advice and 
encouragement of the supervisor of this thesis, Professor 
Glyndwr Williams, and in general from discussions in the 
Seminar in British Imperial History at the Institute of 
Historical Research between 1973 and 1976. Acknowledgement 
must also be made to the helpful staff of the Institute, 
and to the staffs of more archives and repositories than 
there is room here to mention; they are listed in the 
bibliography. Particular mention is due to the Public 
Record Office in London, the Scottish Record Office in 
Edinburgh, and the Public Archives of Canada in Ottawa. A 
doctoral fellowship from the Canada Council made this work 
possible; additional valuable assistance was received through 
educational leave and-allowances from Parks Canada, Department 
of Indian and Northern Affairs. This financial assistance, 
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Chapter 1 Province and Nation: Problems of Imperial Rule 
i 
The activities of British colonists in Lower Canada from 
1821 to 1841 provide a challenging test for the theory that 
Britons overseas acted as agents of imperial expansion. 
This hypothesis, familiar to modern scholarship, was equally 
commonplace to contemporaries, and when British capitalists 
from Lower Canada spoke, for instance, of the "Grand National 
Objects" of a proposed land company, they had firmly in mind the 
idea that though they lived in the province of Lower Canada, they 
were integral participants in the expansion of the British 
nation-' This idea reflected constitutional reality; it 
also appealed to the colonists' emotional need to belong to 
something more than an old-fashioned agricultural colony of 
half-a-million people. Valid though this colonial mentality 
was to immigrants and the descendants of recent immigrants, 
it was understandably weak in the thoughts and feelings of 
French CanadianZ, a tiny minority in the national scale, but 
a preponderant majority in the province. Nonetheless, the 
Canadiens did not entirely repudiate an imperial role, for 
as late as 1836 their leading radical spokesman, L-J Papineau, 
insisted that his own devolutionary policies would serve the 
best interests of Britain and the colonial economy, as well 
as the protection of his nation canadienne. 
2 This bold 
assertion highlighted one peculiar aspect of the struggle 
between local autonomists and imperial centralists in Lower 
Canadian in the early nineteenth century. Each side devised 
policies and rhetoric to appeal selectively to certain types 
of pro-British feeling. The Canadiens stressed their loyal 
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defence of British North America against the United States 
in 1775 and 1812-14; the British colonists insisted on the 
paramount value of their own contributions to British commerce 
and sea power, and argued their own ability, as men of 
recent British extraction, to coordinate and stimulate the 
interests of British merchants, investors, and emigrants in 
North America. So each of the main political alignments in 
Lower Canada challenged imperial administrators, as they 
still challenge historians, to define what were the true 
interests of the empire, and to assess what groups in the 
colony were to be encouraged, and which held back, in the 
pursuit of imperial aims. 
Historians have almost invariably approached these 
questions through studies of men and interests working 
towards imperial devolution. Less attention has been devoted 
to forces which during the same period were exerted 
to reinforce and reinvigorate the colonial relationship 
between Britain and her North American possessions. The 
tendency is to side with the winners, the men who triumphed 
in the late 1840s with the view that Britain could best be 
served by turning her mature colonies of settlement into 
self-governing if economically dependent communities. This 
proposition is no longer controversial; what is nonetheless 
regrettable is that only a few writers have been sensitive 
to the colonists and imperial figures who worked for the 
opposite cause. In the 1930s Donald Creighton expounded on 
the imperial perspective of the Montreal merchants, and W. P. 
Morrell contributed an examination of Lord Stanley's efforts 
to prop up the colonial system in the 1840s. More recently 
Peter Burroughs' work on the "colonial reformers" has drawn 
attention to the fact that radical opinion in Britain was 
not universally hostile to certain types of imperial inter- 
vention and stimulation in colonial affairs. Albert Faucher 
has published valuable studies of Canadian public finance and 
its relation to 'informal' imperialism. John Ward described 
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some ideological aspects of decentralisation in 1976.3 But 
such studies do not add up to a comprehensive view of the 
forces working towards a closer relationship between Britain 
and Canada in the crucial decades of the 1820s and '30s. 
There has always been a tendency to assess statesmen and poli- 
tical movements according to their contributions to devolution. 
This is often accompanied by strongly derogatory references 
to the so-called tories in Canada, and by scorn for French- 
speaking Canadians who made their peace with the British 
authorities before the achievement of self-government in 
1849. The impression left by most writers is that Britain 
was too far away to exercise a wise supervision, and that 
opponents of devolution were antiquated and a nuisance, 
likely to be self-interested and offering nothing constructive 
to the development of Canada and the Empire. Little serious 
treatment is therefore afforded to the views and activities 
of colonial "conservatives" or opponents of devolution in 
Britain herself. It remains broadly true that the groups in 
Lower Canada which are most neglected are precisely those 
which believed they had a special mission to advance British 
interests despite Lower Canada's local traditions, and who 
were encouraged in that belief by influential sectors of 
opinion in Britain itself. 
4 
ii 
Over several decades after 1820, there were substantial 
changes in the interests which were regarded as paramount by 
British observers of Lower Canadian affairs, and in the 
groups through whom British leaders sought to control and 
develop the colony. Three of the distinct periods are the 
basis of the major divisions of this thesis. In the 1820s, 
the subject of part II, few British observers looked beyond 
the colony's role as a producer of timber and a useful 
bulwark against the further expansion of the United States. 
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It was assumed that most of the vital concerns of the colony 
should be administered by the British Army and by a centra- 
lized structure of British-born officials and merchants. 
Despite this emphasis in contemporary thought, the historical 
writing which covers this decade has paid scant attention 
to the structure and working of the colonial bureau- 
cracy, to the Governor's efforts to reform it, or to his 
attempt to create a coalition in the colony which would not 
merely govern harmoniously and efficiently, but would 
encourage agricultural development and cultural progress. 
This Governor, the Earl of Dalhousie, made many enemies and 
no converts, and from the ashes of his administration rose a 
new imperial initiative, generated not only by his failure 
but by new social conditions and political alignments in 
Britain itself. 
From 1828 to 1836 successive British ministries worked 
to create a coalition of leading colonists, including eminent 
Canadiens, through whom the Governor could manage the 
colony. This effort in the thirties, the subject of Part 
III, showed the British government was prepared to abandon 
its inefficient agents during the twenties, the colonial 
bureaucracy, and instead to court the principal Assemblymen. 
Administrative reforms mollified many of the colonial 
leaders, but rapid immigration stirred the deepest suspicions 
of the Canadiens, especially since the burgeoning British 
communities in the colony applauded the individuals who 
demanded the sorts of social and economic change which the 
French feared most. Neither administrative reform nor 
emigration provided the steadying influence British 
politicians expected, and by the end of 1836 the Cabinet was 
covertly preparing constitutional changes to curtail the 
influence of the Canadiens. Historians have given this period 
of compromise much of the attention it merits, but once 
again it is the areas which seemed most important to 
advancing British aims which have had least scrutiny. The 
- 11 - 
political activities of the colony's "British" party, both 
in the province and through emissaries to London, is 
important, fascinating, and almost wholly unexplored. The 
quick growth of the British community is usually noted only 
in terms of statistics and not in the context of social 
change, and surprisingly little has been written about the 
British American Land Company, which was a cardinal grievance 
to the popular leaders, and a source of hope and encouragement 
to their rivals. 
5 
In the next phase, from 1837 to 1841, Britain embarked 
on a daring, reactionary course of assuming that the mass of 
the French Canadians were for the time being not fit to 
participate in government under free institutions. The 
Canadian rebellions of 1837-38, coinciding so nearly with 
the crisis following abolition of slavery in the West Indies, 
reinforced an impatience in Parliament and in Britain 
generally with the existence of social and political conditions 
in the colonies which would not have been tolerated at home. 
Parliament reacted to the rebellion by suspending Lower 
Canada's constitution. Imperial aims were to be entrusted 
to the 'loyal' elite, which largely meant the British elite, 
but with far closer supervision from the Colonial Office 
and Parliament itself than in the period before 1828. 
Paradoxically, the activities of government and its colonial 
agents in this period are among the least studied of the 
era. Historians sympathetic to the elite gloss over this 
stage when its power was most naked and unpopular; students 
of self-government and of electoral politics find, the 
period a wasteland. The concurrent proceedings in England 
to prepare a new constitution for both Canadas have drawn 
attention away from internal colonial events. So apart 
from Lord Durham's mission and a handful of specific issues 
like the abolition of seigneurial tenure in Montreal, 6 the 
legislative history of Lower Canada during the rebellion 
years has almost escaped attention. Part IV of this thesis 
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will concern itself with the most important aspects of this 
period which provided the transition between two stages of 
constitutional change. 
iii 
Interleaved with these specific issues, belonging to no 
particular period, was the competition between Britain's 
English-speaking and French-Canadian colonial subjects in 
the St. Lawrence River valley. The resources of this region 
were seen by both groups as vital to the interests of their 
respective nationalities, and the historians of each side 
have depicted a unique social environment structured and 
divided by mutual suspicion and exclusiveness. Conflict 
between the two cultures has often been used as a scapegoat 
for the shortcomings of French-Canadian society. The 
merchant class, predominantly of British origin, is regularly 
accused of two apparently hostile aims towards the Canadiens. 
First, the merchants are accused of wishing to crush every- 
thing that set the Canadiens off as a distinct society. 
Yet the English-speaking businessmen of Lower Canada are 
also accused of trying to keep the Canadiens permanently 
separate and backward as a pool of cheaply exploitable 
labour. The two accusations cannot be simultaneously true, 
for total assimilation is diametrically opposed to a caste 
system. The desire of the British colonists to assimilate 
the Canadiens is well documented though often exaggerated or 
distorted. But as for the other charge, the following pages 
have been written in full agreement with the recent assertion 
of Fernand Ouellet, a prominent French-Canadian historian, 
that in the 1830s "il n'existe pas non plus une coalition du 
gouvernement metropolitain et des entrepreneurs en vue de 
maintenir les Canadiens frangais dans l'inferiorite econo- 
mique et la servitude politique. "7 Ouellet's statement is 
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cautious and negatively framed -- the remarkable thing is 
that it needed to be made at all. 
Historians nowadays realize that the struggle between 
autonomists and centralists in the 1820s and thirties can no 
longer be discussed in terms of whether the Canadiens were 
feudal and at bottom disloyal, or whether the British 
attitude was domineering and rooted in disrespect for liberty. 
It is generally realized that political partisanship was 
deeply entwined with the French-Canadian preoccupation with 
survivance, while the British colonists, as contemporaries 
pointed out, were interested in assimilation largely because 
they thought survivance incompatible with economic stability 
and progress. One debate concerns just what survivance is. 
For almost a century after the attainment of local self- 
government in 1849, French-Canadian historians lauded as a 
great achievement of the Canadien national will, the survival 
of the French language and Catholic religion, the Canadiens' 
continuing possession of the great mass of Quebec's farmland, 
and the preservation of the distinctive traditional civil 
law. This mood of self-congratulation was undermined by 
historians more conscious of economic considerations, and in 
1957 Michel Brunet wrote that the survival of an indentifiably 
French society on the banks of the St. Lawrence was no more 
than a normal and predictable sociological fact. Inertia 
alone defeated the feeble forces of linguistic and cultural 
assimilation. He argued further that assimilation, for a 
society as for an individual, is the loss of freedom to act 
by oneself. The survivance of a society is "la mesure oil 
eile conserve un minimum de liberte d'action collective 
coordonnee, constante, et dynamique. " By this criterion, 
French Canada was assimilated, partly in 1763, totally by 
1849.8 
Despite the vigour of this modern school of thought, 
the rustic optimism of the nationalists survives in the 
writings of some historians, chiefly of British origin. 
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W. G. Ormsby wrote as recently as 1969 that social change 
after 1841 was sweeping, but not assimilative. "It was 
accomplished without the sacrifice of any of French Canada's 
basic values. "9 Such dogmatism begs many questions, chiefly 
by assuming that the values lost were not basic ones. To 
make this assumption Ormsby must gloss over not only the 
soul-searching of Brunet, but the vociferation with which 
many young leaders in the fifties linked their efforts to 
those of the great leader of an earlier era, Papineau, in 
repudiating the compromises made by LaFontaine and his 
colleagues in the forties. But what is more important, the 
continuing debate on what survived invites a thorough re- 
examination of more fundamental questions -- what was 
threatened, by whom, and for what local and imperial reasons? 
Scrutiny of this question also invites an equally 
careful examination of a more neglected facet of colonial 
politics, namely the desire of some colonists to reconcile 
their British nationality as far as possible with the desires 
of their provincial compatriots. One may still trace a 
genuine desire to sooth racial hostility by creating alongside 
the British and Protestant structures catering to the new 
colonists, a set of new parallel structures for French 
Canada. This tendency ought not to be exaggerated, but was 
nonetheless important; the idea of cultural dualism flowered 
in Lower Canada in strange places for complicated reasons. 
The idea that the habitants should be allowed to retain 
their distinctive language, religion and culture, and that 
the social and economic elite should be recruited from both 
races, was after all the basis of British policy before 1791 
and it underlay the effective working of colonial self- 
government after the reunion of Upper and Lower Canada in 
1841.10 It would therefore be naive to suppose that princi- 
ple extinct between 1791 and 1841. In Britain itself, 
tolerance of Canadian cultural dualism seems to have been 
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stronger than is often represented, and there were always 
severe doubts about the practicability as well as the 
desireability of full assimilation. So it is important to 
decipher the progress and influence of the idea of cultural 
dualism as a factor in the development of British aims in 
Lower Canada. 
The interplay of British colonists and imperial interests 
in Lower Canada in the 21 years after 1820 is therefore a 
subject whose individual parts deserve fresh attention. The 
administrative structure of the colony; the administration 
of land and immigration policies; the development of political 
movements among the colony's English-speaking population, 
and the relations between those who looked to England, and 
those who looked to a French colonial past for a sense of 
nationality -- these are all interesting themes in the devel- 
opment of the British empire which have been approached by 
historians selectively, sketchily, or not at all. What 
draws these themes together is their common tendency to 
illustrate the importance of membership in the empire to 
groups whose pride in British origin made them, as one of 
them said, a "minority under very peculiar circumstances" 
within a troubled province of the empire. 
11 
A French minority in British North America, and a 
British minority in one province -- these were the ingredients 
of the most violent episodes of Canada's internal history, 
yet they put Lower Canada in the fore in the peaceful 
attainment of self-government in the "second empire". 
Superficially it has seemed that Britain gave the Canadiens 
(and their Upper Canadian allies) peacefully in 1849 the 
same thing they had rebelled for a decade earlier. Men 
hounded for treason in 1837-38 were one by one elected to the 
provincial parliament or appointed to offices under the 
Crown; exiles were pardoned and allowed to return, and at 
length the Legislature passed the Rebellion Losses Bill. 
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The debate on this measure turned into an elaborate justifi- 
cation of the rebellion, as old reformers boasted of their 
opposition to Britain in the thirties and one recent 
convert, once high in the Bank of Montreal, declared that he 
wished he had fought for the rebels instead of against them. 
12 
The traditional friends of the imperial connexion were out- 
raged and frightened; angry mobs stoned the Governor-General 
and burnt the provincial Parliament. But instead of a new 
uprising, the troubles of 1849 ushered in decades of mellow 
tranquillity. William Gladstone, who led an abortive 
campaign to have the Bill disallowed at home, said in 1855 
that "we were obliged to put our dignity in our pockets on 
that occasion., 
13 
Perhaps by 1855 only dignity seemed to 
have been at stake; but though the Bill itself was innoous, 
the rhetoric used to pass it struck at the legitimacy of 
everything done in Lower Canada by and on behalf of the 
Empire for a dozen years. 
iv 
Historians have been deeply impressed by this apparent 
confirmation of the legitimacy of the rebel cause, but have 
been far from unanimous in defining the roots of the original 
conflict. Some have followed the earliest major historian 
of the "Late Province of Lower Canada", Robert Christie, in 
ascribing the troubles to "prejudices of-national origin" on 
both sides. 
14 
This analysis has had more appeal to subse- 
quent French-Canadian historians than to those writing in 
English; the notion of conflict based on race-prejudice 
tasted too bitter for the palates of Anglo-Canadians. They 
tended to concentrate on two other determining factors, the 
triumph of liberal ideology, and economic development. 
During this century most histories of the controversy were 
written in what Canadian historiography has termed the 
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"whig" tradition, a narrative of the struggle between 
liberty and oligarchy in which liberty ultimately triumphed, 
not actually over British interests, but over obstructions 
British statesmen raised before they were wise enough to 
perceive where those interests really lay. The chief weakness 
of this tradition is that it is apt to blur the picture of 
the extremes to which the reformers in the 1830s were prepared 
to go, and to exaggerate the defeat of the old oligarchies 
by popular power in the 1840s. The strongest rival to the 
"whig" tradition emerged in 1937 in Donald Creighton's 
Commercial Empire of the Saint Lawrence. Creighton presented 
economic development, not constitutional liberty as the 
great bequest of the nineteenth century to the twentieth. 
In this view the imperial centralists, as progressive 
capitalists, are the heroes while the parochial agriculturalists, 
suspicious of commerce and of public debt, are the 
villains. But Creighton, like the "whigs", did not lift his 
sights beyond the economic and political watershed of the 
late 1840s, and he consequently confirmed the old view of who 
were the winners, and who the losers, in the struggle for 
control of the St. Lawrence basin. Creighton, moreover, 
forgot Butterfield's dictum that one does not write balanced 
history simply by adding the speech for the defence to that 
of the prosecution. 
15 
The historians of responsible 
government had expounded on the political wickedness of the 
British colonial bureaucrats; Creighton took up the other 
theme of Lord Durham's Report, the economic stupidity of the 
French Canadians. But Creighton rejected both racial and 
ideological explanations of the root of the troubles. 
Creighton, like Durham, overstated the racial homogeneity of 
the two economic schools in the colony, and detected economic 
determinism lurking behind a facade of racial and ideological 
rhetoric. Creighton generalized with breath-taking audacity, 
and superficial accuracy, that the struggle for control of 
the pace and direction of social change was "an expression 
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of a fundamental divergence in the attitudes of the French 
Canadians and their opponents. The French Canadians... were 
in most essential respects Frenchmen of the ancien regime; 
the British... were typical products of the age of the 
industrial revolution and of laissez faire. "16 In keeping 
with this interpretation, the Commercial Empire virtually 
ignored British radical businessmen like James Leslie and 
John Neilson, and a host of French-Canadian capitalists. 
Creighton identified national origin too closely with economic 
thought, and thereby failed to demonstrate the processes 
which made it possible for capitalists to co-operate with the 
Canadiens after 1841. 
None of these approaches -- racial, ideological, or 
economic -- leads to an irresistible judgement on the 
contemporary issue -- which colonial party ought legitimately 
to have governed? Was British rule immoral, or merely 
clumsy? Was canadien resistance to that rule laudable, or 
tragically misdirected? Historians' concentration on 
ideological themes has largely supported the devolutionists 
against the centralists, for it is difficult for anyone 
raised in the twentieth century to feel much instinctive 
sympathy with the prescriptive arguments used by the imperial 
centralists. The latter's viewpoint received its first 
sensitive modern treatment as long ago as 1922 in an article 
by K. L. P. Martin, who argued that responsible government as 
achieved in 1849 was more nearly democratic than anything 
that had existed in England when Durham wrote his Report. 
Popular power was not legitimized first in Britain and then 
belatedly in Canada; it was the gradual-erosion of royal 
power in Britain that made responsible government possible 
in Canada. 17 Historians of Martin's generation were less 
impressed by his argument than by the economic one, that the 
growth of free trade ideas made Britain indifferent to the 
retention of traditional prescriptive powers in the North 
American colonies. 
18 
But Martin's point was revived in 1976 
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by John Ward, whose Colonial Self-Government provided a wealth 
of detail surrounding the movements which Martin traced in 
outline. Ward organized his narrative around the gradual 
ascendance of what he called the principle of "representation" 
over the principle of prescription. This analysis is likely 
to be accepted as part of the context in which responsible 
government was peacefully achieved, rather than as the root 
cause of the achievement. 
19 But Ward's seeming lack of curi- 
osity about the political ideas of the British centralists in 
Lower Canada unmasks his reluctance to pursue some of the 
important ramifications of conflicting theories of legitimacy. 
These may be summarized briefly: the old prescriptive 
constitution already contained a representative branch, 
which itself enjoyed rights by prescription. The property 
interests which sought and received representation in 
Britain in 1832 were similar to the interests which were 
disenfranchised in Lower Canada because that colony had a 
democratic rather than a whiggish franchise. Prescription 
was not absolute in Britain before 1832, and representation 
thereafter was a feeble counterpart to the North American 
version. In Lower Canada, indeed, ideological debates were 
more likely to take on French or American hues than to 
clothe themselves in purely British colours, and it is more 
profitable to talk of prescription vying not with represen- 
tation but with the less ambiguous entity, popular sovereignty. 
But D. G. Creighton's work, so hostile to the patriote 
exponents of popular sovereignty, is nonetheless no defence of 
prescription. Nor is this surprising; the nineteenth century 
was concerned with theories of the provenance of rights and 
liberties; the middle part of the twentieth was more concerned 
with economics and efficiency. 
20 By the time Creighton 
wrote, a government could call itself legitimate not only by 
elective mandate or ancient prescription, but merely on 
pragmatic grounds, reduced to the lowest common denominator 
in the saying "He made the trains run on time. " Creighton's 
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work reveals a little of the same spirit -- Peter McGill and 
George Moffatt would make the trains run on time in a province 
where Papineau would not encourage them to run at all. No 
doubt Creighton would repudiate such an idea as the basis of 
a political philosophy, but the uneven balance between 
economic and constitutional argument in his book helps 
explain why modern scholars have rarely echoed Creighton's 
sympathetic treatment of the Montreal business class. 
Nonetheless the writing of Canadian history has been deeply 
influenced by Creighton's economic perspective. In French 
Canada especially, the debate continues: did the centralists 
or the autonomists have the better plans for Lower Canada's 
economic future? 
21 Such purely economic analysis lies 
beyond this study, but it is important to recognize Creighton's 
major point, that some of the discussion of legitimacy in 
Lower Canada was based on pragmatism, which subordinated and 
manipulated abstract political theory. This does not, 
however, mean that such theories were worthless, or that 
they were universally linked to self-interest. Moreover, it 
will be argued that cultural conflict was aggravated by the 
linking of pragmatism with liberal ideology, as well as by 
the traditional links between economic interests and pres- 
criptive political theories. while the debate over legitimacy 
is not construed as the determining factor in the troubles 
of the era, it will be explored in greater detail than 
previous writers have thought worthwhile. 
V 
Three basic aims underlay British policy in Lower 
Canada in the period 1820-41: possession of Canada was 
important to British defence; it was advantageous to British 
trade; and it offered a way to settle British emigrants 
within the empire, where they were not lost to the Crown as 
- 21 - 
subjects or to the manufacturers as customers. There was a 
broadly-based conviction that the Canadas were economically 
too primitive to be anything but colonies, and that if 
Britain lost them they would be drawn irresistibly to the 
United States or, in a more far-fetched view, back to France. 
This gave an expedient legitimacy to the British presence in 
Lower Canada to complement the prescriptive legitimacy 
unequivocally bestowed by the Treaty of Versailles by which 
France in 1763 ceded Canada to Great Britain. The pursuit 
of imperial aims in Lower Canada was rarely arbitrary, 
though frequently insensitive. There is a continuous thread 
from 1763 down to 1849 of efforts to rule the colonists 
through their own natural leaders. Even such benevolent 
intentions could founder on Britain's misunderstanding of 
who those natural leaders were. Popularity alone was never 
considered sufficient evidence of leadership, and there was 
a distressing but understandable tendency in Britain to 
assume that the colonists who were best disposed to Britin 
were the natural leaders, however small or shabby a group 
they might at certain periods be. 
There was nothing inherently vicious in the Lower 
Canadian constitution. Ridicule was heaped upon the system 
in the thirties by Lord Durham and the 'colonial reformers' 
who called representative government without responsible 
ministers equivalent to a fireplace without a chimney. But 
in some colonies like New Brunswick most influential elements 
in the population pulled in the same direction and constitut- 
ions similar to that of Lower Canada worked tolerably well. 
The Governox's office differed radically from that of the 
American president in only one essential respect: the 
Governor was never chosen by the people. But most of British 
opinion and many colonists regarded his responsibility to a 
power outside the colony as perfectly natural. Lower Canada 
had municipal self-government within the greater British 
nation, and (before 1832) its half-million people might be 
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considered to be virtually represented in Parliament in 
roughly the same way as numerous English town-dwellers. 
Lower Canada's relation to Britain was more nearly parasitic 
than symbiotic. Canada relied on British capital for 
development, on British tariffs for a market, and on British 
taxes for defence and major public works. It was very much 
to the point to inquire how Britain should be represented 
in the provincial regime in proportion to the amount of 
colonial expenditure her taxpayers provided. The answer lay 
in having an executive responsible to the British government, 
and a distinguished Legislative Council which could see at 
first hand the needs of the colony without being blind to 
the interests of broader imperial policy. These were the 
corner-stones of the imperial presence in Lower Canada before 
1841; but they were intended to support an edifice of 
constructive interaction between the executive and all the 
powerful and influential elements in colonial society. 
The early policy was to enlist the support of the 
clergy and the well-to-do seigneurial class, two groups who 
were thought to enjoy the confidence of the people and who, 
by judicious imperial protection of their property rights, 
religious observances and civil law, were generally averse 
before 1820 to opposing the government publicly. This was a 
plausible policy, for the seigneurs at least were an element 
in which conservative social views were linked to an under- 
lying disposition to let economic interests dominate public 
affairs; as for the clergy, it was broadly assumed throughout 
Europe and America, among both protestants and Catholics, 
that Roman Catholicism was a buttress to hierarchical as 
opposed to popular institutions. 22 But the imperial policy 
of supporting the traditional canadien elites alienated the 
second group who might have been considered natural leaders, 
the merchants. These were mainly incomers, generally 
Scottish, who had taken the places of French merchants who 
left after 1763, and who out-traded many of those who 
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remained. 
23 The merchants resented the retention of a 
commercial law which was unfamiliar to them, they considered 
the seigneurial tenure an obstacle to the free flow of 
capital through investment in land and mortgages, and they 
wished to see new taxes levied on property rather than on 
trade. About 1807 the policy of the administration at 
Quebec shifted towards appeasement of this group, whose 
importance swelled with the growth of the colonial timber 
trade during the Napoleonic blockade of Baltic ports. From 
about 1812 merchants were installed in increasing numbers in 
the Executive and Legislative Councils, and even in the 
bureaucratic offices which had hitherto been given to 
Canadiens or British-born friends of the ministries at home. 
But increasingly after 1807 the colonial electorate began to 
produce its own leaders from outside the traditional classes 
favoured by Britain. They were chiefly lawyers and notaries, 
deeply interested in the agrarian economy which still 
dominated huge parts of Lower Canada, and indifferent or 
even hostile to trade. By 1815 at the latest the colony 
probably had enough educated professional men that it could 
have afforded to follow the growing British practice of 
satisfying ambition by rotating men in the highest offices. 
Unfortunately the "outs" in the colony often seemed more 
gauche and irresponsible than the "ins" (who were their 
equals if not their superiors in wealth and education. ) 
Furthermore, imperial administrators and even Governors were 
apt to underestimate the size of the pool of talent; and in 
Britain itself the distinction between secure civil service 
appointments and insecure political ones had not yet been 
clearly drawn, even up to the level of cabinet office. 
24 So 
during the first half of the twenties prior support for the 
colonial executive become a test of a candidate's fitness 
for office, and a core of hardened anti-bureaucrats grew in 
the Assembly and the liberal professions. It was to this 
group that ministries after 1828 addressed themselves, 
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recognizing the professionals as a group of natural leaders 
and trying to enlist them by patronage and administrative 
reforms into support for the imperial government and its 
relatively modest aims. 
It is worth stressing that these aims were, indeed, 
quite modest. Ill-advised efforts had been made in the 
early years of the French revolutionary wars to abrogate 
seigneurial tenure and even to undermine the Catholic Church 
by establishing Protestant schools, but on the whole these 
gestures by local zealots received little countenance from 
Britain and if the Governor acted against the survivance of 
local customs, he was likely to lose in the effort the 
support of either the imperial authorities, as in 1810, or 
of the local bureaucracy, as in 1823-5. Survivance was 
considered at worst a transitory phenomenon which economic 
forces would erode, and at best a positive aspect of the 
Canadiens' hatred for the Americans and consequent dependence 
on Britain. Some sort of dependence was taken for granted. 
The tendency was strong in the colony to regard self-government 
as far-fetched, and the same attitude was general in Britain, 
though it waned with time. Early in 1828, a young official 
at the Foreign Office proposed Canadian self-government to 
the British Minister in Washington, but did so with apparent 
certainty that his ideas would earn him a rebuke. 
The real policy in Canada should be to open their 
institutions as much as possible, and press on the 
moment of their entire independence on Gt. Britain.... 
A Colony like Canada must in due time attain its 
majority, and escape from the Controul of the 
Mother Country; and the more we stimulate its 
advances to puberty, the better will its inhabi- 
tants be affected towards us, when the moment of 
its emancipation arises.... 
Does this sound like high treason and lese 
politique to you? 
25 
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It would be difficult to find, in that era, from so 
responsible a source, so strong an endorsement of colonial 
self-government; yet within a decade the same sentiments 
were being expressed by the permanent undersecretary at the 
Colonial Office. In 1836 James Stephen wrote, dissecting a 
delicate question with bureaucratic finesse: 
They are already assuming a distinct national char- 
acter; and the day cannot be far remote when an 
Independence, first real, and then avowed, will 
take the place of the present subjection of these 
Provinces to the British Crown.... A forecasting 
Policy would appear to suggest that provision 
should be deliberately, though of course unavow- 
edly, made for the peaceful and honourable 
abdication of a power, which ere long it will 
be impossible to retain; and for raising up on 
the North American Continent a counterpoise to 
the United States. 26 
About the same time Lord Palmerston raised the same 
question in Cabinet and "expressed the opinion which... was... 
generally acquiesced in that our great object ought to be to 
prevent a contest which would bring disgrace and defeat upon 
us and not to dream of keeping the connectn forever. " Yet 
this general agreement amongst ministers produced only 
instructions to the Governor to continue his efforts to get 
a consensus in favour of policies the government had pursued 
since 1828. But after 1836, views changed rapidly as the 
rebellions provided the occasion for creating an Assembly 
with a British majority, and the prospects of war with the 
United states faded because of two key boundary settlements 
in 1842 and 1846. By 1850 an important British financier, 
Thomas Baring, was advising Lord Grey that nothing could be 
more disadvantageous to the colony than its existing 
constitutional limbo. European investors had more confidence 
in American securities simply because the United States were 
divorced from Europe: 
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As long as Canada is a colony of Great Britain 
there can be no confidence that the Colony will 
not be directly or indirectly affected by the 
influence of the policy of the mother country.... 
I do not know of a single instance of investment 
for foreigners in Canadian securities of any 
description, and all feel that tho' a separation 
from Great Britain or annexation to the United 
States might not endanger property in Canada and 
might even perhaps increase its value the state 
of transition would involve much doubt & create 
considerable anxiety. These feelings & fears 
act on English as well as foreign capitalists and 
certainly the British government does little or 
nothing to remove them. "27 
But Baring was writing after a dozen years' turmoil in the 
Canadas and recent upheaval in Europe. Up to the mid-1830s, 
few would have been found on either side of the Atlantic, 
apart from the patriotes and some Upper Canadian reformers, 
to dispute the wisdom of John Neilson's editorial comment in 
the Quebec Gazette early in 1833, that colonies biting the 
apple of independence would awake like Adam and Eve and find 
themselves naked. 
28 
The first aim of British policy in Canada was defence. 
The Duke of Wellington summarized this neatly: "it is 
impossible for His Majesty's Government to withdraw from 
these Dominions. Whether valuable or otherwise, which can 
scarcely be a Question, the Honor of the Country would 
require that they should be defended in War. " At the 
opposite pole in politics, John Arthur Roebuck sang a 
strikingly similar tune. The Americans, Roebuck wrote, must 
not be allowed to absorb British North America, for then the 
United States would be 
too powerful to be just - no matter how wisely 
fashioned may be her institutions, how just her 
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laws, her citizens are human beings, and they 
like the rest of mankind when so powerful as to 
be above responsibility, will quickly be tyran- 
nical.... Give this nation the navigation of the 
St. Lawrence, sketch their dominion over the 
whole or nearly the whole of... N. America, and 
they will while unapproachable themselves be able 
with deadly efficiency to attack and to injure 
the rest of the world. Create a check to this 
power by still making the St. Lawrence the 
frontier of its dominions and by laying the 
foundations of a northern confederation of states, 
formed of our present North American possessions, 
and you give mankind the best human guarantee for 
the moderation and peaceful habits of the United 
States. The time must come, I do not say that 
it is come when our present colonies will be inde- 
pendent states - and on our conduct now will 
decide whether they are to be added to the already 
too formidable United States, or form another and 
separate confederation. 
29 
Commercial interests connected with the Canadas were 
also influential during the period under study, though not 
powerful enough to preserve the system of preferential 
tariffs past the 1840s. Nonetheless they delayed adverse 
changes, and on occasion advised on Canadian politics, 
especially in 1822 and in the second half of the thirties. 
These merchants were chiefly the importers of colonial grain 
and timber, and the suppliers of manufactured goods to a 
colony of about half a million people with almost no manufac- 
tures. The traders were able to point out that the Canadians, 
per capita, consumed far more British goods than the Americans 
with their high tariffs; and the timber interests of Quebec 
and New Brunswick managed in 1820-21 and 1835 to beat off 
two strong attempts to improve the competitive position of 
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Baltic timber in the British market. The parliamentary 
committee on foreign trade in 1821 combined a general 
endorsement of free trade with a tacit acceptance of the 
status quo in the timber trade; and along with the closely- 
related shipping interests, the colonial timber merchants 
successfully propagated the view that emigration to Canada 
and Canadian importation of British manufactures depended 
entirely on preferential treatment of colonial wood; similarly, 
the landed interest and the advocates of cheap grain could 
not destroy the preference enjoyed by colonial over foreign 
corn down to 1846. A third important interest was created 
in the 1820s when the chartering of the Canada Company to 
deal in Upper Canadian lands, and the establishment of the 
Welland Canal with its enormous borrowing requirements created 
a class of specifically Canadian shares and debentures 
trading on the London market, a branch of the colonial 
economy which became important through a British-guaranteed 
loan in the 1840s and with the mushrooming of railway 
companies later in the same decade. 
30 
From these passages on defence and trade it becomes 
clear that British interests in the Canadas were largely 
defensive but also constructive, held together by sentiment, 
tradition, and advantage. Sentiment was strongest in the 
third sphere of interest, emigration. In this area, even 
more than in defence, the emotional quality of British 
attitudes towards the Canadas showed clearly. Englishmen 
like William Huskisson felt the colonies provided an oppor- 
tunity for Britain to redeem her American failure in 1783 by 
stimulating the trade and settlement and British characteris- 
tics of her remaining colonies in North America. 
Contemplate the possibility of another set of 
provinces, emancipated from commercial thraldom, 
but firmly maintaining their political connexion -- 
their commercial marine a part of our commercial 
marine -- their seamen a part of our seamen -- 
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their population a part of our strength. --Consider 
whether it would not be worth while to attempt a 
course which promises, both to those provinces and 
to the mother country, all the commercial benefits 
of a free trade, together with all the political 
advantages of our continuing parts of one great 
empire, and enjoying alike, under the sway and 
protection of the same sovereign, all the rights 
and privileges of British subjects. 
Many traditional preoccupations about emigration were 
present in that speech -- concern about keeping Britain's 
flag flying and her merchant vessels trading wherever 
British subjects went -- but the emotion in Huskisson's 
remarks was as evident as the strategic common sense. 
31 
To 
other observers, emigration was necessary -- let it therefore 
be an adventure. Wordsworth proclaimed the destiny of the 
English people to reproduce rapidly and fill new lands. 
So the wide waters, open to the power, 
The will, the instincts, and appointed needs 
Of Britain, do invite her to cast off 
Her swarms; and in succession send them forth 
Bound to establish new communities 
On every shore whose aspect favours hope 
Or bold adventure; promising to skill 
And perseverance, their deserved reward. 
And Robert Wilmot Horton, emigration enthusiast par excellence, 
envisaged in 1831 the redundant population of rural England 
transported to the wilderness of Lower Canada and set down, 
in their original groups, in new Canadian villages bearing 
the old English names. To many writers on emigration, 
especially those who had never been to the colonies, English 
village life of the eighteenth century was a social ideal 
which could be reproduced in Canada, leaving the original 
model revitalized by the removal of excess population. 
Britain, Canada, and the world were expected to benefit 
almost immeasurably. 
32 
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vi 
These imperial aims, pressed by different commercial, 
military, political and social bodies in Britain, added up 
to a policy with which colonists could at least for the time 
being collaborate without sacrificing their own interest. 
The details of some imperial plans might be impracticable, 
but there was nothing inherently oppressive in the objectives. 
Not all the colonial public revenues were at the disposal of 
the elected legislature, but Parliamentary grants for 
defence and defence-related public works outstripped the 
total of local taxes, at least on annual average during the 
1820s and 1830s. There was no serious local campaign for 
free trade (and none for protection of native manufactures) 
and the province's resource-based economy would have shrunk 
without the reciprocal tariff preferences. Canadien 
opposition to immigration, weak between 1808 and 1828 in any 
case, was based on ethnic and not on demographic consideration, 
for much of the present-day farmland of Quebec was still 
unoccupied in 1840. To British observers, imperial aims 
seemed more likely to conflict with each other than with the 
good of the colonists. The Duke of Wellington struck a 
warning note on assisted emigration in 1826: 
I do not consider it necessary for the defence of 
the colonies of North America to encourage emigra- 
tion to them. I believe they are now sufficiently 
peopled to be able, if encouraged [and assisted by 
this country]... to defend themselves.... But if 
we look forward to the result of the natural course 
of events, consequent upon an encouraged and there- 
fore a premature and forced emigration to the North 
American colonies, we shall find among them an 
early and large increase of the population of the 
country, a recourse to manufacturing industry as a 
means of subsistence for a portion of that popula- 
tion, and an impatience of the subjection and 
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control of the mother country. 
33 
Slow development was better than reckless development. 
A similar note on a slightly different theme was struck by 
the diplomatist Stratford Canning, in a letter of 1822 
warning Horton against too hasty an attempt to change the 
province's French characteristics. Why, Canning asked, did 
Horton imagine that merging the Canadiens 
with the mass of the population, would be 
ultimately beneficial to British Interests? The 
french Canadians have frequently given proof of 
their loyalty, their prejudiced reluctance to give 
up the present system with its various clogs on 
property secures them from the modern spirit of 
innovation; their attachment to the language & 
customs, of the country from which they sprung, 
though tending to keep them apart from the English, 
has the effect of making them still more averse to 
their Anglo-American neighbours. Destroy them as 
a separate influence, and with these advantages 
you lose whatever resources they may afford at any 
future period for keeping in check the mixed & 
loose population of British origin.... In spite 
of what you hear from sub-official quarters, I 
never can believe that it is for our interest to 
treat la nation canadienne as a conquered people. 
34 
This was a classic statement of the military and diploma- 
tic view of the preceding half-century, and it epitomized 
the imperial authorities' reluctance to govern the colonists 
against the grain of their own feelings. This British 
complaisance provides the main reason why in this study the 
terms "collaborators" and "non-collaborators" have been 
avoided. They assume an integrated imperial purpose that 
was lacking in Lower Canada before 1841. Colonists, almost 
without exception, were collaborators with the imperial 
authority to the extent that all supported a paramount aim 
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of British policy, depriving the United States of the 
northern half of the continent they shared. But there was 
ample room for disagreement on how that strategic aim could 
best be defended, for the local majority in one province 
argued that autonomy was the best route to strength. On 
this point the Canadiens differed vitally with the majority 
of British North Americans, who believed military security 
was pointless without commercial strength, and therefore 
championed the central authority of the empire. From the 
imperial perspective, the basic problem from 1820 to 1841 in 
Lower Canada was not to find new ways to take unfair advan- 
tage of the colonies' weakness, but to create a regime, a 
socio-economic structure, which would advance the aims of 
British imperialism while remaining, not merely efficient, 
but legitimate in the eyes of both the colonists and the 
politically articulate classes in Britain. 
PART II 
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Chapter 2: Imperial Control and Local Leadership, 1820-1830 
i 
During the 1820s, all parties in Lower Canada claimed to be 
friendly to British interests and institutions. 
1 
The imperial 
authorities reciprocated: they tried to give strong but 
friendly guidance towards social and economic improvements, 
and they cultivated -- at least sporadically -- the good will 
of all elements of colonial society. Some groups responded 
more readily than others to British initiatives. Britain's 
reliance on the traditional elites of Lower Canada -- the 
clergy and the country gentry -- dated from the earliest 
days of British rule and was never formally abandoned by 
the imperial government, but it bore little fruit in the 
twenties, when those elites refused to use their influence 
to help return an Assembly that would co-operate with the 
bureaucracy. The Governors' views did not always mesh with 
those of local or imperial politicians; and there was 
maladroitness, disorganization and outright corruption in 
the colony's administration. The Governor, the Executive 
Council and the judges were targets for intense criticism 
from popular leaders of British as well as French origin. 
Harmony was further disrupted in 1822 when the government 
in London lost patience with the Canadiens' social 
conservatism and flirted with schemes to'increase the power 
of the English-speaking merchants and settlers, as well as 
the colonial executive. 
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ii 
The Roman Catholic clergy, whose property and tithes 
were guaranteed by Britain after the cession of 1763, were 
counted on by the imperial government to act as a main prop of 
the civil and military authorities. There were occasional 
threats against the clergy by headstrong local officials 
during the Napoleonic Wars, but by the 1820s the clergy were 
threatened more by anti-clericalism among their own flock 
than by the British authorities, most of whom felt well-served 
by the clergy's loyalty during two wars with the United 
States. This loyalty seemed to justify leaving the bishop 
with a larger patronage than the Governor. One British 
observer in the colony wrote in 1819 that the government was 
inclined to rely too much on the Church, whose power was 
exaggerated; but another recognized the symbolic importance 
of Catholicism to the mass of French Canadians during the 
election campaign of 1820, when "even those who have no 
religion, join in the Cry, for their national pride, & 
predilictions are aroused" by threatened Protestant 
encroachments. 
2 H. T. Manning has treated in some detail the 
courtship of the Bishop of Quebec, J-0 Plessis, by the 
Colonial Secretary, Lord Bathurst; 3 but her treatment of the 
question left out of account aspects of two main issues after 
1820: primary education, and conflict between the diocese 
and the clergy of the district of Montreal. 
Before 1830, the Royal Institution for the Advancement 
of Learning was the only state educational body; it was 
controlled by Protestants under an Act of the Assembly of 
1801, and was starved of funds by later, more nationalistic 
Assemblies. Fernand Ouellet has sketched some of the 
obstacles to an attack on the province's widespread 
illiteracy: a residual suspicion in some Catholic circles 
that universal education was unnecessary and might be 
dangerous; a shortage of funds in the hands of the Church; 
and a lack of potential teachers. 4 Yet Lord Dalhousie, as 
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Governor, was anxious to encourage Church-controlled Catholic 
primary education, while the liberal nationalist opponents 
of the Church were assisted by Lord Bathurst. Dalhousie, 
Plessis and the Anglican head of the Royal Institution all 
agreed that the Institution was not working against Cath- 
olicism, but all equally realized that its Protestant 
composition made the people suspicious of it, and a thorough 
revision of its managing board, or a division into two 
boards, was overdue. Dalhousie pressed this view on Bathurst 
in 1821: "The Catholic Religion in this Province is certainly 
the most sure defence of it against our Neighbours, and every 
fair encouragement should be given to it in promoting 
Education and Learning. " This remark accompanied a bill 
which had passed the Assembly that year. Bathurst found the 
bill unobjectionable, but. told Plessis that royal assent 
would be withheld, along with the rent for the legislative 
buildings (which the diocese owned) until the civil list 
question was settled. 
5 Dalhousie went to London in 1824 and 
appealed in person for, approval of the still-reserved parish 
schools bill, and also unveiled his plan for dividing the 
Royal Institution. Bathurst still resisted both plans, saying 
they would create powers "too independent of the Crown to be 
safely lodged with a religious persuasion whose unity of 
design always makes the most of any power which is given to 
them. " A final effort by Dalhousie to carry the measure in 
1827 was defeated by the anti-government and anti-clerical 
forces in the Assembly. 
6 
A second source of trouble was the Sulpician seminary 
at Montreal, which was under pressure from both the Bishop 
and the local merchants. The issue with the merchants centred 
on the seminary's right to three seigneuries, including that 
of Montreal. Ownership depended on the order's tenuous claim 
to be a corporation separate from its parent community in 
Paris; if no separate Canadian corporation existed, then 
the seigneuries properly belonged to the Crown. No responsible 
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person proposed to strip the seminary of its income, but many 
merchants at Montreal felt the Crown would be a more congenial 
seigneur, and might abolish seigneurial burdens altogether. 
The matter reached a turning point in 1816, when William 
Fleming, a merchant, erected a windmill and began to grind 
wheat. The seminary sought a judicial order to have the mill 
destroyed as an encroachment on seigneurial rights. During 
eight years of litigation, the best of the colony's lawyers 
were briefed by both sides and eventually the Court of King's 
Bench at Montreal, despite its British-born majority, over- 
ruled Fleming's defence that the Crown was the true seigneur 
of Montreal. Fleming appealed in 1823 to the court of appeal, 
which was the Executive Council at Quebec; it failed to 
reach a verdict, dividing 4-4 in February, 1824. Lieutenant- 
Governor Burton, thought to be a friend of the Canadiens, 
nevertheless voted for Fleming, as did the merchant William 
a*d 
Coltman, Chief Justice Sewell, 1his brother-in-law William 
Smith. Two Canadiens upheld the seminary's rights; so did 
the politically moderate collector of customs, Michael 
Perceval; and so did the Honourable John Richardson. 7 
Richardson was the doyen of Montreal's tory protestant 
merchants, yet in a confrontation between commerce and a 
Catholic seminary, he sided with the priests. How he viewed 
the points of law is difficult to gu%age, but support for the 
Sulpicians was consistent with his political thinking despite 
his Anglican and mercantile connexions. For the seminary 
was a thorn in the side of Bishop Plessis; the community was 
made up almost entirely of French and Irish priests who 
leant towards the Gallican position in church-state relations; 
Plessis, by contrast, was an Ultramontane, trying to use his 
connexion with Rome to slacken the formal links between the 
Roman Catholic Church and the protestant government of Lower 
Canada. Conflict broke out between Plessis and the seminary 
after the former's visit to Rome in 1820. Plessis had 
procured a bishopric in partibus for Jean-Jacques Lartigues. 
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The elevation of this clever young Sulpician, a lawyer by 
training and a cousin of Papineau and Viger, created 
repercussions in both the British protestant community, which 
believed in the dictum "One Governor, one Bishop", and among 
the Sulpicians themselves. They suspected Plessis and 
Lartigues of plotting the latter's succession to both the 
Bishop of Quebec and the superior of the seminary, exting- 
uishing the seminary's separate existence, enlarging the 
property of the Diocese, and ensuring that future priests 
would receive an Ultramontane training. This last point 
was of deep interest to the government, and when Lartigues 
was forbidden to live at the seminary because he had accepted 
the bishopric of Telmesse without his superior's permission, 
a public squabble resulted which allowed Richardson to show 
his colours. A quarrel between the seminary and Lartigues 
over the use of churches led to the construction of the 
magificent new church of St. Jacques; John Richardson's 
financial contribution to the building fund was a matter of 
public remark. 
8 
Lartigues also provoked resentment among priests under 
his charge by a punctilious insistence on his episcopal 
dignities which brought to a head the feud between Plessis 
and some of the older country priests. From the beginning 
of 1823 the dissident priests encouraged the Governor to 
believe that a majority of the clergy wished to rely on the 
government for protection from the Bishop; their spokesman, 
M. Chabouillez of Longueuil, convinced Dalhousie in a long 
interview in September, 1823, that many of the clergy 
"anxiously but secretly wish that Govt would require their 
induction" to benefices under dormant terms of an ordinance 
of 1722. Plessis reputedly was reluctant to induct cures, 
preferring to send priests into parishes as missionaries, 
thereby retaining the right to move them about and to assign 
parts of their tithes to other parishes or to general diocesan 
purposes. Dalhousie felt Plessis did not misuse his power; 
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but he was old and infirm, and his successor might be less 
fair. Another small eruption occurred win 1824 when Lartigues 
refused to confirm children in parishes whose priests had 
opposed him, and the cure of St. Phillippe published his own 
and his parishioners' protests. 
9 It is not surprising that 
Dalhousie, Sewell and Richardson were tempted to fish in 
these troubled waters. But Bathurst was sceptical, and 
supported the Bishop's right over induction with one hand 
while sabotaging with the other Dalhousie's search for a good 
understanding with the church over primary schooling. This 
conflict between the Governor and the Colonial Office soured 
for the time being the traditional policy of trying to reach 
the sympathies of the people through the co-operation of the 
clergy. 
The government was no more successful in reaching the 
people through the declining seigneurial class. The wealth 
required to buy a seigneury could seldom be maintained through 
income from land alone. Seigneuries tended to change hands 
fairly frequently, and by 1800 many of the most important 
seigneuries and fiefs were in the hands of the Church, the 
Crown, or the British inhabitants. One French Canadian 
merchant who managed to buy a seigneury outlined for 
Dalhousie's successor the decline of government influence in 
the countryside. The executive, wrote Toussaint Pothier, 
could have checked the decline by employing more of these 
local aristocrats, who instead became discontented at seeing 
their social inferiors -- Loyalist placemen and upstart 
opportunists -- put into the best-paying posts of the bureau- 
cracy. Too loyal to court popularity through opposition, and 
too poor and mortified to be ardent supporters of the govern- 
ment, the old seigneurial families simply faded into 
insignificance. 
10 
The picture was over-drawn, but accurate in parts. In 
places where the seigneur was a non-entity or was regarded 
by the habitants as a foreigner, influence tended to pass to 
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the priest, notary and doctor, who were often drawn from the 
people and were distinguished from them only by their 
education. These professional groups largely chose and 
provided the membership of the House of Assembly, and by the 
1820s it was the Assemblymen, not the executive, who con- 
trolled patronage in the other great focus of popular leader- 
ship, the militia. 
11 Much has been written about the social 
influence of senior officers of the militia, but this 
influence extended only to officers who already met the 
other requirements for acceptance as social leaders. If an 
officer was already part of the rural elite his commission 
might make him as powerful as the local priest. But there 
was no magic in the commission itself, as Dalhousie found 
when he tried to dismiss non-resident officers in 1827; this 
lesson was even more forcibly brought home to the executive 
when Dalhousie in 1828 and Lord Gosford in 1837 purged the 
militia of anti-British officers. 
12 In Lower Canada humble 
birth was no bar to popular leadership and broad social 
influence, and if the government was to create a political 
elite to rival the one Papineau led, it had to do more than 
give salaried offices to the inheritors of respectable 
surnames. It had to locate and promote talented individuals 
before they became locked into systematic hostility to the 
administration. Such a selection was a task for which the 
local executive was wholly inadequate. 
iii 
The focus of the formal British presence in the colony 
was therefore not the semi-established churches or the great 
landowners, but the bureaucracy. In the thirties it became 
fashionable to point to the Legislative Council as the 
defender of the interests of Britain and the English-speaking 
colonists, but in the twenties this role belonged to the 
executive. Executive officers were to a great extent care- 
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takers; they had little to do with anything that was 
innovative or creative in the colony. Important strides were 
being taken in public works by the imperial authorities 
directly, by-passing the local officials, and by private 
enterprise, and even by the parsimonious Assembly, but until 
1840 there was no executive department to plan or supervise 
these ventures. Out of 160 officers in the Blue Book for 
1821 more than half -- 69 -- were in the legal and judicial 
departments, 15 were directly involved in collecting the 
public revenue, and 20 were employed by the two houses of the 
legislature. The remaining 56 included the Governor and his 
entourage of clerks and assistants, the ten Executive 
Councillors, and a small militia staff. 
13 The executive 
officers were, barring a few exceptional personalities, so 
divorced from the majority of the Assembly that they did not 
even function as a team of legislative draftsmen. Except for 
the administration of justice and the work of the land- 
granting process (including a small surveyor-general's staff) 
the executive merely collected the revenue and carried out 
other routine duties imposed by British and colonial Acts. 
The Executive Council advised the Governor when he sought 
advice, and otherwise served the empire chiefly by providing 
a congenial social milieu for the Governor and senior military 
officers, and by acting as a social influence holding up a 
model in miniature of aristocratic British society, discour- 
aging republicvanism and encouraging the idea of aristocracy 
in a way that the local elites could not or would not do. 
Within the colony the executive was seen by its supporters as 
something more than a social model -- it was the rallying- 
point for colonists of all origins who rejected the local 
ideal of an agricultural province retaining individuality 
through an ancient legal system, and entrusting its future 
to priests and notaries instead of soldiers and businessmen. 
The executive was also regarded in the twenties as a vanguard 
-- or a Trojan horse -- to assist future immigrants to Lower 
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Canada. Some bureaucrats, like the auditor-general (later 
receiver-general) John Hale did indeed combine official duties 
with a disinterested straightforwardness in politics and the 
attitudes and investments appropriate to an improving English 
landlord of the times. But more conspicuous were men like 
Chief Justice Sewell and the clerk of the Executive Council, 
Herman Ryland, who certainly lived in aristocratic style but 
were cut off from the people by their dabbling in politics 
and their constant caballing among and against each other to 
secure for their friends and off-spring parts of the slender 
patronage at the Governor's disposal. 
14 In the twenties, 
Sewell and Ryland were the most prominent survivors of some 
abortive manoeuvres against the Catholic Church and the 
elective franchise before 1813. The deep mistrust the 
Canadiens felt for them coloured the attitude of much of 
society towards the whole executive, who were branded the 
"chateau clique" and despised and feared. Far from making 
British rule agreeable to the people at large, the chateau 
clique was an irritant. 
There were two rival theories about the relationship of 
the bureaucracy with the Governor. Both were promulgated 
at different times by John Neilson and his Quebec Gazette. 
The orthodox patriote view was that the Governor was a despot 
who made the Executive Councillors his tools and through them, 
and his control of patronage, commanded a block of votes in 
the Legislative Council. But a leading article in 1824 
expounded a more subtle view. 
if those to whom a Governor is to look for advice,... 
[are] bound together by any tie ofindividual interest; 
if, in addition to this, they should have a decided 
controul over one Branch of the Legislature, and 
could arrest the whole of its proceedings; if 
they had also the expounding of the Law in the 
Courts of Justice; a Governor must find himself 
very powerfully supported both in and out of the 
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Colony, who would think it adviseable to take 
a decided part in opposition to their views. 
15 
With a weak Governor the second explanation was the more 
accurate one. Dalhousie dealt diffidently with his Councillors, 
seldom finding the nerve to resist their more outrageous 
demands for patronage, allowing himself at one point to be 
excluded from an in camera session of the Council discussing 
the receiver-general's embezzlement, and observing in the 
early days of his administration that he had been obliged to 
bring forward a vital measure -- the civil list of 1820 -- 
in a manner he disapproved of. This habit of temporizing 
with the executive and confronting the Assembly formed the 
basis of his reputation as an authoritarian Governor. As 
long as he hid his rifts with the officials and joined their 
battles with the Assembly he would have comparatively little 
difficulty with Lord Bathurst in London, but he was bound to 
appear arbitrary to the colonists. He deferred too easily 
to the Council's talent and authority, then resented the fact 
that almost no-one would defer to him. His private plans for 
reforming the Executive Council were strikingly similar to 
the system worked out by Lord Sydenham twenty years later. 
The Council as Dalhousie found it was dominated by judges and 
lesser functionaries, with a few independent and distinguished 
members like John Richardson. Dalhousie proposed reforms to 
make the system more Parliamentary than presidential, excluding 
judges and appointing the principal officers of the legal 
and revenue departments to the Executive Council, along 
with the Speaker of the Assembly. He also compelled the law 
officers to seek seats in the Assembly, pushing "every public 
man to do his duty in his station, & to draw towards 
unanimity & cordial co-operation in public affairs. " But 
Papineau refused to take his appointment to the Council 
seriously, Attorney-General Stuart lost his seat at Sorel in 
1827, and only one Canadien, the clerk of the Legislative 
Council, joined the Executive Council during Dalhousie's eight 
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years as governor. His Council failed, despite his best 
efforts, to become either an effective administrative body 
or a bridge to link the sympathies of the people more closely 
to the wishes of the imperial government. 
16 
The remainder of the bureaucracy was a patchwork of old 
French survivals and eighteenth-century British improvisations. 
Dalhousie was appalled by the inefficiency of the over- 
centralized, structures -- the judiciary, for instance, 
mustered as many judges as all of England and Wales, yet 
only the most trivial cases could be tried outside Montreal, 
Quebec and Trois RiviZres. 
17 Dalhousie's papers are strewn 
with proposals for municipal authorities, rural police and 
an extended system of courts, but complaints against over- 
centralization came even more eloquently from the reforming 
editor, John Neilson: 
In Canada we have been plagued with an old 
French system of government; that is to say a 
government in which the people have no concern 
whatsoever, every thing must proceed from the 
city of Quebec and the city of Montreal, and 
persons must come to the city of Quebec and 
the city of Montreal to do every thing.... In 
the United States they have the English system, 
by which every locality has certain powers of 
regulating its own concerns, by which means 
they regulate them cheaper and better; whereas 
with us a man must make a journey to Quebec, he 
must go to great expense, he must bow to this 
man and bow to that man, and rap at this door 
and at that door, and spend days and weeks to 
effect a little improvement of a road, or 
something of that kind, of common convenience 
to a district, whereas all that is done in the 
United States without going out of his own 
small district. 
18 
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Patronage was the glue that held the chateau clique to- 
gether, but there is little superficial evidence to support 
J. B. Brebner's suggestion that the struggle of colonial 
assemblies to control the executives was really a struggle to 
control patronage. The patriotes' steady refusal to enlarge 
the bureaucracy (except for small offices in the gift of the 
Assembly) made acute the competition for the few places which 
fell vacant every year, but it also ensured that the patriote 
notaries received a sizeable income from fees for performing 
quasi-public registration duties which British colonists were 
anxious to commit to a new class of public officials at the 
parish or township level. Equally important was the paucity 
of good patronage at the Governor's disposal. Of the 160 
offices in 1821,12 of the best were routinely in the gift of 
the imperial authorities in London, and another 22 were at 
the disposal of judges, magistrates and the legislative 
chambers. Some higher offices, such as judgeships at Quebec 
and Montreal and the posts of law officers of the Crown, were 
nominally at the disposal of the Colonial Secretary and 
Bathurst did sometimes dispose of these offices without 
consulting Dalhousie. Not only could the Governor rarely 
reward deserving local figures with high offices, but he was 
saddled with the unpredictable and sometimes undesireable 
attitudes of the newcomers, for the tide they moved on flowed 
from Westminster, not from the Chateau St. Louis at Quebec. 
The Governor originally intended to delegate patronage to the 
heads of departments; but no clear departmental structure 
emerged, and Chief Justice Sewell showed the impracticability 
of such delegation, because he had enough sons and brothers 
to fill every vacancy in the legal departments. With parish 
patronage in the hands of the Assemblymen and regular 
importunity from the men on whom Dalhousie depended for the 
day-to-day conduct of affairs, it is not surprising that he 
regarded patronage as a curse. As W. L. Morton wrote recently, 
"There was simply not enough effective patronage to make the 
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ponderous machinery work if there was real friction. "19 
With the Governor and reformers united in believing in a 
general overhaul of the administration, there was nonetheless 
no general improvement before 1838. Dalhousie struggled hard 
and for the most part fruitlessly to reduce excessive fees 
and contingencies in public offices, and bills to improve the 
judiciary migrated almost annually between the two chambers 
of the legislature. Public works were administered by 
temporary boards of paid, part-time commissioners named on 
the advice of Assemblymen, but almost no new works were 
begun between 1820 and 1829. Courts of limited civil 
jurisdiction were set up in two remote towns. But the 
bureaucracy remained largely unchanged. Leading Assemblymen 
sought reforms to make judges and bureaucrats more account- 
able to public opinion, less fully dependent on each other 
for protection and support. There was strong resistance to 
the idea of making new salaried offices; Assemblymen never 
sanctioned the creation of the post of auditor-general, and 
wrangled interminably over creating rural courts. The 
Governor wanted to expand the bureaucracy to bring the voice 
of the executive closer to the people; the Assembly wished 
to constrict the bureaucracy and make new offices, if they 
were needed at all, responsive to the people and not to the 
British executive. Finally, throughout the attempted reforms 
ran a common thread -- the determination of the Assembly to 
offer everything with strings attached. The correction of 
small abuses was always intimately linked with the demand for 
large concessions. Whether the issue was roads, schools, 
control of the receiver-general, extension of the courts or 
revision of the militia laws, the Assembly always couched 
-its measures in such terms that the Council and Governor, 
in accepting them, would have to give way on some point of 
the quarrel, in the imperial context, between the advocates 
of centralism and autonomy. 
20 
To the imperial centralists, 
this passion of the patriotes for mixing up small matters with 
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large ones betrayed a lack of wisdom, and a lack of serious 
purpose, which called into question the whole constitution 
of Lower Canada. 
iv 
The complexity of imperial, executive and popular 
pressures on the bureaucratic structure is well represented 
by the case of John Caldwell. When Caldwell succeeded his 
father as receiver-general in 1809, he also acquired a secret 
deficit of L39,000 which must have come to light if the 
office had passed out of the family. During the next dozen 
years Caldwell represented all that was respectable in 
provincial society. He owned the valuable seigneury of 
Lauzon near Quebec, and his most intimate friend and business 
partner, John Davidson, sat in the Assembly for the county of 
Dorchester, where Caldwell's seigneury and sawmills were 
located. He visited England often, but while in Canada his 
hospitality was particularly noted by the local gentry and 
by visiting strangers. Caldwell was appointed to the 
Legislative Council in 1818. And between 1810 and 1822 a 
further 866,000 of public money became tied up and lost in his 
mercantile speculations. 
21 
In 1821, the MPP for a neighbouring county introduced a 
bill to enable the Assembly to oversee the receiver-general's 
affairs. In a guarded exchanged with Charles Ogden of Trois 
Rivieres, Frangois Blanchet avowed that his bill meant no 
"mistrust of the integrity of the Receiver-General"; but he 
proposed to forbid Caldwell to engage in-trade, and to sumbit 
the public monies to annual account. Ogden protested that 
the bill was "premature and personal" unless Blanchet had 
"complaint or suspicion" of misconduct; and Blanchet let the 
bill die in committee. But Dalhousie was uneasy, and ordered 
his civil secretary John Ready to investigate. He reported 
nothing, and it was not until 1823 that his duplicity was 
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exposed. Ready had consulted Davidson and Caldwell, and 
"The inquiries... were not neglected, as I imagined, but were 
suppressed, & the declaration only now forced from 
Mr. Caldwell, ought to have been laid open then., 
22 
Caldwell did his best to keep his fences mended. In 
London in 1822 he tried to persuade the undersecretary for 
the colonies, Wilmot Horton, to repay to the province money 
used by the imperial authorities during the recent war; but 
Bathurst hoped to save this sum by balancing it against 
local expenses borne in the past by the British treasury. 
Caldwell and Davidson continued to cultivate Ready; they also 
courted Papineau and the Lieutenant-Governor, Sir Francis 
Burton. At the same time Caldwell did his best to undermine 
Dalhousie: "He knows neither how to induce or even take 
advantage of a favorable disposition towards him, he wholly 
avoids being in communication with the leaders of the 
Assembly. " At the same time Caldwell touched a point he and 
Horton had discussed at length in 1822: 
, 
An elaborate report has been made on the state 
of the Publick Accts. by the special Committee 
of the Assembly. It takes up the question from 
the beginning, & may be considered as a fair 
statement of the balce. which ought to be in my 
hands... but which is not there, in consequence 
of former Governors having drawn from my Chest 
Monies on account of expenditure never laid 
before the Legislature... & 2nd the excess of 
expenditure over what the 14th G. 3 and the 
Territorial Revenue were able to pay. 
23 
Not only the Assembly was perturbed. Dalhousie was called 
upon to issue warrants for nearly 8100,000 on a chest con- 
taining about 812,000. What amazed him most was the culprit's 
demeanour: "with most extraordinary coolness, he justifies 
himself upon an understood permission of the Lords of 
H. M. Treasury, to hold for his own benefit, and as part 
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salary, a floating balance of B100,000. In truth, there 
is... L80,000, involved & tied up in Mr. Caldwell's Mercantile 
concerns. " Dalhousie refused Caldwell's proposal to "use the 
Military and Civil Chests indiscriminately in aid of each 
other", an expedient which would avert a cash shortage but 
leave the accounts in chaos. He decided instead to defer 
for three months the payments due on 1 May, and to pay none 
of the Assembly's new appropriations until the eve of the 
next session, 1 December. 
24 
After the shock of public disclosure in August, 1823, 
the Caldwell affair lurched from one crisis to another. 
Sewell and Dalhousie preferred to deal with Caldwell as with 
any other defaulter. Caldwell paid back a mere b3,000 during 
a period of grace in 1823, but the Executive Council gave 
Dalhousie the dubious advice that he had no authority to 
suspend an officer appointed by Treasury; so the Governor 
appointed two commissioners to watch all financial trans- 
actions. In mid-November Dalhousie suspended Caldwell and 
turned all the relevant papers over to the Assembly. A 
rear-guard action was fought by Caldwell's friends in the 
Executive Council, and eventually Davidson personally 
extracted promises from Bathurst and Wilmot Horton that 
Caldwell would be dealt with as leniently as possible. Horton 
even contemplated reappointing Caldwell as the best way to 
speed up repayment of the deficit. The Assembly tried to 
hold Treasury accountable for repaying the deficit, and 
Treasury took more than two years to decide that it was not 
responsible after all. Dalhousie was irritated by the 
Assembly's determination to jumble up Caldwell's case with 
all the unsettled old accounts between the colonial and 
imperial treasuries. In the long run Caldwell lost his office 
only because Dalhousie refused to temporize further; he also 
surrendered speculative holdings in the townships and a few 
small seigneuries and two lots nominally worth 1,32,000. He 
promised to pay back the remainer at 162,000 a year from the 
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revenues of Lauzon, which he retained while a supposed entail 
was tested in the courts. The judicial committee of the Privy 
Council found the entail invalid in 1835, and from then until 
1858 the seigneury was Crown property, but leased to the 
Caldwell family. Caldwell retained his seat in the Legislative 
Council, but in 1825 John Hale, whose capital was not in 
trade but in Canadian land and British funds, was approved 
by the Assembly as receiver-general, with twice the salary 
that Caldwell had received. 
25 What is particularly interest- 
ing is that the embezzlement of about '100,000 was not 
mentioned in the imperial Parliament until five years after 
it was disclosed. The handling of this problem by-Bathurst, 
Horton and Treasury amply demonstrated that while British 
authorities were careful to centralize control of the colonial 
executive, they were sometimes casual in their approach to 
how it functioned. 
V 
From 1822 to 1826 Canadian politics were enlivened by 
the impetuous young Under-Secretary at the Colonial Office, 
R. Wilmot Horton. Lord Bathurst had personified the traditional 
policy of trying to rule quietly through established elites; 
Lord Goderich would begin in 1827 the wooing of the liberal 
nationalists; but Horton produced a short burst of reform 
projects which, encouraged by visiting or expatriate Anglo- 
Canadians, he tried to push through the imperial Parliament. 
Apart from Horton's well-known record as an emigration 
enthusiast mention must be made of the Canada Trade Act of 
1822, part of which reimposed on the St. Lawrence ports a 
lapsed provincial revenue tariff, and the Canada Tenures Act 
of 1825, which extended English land and inheritance laws to 
the Eastern Townships and made it possible for seigneurs to 
take a freehold grant of tracts they previously held in trust 
for future censitaires. 
26 
Important as these measures were 
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as intrusions into the internal affairs of Lower Canada, they 
were but fragments of a far-reaching reshaping of the Canadian 
constitutional Act of 1791 which Horton presented to 
Parliament in July, 1822, but withdrew under pressure from 
members anxious to hear the colonists' views before proceeding 
further. The measure was the legislative reunion of Upper 
and Lower Canada. 
The ostensible cause of this venture was the revenue 
dispute between the Canadas. The population and amenities 
of the upper province were much smaller but growing more 
rapidly than those of the longer-settled lower province. 
Officials at York were already by 1820 annoyed at receiving 
less than Upper Canadians paid of the revenues collected on 
goods which they and the Lower Canadians imported jointly 
through Quebec and Montreal. Unfairly small or not, their 
share was important, and they relied especially on duties 
levied in 1813 as a wartime emergency and diverted to peace- 
time purposes after 1815. Lower Canada used its share of this 
fund to finance an uncharacteristic burst of road-building, 
but refused to renew the duties beyond the end of 1822. The 
British authorities were reluctant to see Upper Canada 
starved of funds or to divide the economic unity of the 
Canadas by a customs barrier at the province line; so Horton 
stepped in to renew the expiring acts, pleading in just- 
ification that Parliament was the only legislature the two 
colonies enjoyed in common. 
27 But Horton had tried to go 
much further, by remedying the lack of a common legislature, 
uniting the two Assemblies, Councils, and governorships (but 
not the treasuries or bureaucracies). This attacked the 
policy of letting the French Canadians develop separately, 
because Horton accepted the Montreal merchants' argument that 
the Canadiens were reluctant to develop at all. 
The economic evolution of Lower Canada, and its assimi- 
lation to Britain, had been residual British policy since 
1791. The distractions of twenty-five years of war, and the 
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cultural conservatism of all classes of Canadiens, had 
thwarted this policy without burying it. Charles James Fox 
had supported the merchants in 1791 in their effort to keep 
the province intact: 
The most desirable circumstance was, that the French 
and English inhabitants of Canada should unite and 
coalesce, as it were, into one body, and that the 
different distinctions of the people might be 
extinguished forever.... He wished the people of 
that country to adopt the English laws from 
choice, and not from force; and he did not think 
the division of the province the most likely means 
to bring about this desirable end. 
Pitt retorted that the division was fundamental to the bill; 
it was important in the short run to prevent the French 
from oppressing the Loyalists as they might in a single Assem- 
bly, and the French themselves should realize that 
the British government had no intention of forcing 
the English laws upon them, and therefore they 
would, with more facility, look at the operation and 
effect of those laws, compare them with... their own, 
and probably in time adopt them from conviction. 
To Pitt, the goodwill of the Canadiens was more important 
than assimilation; but within thirty years colonial merchants 
found they enjoyed neither the goodwill of the habitants nor 
the advantages of the English laws they sacrificed to earn 
that favour; Upper Canada too was suffering. Dalhousie 
was left to muse sadly, that Fox was right and Pitt wrong 
"in their views of men and of state policy". 
28 
Views of the future of French Canada were diverse in 
the 1820s. Edward Ellice assured an audience in 1828 that 
"any attempt to sacrifice the paramount interests of the 
improvement and civilization of the country to their habits 
and prejudices, would not only be injurious to the rest of 
Canada, but hopeless as to its result. "29 But this view was 
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not unanimously held. A more knowledgeable observer, James 
Stuart, warned in 1824 that the Canadien threat had not 
reached its peak; by 1844 the high canadien birthrate would 
make a compact French society of a million persons. This, 
just ten years after Waterloo, was unthinkable to anyone 
but the French Canadians, wrote Stuart, yet "the expectation 
of this result... obtains generally in the minds of the French 
Canadians, and increases their aversion to any assimilation 
with their fellow subjects. , 
30 
The provenance of the reunion 
scheme is in doubt, but one can readily imagine that Ellice, 
a whig friend of Wilmot Horton, was the prime mover. The 
subject came up early in March 1822 in the midst of talks at 
the Colonial Office between representatives of the Upper and 
Lower Canadian bureaucracies, trying to settle their financial 
squabble. The Upper Canadian delegate was the attorney- 
general John Beverley Robinson; he exerted himself powerfully 
to defeat the reunion for his jaundiced view of human nature 
convinced him that in a united legislature Lower Canada's 
politicians would poison the principles of the Upper Canadian 
minority, who would remain indifferent to the need to assimi- 
late the Canadiens. 31 But a variety of personal motives 
prompted more favourable reactions from the Lower Canadians 
present -- solicitor-general Charles Marshall, an ambitious 
young Londoner; the aged, crabbed and miserly Francophobe 
Chief Justice of Montreal, James Monk; the desperate, secretly 
insolvent receiver-general John Caldwell; an old former 
judge, William Osgoode, retired since 1801. The Canadiens 
always treasured the illusion that John Richardson had 
inspired the reunion from Montreal, but he regretted this 
was a mistake, "for I would glory in being the author of the 
measure., 
32 The idea of reunion was as old as the division in 
1791, but Ellice was probably the one who put it into Horton's 
mind in 1822. The measure, Ellice promised Horton, would pass 
without a voice raised against it. 
It did not. At the last moment Sir James Mackintosh, 
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who had seen the bill well in advance and discussed it twice 
with Ellice, rose in Parliament to ask for postponement until 
the views of the colonists were known. Ellice was mortified, 
and so was Horton. 
33 But Mackintosh's interruption, followed 
by the illness and suicide of Lord Londonderry, killed the 
bill for 1822. Horton hastily dusted off the two partial 
reforms originally contemplated (for making the revenues 
permanent and allowing seigneurs to alter their tenure) and 
had them passed with a package of tariff reforms produced by 
the Board of Trade. Although Horton and Ellice continued to 
hope for the revival of the Bill, Mackintosh's demand for 
colonial consultation was a dead weight around the neck of 
reunion, and it was seventeen years before the matter could 
be seriously broached in Parliament again. 
34 
Ellice thought consultation unnecessary, for the 
Canadiens would resist on grounds he considered illusory, 
namely a wish for survivance. Monk was strident against the 
democratic implications of consulting the colonists, and from 
Montreal Richardson pleaded the higher prerogatives of 
Parliament over those of a few hundred thousand subjects. 
"The question is one of great national policy, and as such 
should be argued without attention to likes or dislikes of 
the inhabitants. " But at Quebec City the merchants' organ, 
the Mercur , found such a reform without consultation unthink- 
able. 
35 Needless to say opponents of consultation were 
advocates of the measure; there was a general sense that if 
reunion occurred in 1822 it would not be a natural evolution 
but a coup, carried out against the grain of the past 
thirty years of colonial policy. 
In the colony, the chief advocates of the reunion were 
Richardson and James Stuart. The latter at the age of 42 
had already been solicitor-general and then leader of the 
anti-government party in the Assembly; his wholehearted 
conversion to the cause of the Montreal merchants aroused 
much suspicion but Stuart worked loyally for the cause, 
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dominating Montreal's compaign for the bill, crossing the 
Atlantic four times, winning the Governor's ear, and publishing 
a flood of phamphlets in London in 182436 to counteract the 
Canadiens' isolationism as well as schemes for a general 
British North American federation put forward by his arch- 
enemy Chief Justice Sewell, and Upper Canada's Robinson. 
In the meantime, John Neilson's son reported to the absent 
reformer, the Legislative Council joined the Assembly in 
rejecting the proposal, as 15 seigneurs and bureaucrats 
crushed the reunionist hopes of four merchants and Herman 
Ryland: 
I believe the people have frightened them into terms. 
The evils of the measure were magnified by the Cana- 
dians so much that the English party really thought 
there would be some serious disturbances if it took 
place and the Council have declared themselves for 
no union upon any terms equitable or not. This is 
more than the Assembly if the Question had received a 
little varnishing and been declared equitable would 
have done, indeed, a very good speech of 
Mr. O'Sullivan for an union on equitable principles 
I saw had made many converts in the Assembly; 
(Dr. Blanchet & Cuvillier among others) he conten- 
ded that an union was desirable because it would 
increase the weight of the popular branch and give 
a spirit for public concerns which is now wanting 
to the Assembly of L. C. 37 
It is difficult to assess how much of the hostility the 
Canadiens directed against the measure was due to its gradual 
tendency to assimilate them, and how much to the provisions 
Neilson alluded to as inequitable. There were two of these -- 
the language clause, making English compulsory in Legislative 
debates after 15 years, and the regulation of Church patronage. 
At the instigation of Monk the Bill sought to give the 
Governor the final decision in the distribution of Catholic 
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clergy. This provision, the source of Dalhousie's subsequent 
efforts to revive the ordinance of 1722, ensured that nine- 
tenths of the clergy would oppose the reunion bill unreservedly, 
and the Governor and Chief Justice warned the Colonial 
Office that so delicate a matter must be arranged by concordat 
with the next Bishop, and not embodied in a constitutional 
Act. As for the language clause, Caldwell had warned 
Horton that it would draw a heavy fire, and Richardson 
thought it worthless: "They may be allowed to speak in 
Hebrew if they choose, for the evil would soon cure itself". 
38 
The representation clauses, which were not widely debated, 
were objectionable only to the extent that they consolidated 
the existing bodies, giving the upper province a heavier 
representation ehr capita than the lower. But this illuminated 
the core and the justification of the measure: it was designed 
to stimulate development in the parts of Canada already grow- 
ing most rapidly -- the British parts. This was most 
eloquently put in the mass petition from the Eastern Town- 
ships: 
The question is not whether a country already 
peopled is to renounce its national feelings and 
characteristics, as the French Canadians may en- 
deavour to represent, but whether a country for 
the most part waste, and to be hereafter chiefly 
peopled by a British race, is to assume the 
character, language, and manners, of a foreign 
nation. 
39 
The Canadiens attacked this argument by reminding the 
British authorities of French-Canadian participation in 
imperial wars against the United States, and by stressing, 
in tune with the liberal ideology of the Assembly and its 
new-found friend in the House of Commons, that the opponents 
of the reunion were a great majority of the population of the 
affected parts of the Empire. John Richardson might insist 
that "Argument, not a tale by heads, must decide" but Bathurst 
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was more cautious; he never abandoned a basic disposition 
towards reuniting the Canadas, but equally never saw his way 
clear to turn back the tide of Canadien power by publishing 
the bills that continued to be worked over by Stuart and the 
lesser lights at the Colonial Office. 
40 
vi 
The reunion debate threw a vivid light on Britain's 
failure to create a strong and popular coalition of local 
forces to promote imperial interests in Lower Canada. True, 
the fundamental interest, military security, had been pre- 
served, but in the society that emerged after the war of 1812 
too many of the influential and potentially creative elements 
were hostile or indifferent to commercial expansion and 
accelerated settlement. The groups most favourable to those 
other imperial interests, the officials and merchants, were 
a source of conflict between the mother country and the bulk 
of the colonists, but still lacked the power to take decisive 
steps on behalf of the empire. The abortive reunion scheme, 
instead of providing an exit from these difficult straits, 
merely increased the anxiety of the French Canadians. But 
the Revenue Act of 1822 which taxed the colonists by imperial 
enactment pinpointed the problem, the Assembly's threat to 
Upper Canada's development. The Assembly of Lower Canada had 
dared to tweak the tail of the lion's cub, but was amazed to 
face the full roaring fury of the parent. The only escape 
for Papineau and his people was to cry "Vive le Roi et la 
Constitution". 
41 
But the loyalty was now a tactic, a bargain, 
and from the time of the reunion quarrel the Canadiens looked 
more to their own numerical strength and less to the fickle 
power of Downing Street to protect their local interests from 
the advocates of those other, less formal aspects of British 
imperialism, commerce and settlement. 
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Chapter 3: The Struggle for Control 
i 
The immaturity of the colonial administrative structure, and 
the limited spheres in which it needed to operate, sharpened 
the struggle between centralists and autonomists for control 
of the state machinery. Both sides could refuse to compromise 
without too much fear for the short-term consequences: as 
Dalhousie admitted in 1824, "I am as yet content with what 
all acknowledge to be true, that the province has improved 
greatly within the last few years, notwithstanding the untoward 
circumstances which have occurred. "1 In the district of 
Montreal development of military transport routes was 
synonymous with that of commercial waterways, and the British 
Treasury and colonial legislature shared the burden; at 
Quebec, timber and ship-building interests were made profit- 
able by imperial stimulation and private enterprise, which 
the assembly could do little to retard, even if it did no- 
thing to encourage. The permanent revenues of the crown 
guaranteed that civil servants need not starve, and the gaols 
need not be thrown open. In short, the struggle for control 
of the legislative machinery of Lower Canada could not be a 
grand battle for the destiny of a state, but a part-time 
squabble for local authority in a province, and it was the 
sort of conflict that could be prosecuted with most flair 
and disruption by those who wanted the power of the state 
checked rather than expanded. 
The modest nature of the authority contended for helped 
to hide from many contemporaries the economic roots of the 
struggle which historians have been apt to stress. Many 
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people in the twenties persisted in seeing the struggle as 
one not of classes, nationalities, creeds or even ideologies, 
but simply of personalities. Canadian historiography developed 
too late to provide a well-developed school stressing the 
role of great men in determining events (though the Makers 
of Canada series early in this century was designed to meet 
this lack) so the influence of personalities has traditionally 
and no doubt correctly been subordinated to other determinants; 
but to contemporaries, personal hostility seemed clearly one 
of the ruling forces. Bishop Mountain hated Bishop Plessis, 
who reciprocated. Louis-Joseph Papineau and John Richardson 
treated each other with icy indifference in person and with 
venom in their public addresses. James and Andrew Stuart led 
the Assembly in a vendetta against James' erstwhile patron, 
Jonathan Sewell. The British garrison disdained the company 
of the French Canadians. It was such influences, some 
observers thought, which really lay at the bottom of the 
colony's strife, and if only evil men could be checked and 
proud ones brought to dine at the same table and join in 
cultural endeavours like the Literary and Historical Society 
of Quebec, change would be gradual and harmonious. A 
complicated example of this emphasis on personalities is 
contained in the following attack in the Quebec Mercury. 
It was contributed by the Chevalier R-A d'Estimauville, an 
elderly free-mason, an anglicized, much-travelled landless 
member of a seigneurial family, but a Canadien all the same. 
The passage obliquely traced the colony's troubles in the 
twenties to the ambitions of the two Stuarts in the previous 
decade: 
Perceiving that the new set of Senators were 
rather inclined to adopt the political opinions 
disseminated by the French Revolutionists, they 
built their hopes of ultimate success upon that 
present disposition of their rivals.... Having 
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obtained their end, they prudently withdrew... 
and silently have planned that ultimate scheme, 
whereby the whole mass of influence must, of 
course, fall into their hands. And now, indeed, 
they may be proud of having so ably led, under 
the mask of friendship, the unsuspicious 
representatives of the Canadian Nation into a 
dilemma, out of which they must find it extremely 
difficult to extricate themselves, with honor and 
proper dignity.... The resistance offered 
by these Representatives is directed neither 
against his Majesty's Government, nor against 
any constitutional authority; but solely 
against that party out of the Constitution, 
which has intruded itself between them and 
the Sovereign. 
2 
The last lines are interesting -- a veiled attack on the 
chateau clique in the journal regarded as its organ -- but 
the main burden of the passage is that James Stuart's 
ambition, feeding on canadien pride and naivete, was more 
important in fomenting difficulties than were democractic 
ideas. Dalhousie also saw personal objects in public dis- 
cords. His first great disillusionment with Canadian 
politics came early in 1821 when personal abuse of the chief 
justice was hurled about the Assembly. 
3 Bishop Plessis was 
the Governor's particular bete noir, whom he regarded as the 
"secret spring" behind all efforts to strengthen the Assembly 
at the expense of the Government, and after Plessis' death 
he was gratified to find a successor of whom he could write, 
"this old man seems quite passive. " Two years later he 
wrote that "the financial difficulties... have been a mere 
veil to the mischievous intentions of the faction headed by 
Papineau. His object is Power. "4 Papineau himself was not 
beyond publishing a pamphlet attacking the selfish machinations 
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of a handful of wicked men as the root of all the colony's 
troubles. These men of the early nineteenth century knew 
nothing of Marx, and they were led by Adam Smith and much 
older writers towards the belief that the economic interests 
of all social classes were the same. 
5 What was good for 
commerce (or in Papineau's eyes, for agriculture) was 
ultimately good for everyone. Political strife seemed a 
symptom of personal vice, greed, or ambition. 
This simplistic approach to the conflict was not as 
absurd as it must sound to a modern generation raised on 
economic determinism and the history of social classes. 
Colonial society was miniscule: the number of effective 
leaders and prominent men of business on either side can be 
counted in dozens or scores, and most were personally or 
professionally acquainted. And the ap rti canadien (properly 
called patriotes only after 1826) tried to mask its class 
appeal, supporting two merchant MPPs from Montreal whenever 
it could, the notable ones after 1824 being a Canadien, ex- 
fur trader Pierre de Rocheblave, and a highly-educated Scot, 
James Leslie, who retained his connexion with the Canadiens 
well into the 1850s. The patriote party itself was erratic 
in pronouncements on social classes and economic development. 
During the 1827 elections Papineau showed this indecision in 
his praise of the new world at the expense of the old. In 
Lower Canada, he wrote, there were no great private fortunes, 
"generatrices de l'ambition et des vices perturbateurs de 
fordre social", and the egalitarian state of Canadien society 
was a "magnifique creation de la Providence. " And yet the 
society of the United States, so dynamic'and materialistic 
compared to French Canada, was equally praised: "Il n'y a 
pas sur la surface du globe une societe plus belle, mieux 
reglee, plus prospere, oü les peuples soient aussi contens. "6 
This ambiguity of aims and social vision encouraged 
contemporaries in the view that the struggle was a personal 
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one to most patriotes, rooted in spite or ambition. 
Superficially there was little to distinguish the opposition 
of a Stuart, who might change course on the mere appearance 
of a shift in the political winds; or a Valli6res, who could 
be bought, or very nearly bought, with a judgeship; or a 
Papineau, who would cling to his principles through rebellion 
and exile. All three of these men at different times in the 
late teens and early twenties led bitter campaigns against 
the bureaucracy, and when Stuart and ValliZires could be 
silenced (like Pierre Bedard in 1813) it was not unreasonable 
for the centralists to believe that the patriotes were 
fundamentally ambitious individuals who collectively derived 
their power from the weakness of the executive, and not from 
any special merits in their political beliefs. 
The importance of personalities in the Canadiens' cause 
was enhanced by the negative character of their programme. 
The precise nature of that programme eludes definition; one 
recent writer has discerned a deliberate effort by the parti 
canadien to create an integrated Lower Canadian economy based 
on agriculture, quarantined from Upper Canada by poor water 
communications and a free trade policy designed to divert 
Upper Canadian trade and sympathies towards the United States. 
7 
Much of this was certainly implicit in the negative policies 
pursued by the Assembly, but it begs the question of whether 
a CI the Canadien leadership as a whole wish to destroy commerce, 
or merely divert it into French-Canadian hands by discouraging 
Anglo-Canadians. The parti canadien in the twenties 
contained men like Cuvillier who were split between. the 
economic attitudes of the haute bourgeoisie and the political 
principles of the autonomists, and in the thirties rifts 
would develop over economic policy, driving nationalist 
lawyers like LaFontaine towards liberalization of traditional 
canadien economic structures through radical politics, and 
others like Sabrevois de Bleury towards a closer alliance 
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with the English-speaking business interests. Despite these 
aberrations and exceptions, the patriote policy was chiefly 
inspired by the muddled economic thinking and enormous popular 
prestige of Papineau and was therefore passive and negative, 
and suited to a long campaign of attrition against govern- 
ment. Simply stated, the mass of the Lower Canadian 
electorate accepted representatives who offered nothing but 
protection from human, not economic forces; and the apparatus 
of the state was so small it scarcely touched them; they 
liked it as it was, and voted for men who promised to leave 
it that way. 
The great electioneering cries of the twenties denounced 
alleged threats of high taxation and religious oppression. 
In the first campaign of 1820 Cochran noted that "there is 
a very prevalent apprehension that their Religion is in 
danger. "8 And in 1827 Papineau warned the voters that the 
ambition of the opposite party was to tax the people at every 
level of their existence. Sewell and Richardson 
"ont en effet voulu etablir des taxes directes 
sur les terres, et la nuee de collecteurs qui 
auraient ete necessaires pour en faire la 
perception. Si nous ne voyons pas cette 
odieuse esp? _ice d'hommes penetrer dans nos maisons, 
pour emporter leur part de nos propriet6s, ce 
nest pas aux employes de l'administration que 
noun en avons obligation. "9 
There was even a degree of fact in this: the government party 
had openly espoused local taxation for local public works 
since the great gaols controversy of 1805, and although such 
taxation would have fallen very lightly on rural parishes 
with few British settlers, it would doubtless have increased 
the public revenues and expenditures of the province as a 
whole. And there were always ill-informed and ill-disposed 
rumours of what the government would do with the property of 
the seminary of Montreal if its title was ever formally 
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judged invalid. These threats were mostly out of date by 
the time of Dalhousie's administration, but the memory of 
them was kept green by the patriotes and by the fulminations 
at Montreal of a minority amongst the merchants and the legal 
profession. This ambiguity helped permit the parti canadien 
to represent itself as the indispensable protector of the 
habitants; and as long as the official policy of Great 
Britain remained passive or sympathetic to the Canadiens, 
the Assembly could continue to block or postpone measures 
urgently demanded by the capitalist class and the British 
colonists generally, relying on the passive acquiescence of 
an electorate that required little other than to be protected 
from threats which were easily evaded because they were in 
any case between ten and twenty years out of date. 
ii 
The struggle for control centred on finance; this was 
as true for the centralists as it was for the autonomists in 
the Assembly. The exact amount haggled over was small -- 
about L3,000 a year in salaries for absentees and new 
offices -- but the struggle was bitter, because the bureau- 
crats strongly suspected that annual dependence of officials 
on the Assembly would make popularity a prerequisite for 
retaining office -- and in a small colonial society popularity 
was not necessarily equated with ability or integrity. Could 
decent men be found for the executive posts if they had to 
rely on the Assembly for an annual and variable pay? Of 
course not, replied the Colonial Office and the bureaucrats, 
and one wag proposed a candle auction to sell off the public 
offices to the men prepared to fill them for least reward: 
"it would only be necessary for the Auctioneer to make public 
declaration, that Character, Education, Talents and Integrity 
would be dispensed with in all candidates for public employ- 
ment. This assurance alone... tends no further than what a 
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certain reduction in the appointments of all public officers 
would bring us to. " And Solicitor-General Marshall expressed 
his contempt this way: 
"What could be more unstatesmanlike than to say, 
'It is true that there are some heads in the 
estimate, under which more is asked than we 
think necessary... but no matter... we 
can afford to be extravagant this year; but 
if our trade falls off, you must be cut 
down... according as our Constituents 
consume more or less rum. ""10 
Papineau retorted that annual votes worked well in every other 
British colony; but since all other colonies' civil lists 
were subsidized by Britain, the argument was clearly meant 
to impress Papineau's followers, not to discourage his critics. 
There were two other main elements in the debate. Because 
the proposed long-term civil lists included the cost of the 
judiciary, they might amount in some years to over one-third 
of the year's revenues. (Britain's civil list was one 
sixtieth of total revenues. ) But the colonies paid no- 
thing for defence or for a national debt; the two situations 
were in no way parallel. This hypocrisy on Papineau's part 
was matched by a narrow legalism on the side of the Colonial 
Office concerning the right to appropriate the duties raised 
at Quebec under a fifty-year-old revenue Act of the British 
parliament, (14 Geo. III c. 88) passed before the Declaratory 
Act in 1778 renounced the right to tax the colonies for 
revenue. In 1824 the imperial law officers confirmed 
Bathurst's view that the British Government had not merely the 
duty to audit but the right to direct the disposal of all 
those funds. But this strict interpretation need not have 
inhibited the Colonial Office from spending in accord with 
the Assembly's priorities, provided the latter were constitut- 
ionally presented and met the rather wide criteria of the 
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original appropriation in 1774. The Assembly, unhappily for 
its own cause, always claimed these revenues on the untenable 
legal ground that the act of 1778 could be construed 
retroactively to amend (but not repeal) that of 1774. It 
would be difficult to improve on Creighton's gloss: "On the 
one hand, there were the dilatoriness, the stubbornness, the 
sudden concessions, and the righteous superiority of the 
colonial office and the executive; on the other, there were 
the childish suspicion, the absence of public responsibility, 
and the mental rigidity of the members of the assembly. "11 
Creighton and Manning have given the minute details of 
the civil list question down to 1831, and P. A. Buckner has 
examined the issue from 1828 to 1841.12 There need be no 
effort here to review the details, and the discussion which 
follows is designed to concentrate on aspects of the contem- 
porary debate which have not been sufficiently appreciated 
by other historians, and particularly the relevance of the 
civil list disputes to the evolution of political alignments 
and rifts amongst the Governor's supporters, the colonial 
centralists who stood between the Assembly and the Colonial 
Office and tried to advance the interests of the colony 
within the limits of their own constitutional ideas and 
private interests. 
When Dalhousie took over the administration of Lower 
Canada he inherited many of the views of his predecessor. 
His only first-hand experience of the Canadas was a visit to 
Richmond in 1819, and he retained the late Governor's private 
secretary. Since Dalhousie inherited Richmond's despatches 
and his secretary it is not surprising he received many of 
his opinions as well. He set these down in a major despatch 
on the civil list on 14 July, asking Bathurst's advice on 
the wisdom of persisting in Richmond's course of seeking 
from the Legislature a permanent appropriation, or one for 
the life of the King, to guarantee the government about 
B40,000 a year for official salaries and contingencies. 
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Bathurst's reply, received in mid-November, left Dalhousie a 
fair amount of latitude to conclude the best agreement he 
could, but indicated what would be the policy of the Colonial 
Office if the assembly proved intractable: 
It may be necessary however that I should 
shortly submit to you that the essential 
object to be attained is that the concession 
to be made should be dependent on the 
permanent assignment of a fixed annual 
Revenue to meet the Charge of such a Civil 
List as the Province requires for its proper 
Administration. 
If the revenues at Dalhousie's disposal were sufficient to 
carry on the fundamental operations of government without 
help from the Assembly, he should prorogue it if it refused. 
Bathurst clearly anticipated a struggle during which the 
normal operations of government would have to be pared down 
severely. A private despatch of the same date declared that 
Richmond's figure of 840,000 was reasonable, and authorized 
Dalhousie to draw if needed L12,000 of post office and customs 
revenues normally remitted to Britain, and to save L5,000 
wherever it could best be spared -- probably from the salaries 
of absentees, sinecurists, and Papineau and Plessis themselves. 
Manning thought that "nothing very clear emerges from Lord 
Bathurst's dispatches of 1820 and 1821" but Dalhousie laboured 
under no such disability. He thought Bathurst's instructions 
"most clear & distinct... corresponding entirely with the 
views I had myself imagined most wise and also giving me a 
discretionary power & latitude which I did not expect. " He 
prepared to meet the legislature a month later. 
13 
Dalhousie had been warned against the leaders of the 
Assembly by Richmond's experience, and in dealing with them 
he intended simply to keep all his intentions candidly before 
them, and to brief whatever members were willing to support 
him openly in the details of his measures. He hoped to convert 
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the Speaker to all his views, but relied in the meantime 
mainly on Jean-Thomas Taschereau, a Quebec barrister of 
some talent and energy, but a man of little influence in the 
Assembly. Dalhousie was less anxious to push his views 
forward in the Legislative Council. Two weeks before the 
session opened a senior canadien Councillor, Olivier Perrault, 
called on the Governor to hint that Councillors would 
appreciate the same easy access to Dalhousie as had been 
granted to Papineau, Taschereau and Vanfelson by earlier 
Governors. Dalhousie sent him away politely, and noted that 
such consultation was inappropriate: Councillors might give 
useful advice on their own localities, but were otherwise 
an undistinguished lot, apart from the Chief Justice who 
was then very ill. (This view was revised when Dalhousie 
had met, during the session, Roderick McKenzie and John 
Richardson, representatives of the Montreal merchant community 
in the Legislative Council. ) The executive officers them- 
selves seemed "disposed to advise more than they ought"; 
14 
but he was uncertain how to deal with this forwardness. From 
the very start Dalhousie adopted the policy ascribed to him 
by the historian Robert Christie: "There was no mysticism in 
his policy, nor intrigue in his dealing with Parliament. , 
15 
He sent his measures forth to succeed, or not, on their 
apparent merits; the strife of all around him convinced him 
of what he sincerely believed, that he stood above and apart 
from partisanship. 
The session of 1820-21 opened, as the last one had closed, 
on a sour note over finances. The English-speaking members 
of both Councils did their best to take the new Governor in 
hand. Dalhousie was disappointed to find that Sewell's 
"object is to force the Commons to a permanent confirmation 
of the system of Govt by voting a Civil List equal to that 
which has created of late years so much irritation & dis- 
content, " including provision of the "wildly extravagent" 
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contingent expenses of the executive and legal departments. 
This steady pressure from the men closest to him caused the 
first great blunder of Dalhousie's administration, a 
characteristic capitulation to talent and rank. He decided 
to let the Assembly's sense of grievance wait while he tried 
to soften the rigidity of the bureaucracy. 
16 
Both houses were warned that prosperity and the Governor's 
own success depended on harmony within the Legislature; 
Dalhousie was delighted to find the Assembly had called for 
all accounts since 1793, which "pleases me very much, because 
it is exactly what I myself wanted done, in the hope of 
leading to some matured & fixed System of reducing the 
expenses of the Civil Administration. , 
17 But. by the end of 
January the Governor was dismayed to find no real results 
proceeding from the Assembly, and with the criminal courts 
due to open in six weeks, many of the best-educated members, 
the lawyers, would be called away. The civil list continued 
to sizzle quietly in the background; rum punch passed 
around the chamber and debate was punctuated by the most 
violent personal abuse of Sewell and other highly-placed men. 
,, of course the moment that moderation is lost sight of & old 
feelings on this subject are irritated, so soon the great 
crash of the whole fabrick will fall in, and all will end in 
fury, & in smoke. "18 
To avert the Apocalypse, the Governor continued to invite 
all parties indiscriminately to the Chateau, and tried to 
ignore the fact that they sat silently eating, talking neither 
to left nor to right, and listening without enthusiasm to 
his exhortations to conduct themselves with peace and caution. 
This was not enough. On 8 March the hotheads in the 
Legislative Council anticipated the Assembly's proceedings 
on the civil list and fired off six salvoes, "angry 
resolutions" Dalhousie called them, " which have equally 
disturbed the steadiness" of the upper house. These were 
the Richardson rules, adopted as standing orders of the 
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Council, pledging it not to proceed with money bills 
inconsistent with British constitutional practice. The first 
five merely recited what a standing order of the Assembly 
already declared, that money bills had to be recommended to 
both houses by the executive. The sixth regulation took 
higher ground: it repudiated any civil list voted for a 
shorter time than the life of the King, or voted in a way 
that allowed the Assembly to curb individual salaries. 
By a narrow majority the rules were adopted, and the supply 
bill which came up, passed for one year and with specific 
items deleted, was killed without debate. 
The colony was taken by surprise, and badly divided. 
All the Canadiens in the council, and two British members, 
had opposed the resolutions. John Hale told his brother-in- 
law that the resolutions took "higher ground than I thought 
we were likely to maintain, or than perhaps the Executive 
Government expected. "19 Dalhousie closed the session with a 
haughty speech deploring the clash between the two houses, 
and the Mercury took up the same theme: 
The differences between our Legislative Council 
and the House of Assembly, on money bills, are 
in about as hopeful a way as a suit thrown into 
chancery.... how, when, or by whom, is the issue 
to be determined? Arguments are to be adduced 
on both sides.... 
All we dare do is to pour out our ardent prayer 
that, prior to the meeting of the next session, 
the leading members of the different branches may 
see each other, and come to such an understanding, 
as to future proceedings, as may smooth the path 
to harmony, in such a manner, that... there may 
be no further ground for exclamation... 'a 
plague of both your houses. 
20 
There were no conciliatory meetings, and no compromising 
behind the scenes. In the next session the controversy over 
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the Richardson rules blotted out what might have been the 
more important issue, Dalhousie's effort to reduce costs, 
especially in the legal departments, by transferring many 
official contingencies to the list of local expenses for which 
he thought annual appropriations would suffice. But he also 
transmitted, in the name of the King, a civil list of 
important salaries, about a third of them in the judicial 
department, to be voted permanently for the life of the 
King. The Assembly and Council gathered at Quebec in a most 
hostile spirit; Papineau had the quorum in the lower chamber 
raised from 15 to 26 in the house of 50, so that a minority 
could 
r 
suspend proceedings. No longer "mild & silent" as in 
1820-21, Papineau was now "the declared life of the faction", 
and in the Legislative Council Bishop Plessis was trying to 
repeal Richardson's rules. 
21 On 20 January the Assembly 
passed resolutions in favour of annual supply bills, the 
non-parity resolutions which proclaimed that British 
precedents were on this question no suitable guide to the 
colony. The council replied with "strong constitutional" 
rebuttals; 
22 in the course of these proceedings Richardson 
vented his full hostility and suspicion of the Assembly, 
adverting to private meetings outside the house to prearrange 
Assembly business. Such meetings would correspond roughly 
to the modern Canadian parliamentary party caucuses, but were 
unfamiliar in British parliamentary practice in the 1820s -- 
the Lichfield House meeting of 1835 would probably be the 
nearest contemporary parallel. Richardson could not be 
expected to look that far forward; instead he looked back. 
The only precedents for secret Committees 
originating independently of Royal Authority, 
are to be found in the time of Charles the 1st 
and the Revolution in France, where a Secret 
Committee, called, the Committee of Public 
Safety sat and promulgated their Decrees or 
Proceedings, when it suited them. It is well 
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known, what followed, and can it be tolerated, 
under our Constitution, that any Committee 
appointed by the Assembly without the authority 
of the King's Representative shall dare to 
exclude other Members & keep secret their 
deliberations.... If they assume so dangerous 
& so unconstitutional a Power... might it not by 
possibility lead to consequences as destructive, as 
would be, the appointment of a First Consul, and 
turning the King's Representative out of the Castle. 
23 
There could be no advantage in relaxing standing orders which 
declared and enforced the same salutary checks which the 
British constitution imposed on hasty or prejudiced legislation. 
When the supply bill eventually came up, reduced from the 
estimates and enacted for only a year, Richardson prevailed 
against the efforts of Plessis, his camadien allies and 
Michael Perceval; the bill was declared unfit for further 
proceedings. 
24 The session produced another major discord, 
the fiscal dispute between Upper and Lower Canada; this 
dispute involved the non-renewal of temporary Acts from which 
44% of the lower province's revenues were derived. The 
expiring Acts were eventually kept in force by the imperial 
parliament. 
25 
The session of 1823 proceeded under the shadow of this 
loss of control. Not only had Dalhousie continued, against 
his inclinations, to pay the civil list from unappropriated 
revenues and the military chest; not only had the British 
Government wrested from the Assembly its stranglehold on 
Upper Canadian finance; but the Government had also publicly 
contemplated reuniting the two Canadas. The Assembly was 
haunted by this possibility. It may also have been tempted 
by the knowledge that Caldwell was on the brink of bankruptcy, 
and that a great scandal could be created by reversing the 
normal parsimonious policies and spending money which ought 
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to have been available, but was not. Moreover, Papineau and 
Neilson were in England lobbying against the reunion bill and 
the new Speaker, Remi Vallieres, was a less forbidding figure 
than his predecessor. 
26 This combination of fear, hope, and 
different leadership induced the assembly to cooperate with 
Dalhousie's very modest request on the civil list. 
Furthermore, in 1823 the Crown revenues for the first 
time exceeded the "permanent" part of the cost of the civil 
establishment. This was L32,083 (well below the '40,000 
figure set by Richmond) but the Assembly was incensed at the 
apparent intention of the executive to put the permanent 
revenue completely outside the Assembly's purview. Perhaps 
the executive intended not merely to shelter the present 
group of placemen, but to create a greater number even more 
obnoxious than the existing ones, as the permanent revenues 
increased. On the other hand, the change meant that the 
explicit request for a civil list for the life of the King 
was not renewed. Dalhousie noted afterwards that he asked 
for nothing special that year, but merely left the matter to 
the good sense of the two houses. In fact he did a little 
more than that. The Assembly's vote of supply failed to 
meet the strict terms of the Richardson rules, the under- 
lying spirit of the representatives was bad, 
& the material part of appropriation would 
again have dropt as last year, had I not 
actually requested Mr. Richardson in Council 
to help the Bill to pass, and that, with every 
desire to comply with my wishes, he could only 
do, by adding a strong & pointed Protest against 
the Spirit and the form in which it had been 
presented. In fact, therefore, little has been 
gained in the great object of cordial recon- 
ciliation in the Legislature, and I do not 
doubt but that the evil spirit will out again 
in next session. 
27 
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The session of 1823-24 proceeded in an entirely different 
spirit. It was the "penitentiary session", the last before 
a mandatory quadrennial dissolution, and Papineau was back 
from England and manoeuvering to supplant ValliOres in the 
Speakership. The disgrace of Caldwell was nearly complete, 
and the threat of Canadian reunion seemed more remote. 
Papineau was warm in personal abuse of Dalhousie; the assembly 
rejected an appeal from Upper Canada for new taxes to help 
repay individuals for property damage during the War of 1812. 
An Act establishing the rights of dissenters was passed with 
much sniping at Sewell and the Church of England; and the 
supply bill, on the pretext that Caldwell's default had 
impoverished the province, had 25% shorn from every item. 
A lump sum was voted, somewhat below the total amount asked 
for. The Legislative Council made short work of this, and 
Dalhousie at last announced what he had all along wished to 
do, that he would no longer place himself "in the gap between 
the Province & its ruin"; he would pay from the permanent 
revenues the costs of justice and central administration, 
which he conceived of as essential elements in the royal 
government of the province, or elements already provided for 
by previous enactments; and he would leave unpaid those 
institutions which existed by the will of the Legislature for 
the convenience of its constituents. In 1824, the harassed 
governor would "let the Province feel the consequences of the 
folly & absurd violence of the Assembly, in which I place the 
whole blame & mischief. "28 The Assemblymen were furious, 
regarding the division into permanent and local establishments 
as a means of favouring the higher bureaucrats at the expense 
of the lesser ones. But in this year, as in so many others, 
political events prevented the matter from being carried into 
the following session in the same form. 
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iii 
In June, 1824, Lord Dalhousie left Lower Canada for his 
first visit to Britain since 1816. He was due for a year's 
leave; grave irregularities by his private agent demanded 
his presence in London; his health had been deteriorating, 
with severe headaches and pain in the eyes, for over a year; 
and he hoped a visit to the Colonial Office night shake the 
lethargy of the authorities there, who seemed to believe a 
reconciliation possible between their own principles (which 
Dalhousie shared) and those of the Assembly, which seemed 
unlikely ever to yield. Because the Assembly's term had 
expired, Sewell advised Dalhousie he could be away for 
almost a year without having to meet the Legislature; 
nothing need be decided in his absence. Moreover, Dalhousie 
was lukewarm on the reunion, but was determined that some 
energetic imperial interference must break the current dead- 
lock. Routine matters would be handled in his absence by 
the popular Lieutenant Governor, Sir Francis Burton, brother- 
in-law of George IV's mistress. 
29 
What followed was unique in the annals of Lower Canada. 
A Governor on leave turned over limited authority to a sub- 
ordinate and returned fourteen months later to find the whole 
system of his government overturned. Burton was already on 
easy terms with the leading Assemblymen, and had made deep 
inroads into the bureaucracy and Executive Council. Caldwell 
and Davidson, who still counted for something, were in Burton's 
camp; so was the receiver-general, Hale, who hated Sewell, 
and Ryland, whom Burton courted and who regarded the 
Lieutenant Governor as his last hope of retiring in dignity 
to a "snug little Situation" in England. Michael Perceval, 
collector of customs and member of both Councils, had always 
mistrusted extreme constitutional doctrines. Andrew Cochran 
accompanied the Governor to Britain. Jonathan Sewell was at 
war with most of the "Executive Council over his son's appoint- 
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ment as sheriff of Quebec and, fearing an alliance. of Burton, 
Hale, and the other judges against him, was cowed into 
silence. 
30 And the Quebec Gazette launched a shrewd campaign 
to convince Burton that he could succeed where Dalhousie was 
so dismally failing. In a lengthy treatise on the financial 
question, the Gazette discussed the influence of the chateau 
clique and Colonial Office on the Governor, and argued that 
"a Governor must find himself very powerfully supported both 
in and out of the Colony, who would think it adviseable to 
take a decided part in opposition" to the Executive Council * 
31 
The reasoning was seductive. In the colony, Burton enjoyed 
the support of the Assembly and much of the two Councils 
(excluding the British from Montreal, and Sewell, Smith and 
Mountain from Quebec. ) Outside the colony, Burton's influence 
extended into the King's bedroom. No one could be in a 
stronger position to over-ride Sewell, Richardson, and the 
Governor whom they served. 
pursued by such reasoning, Burton quickly threw over- 
board all his agreements with Dalhousie. Fie dissolved the 
Assembly, getting a new one with all the old leaders still 
in place. He prepared to pay the local establishment unpaid 
by Dalhousie after the failure of supply; and he summoned 
the Assembly to meet early in 1825. And when Burton sent 
his estimates down to the assembly, they took the form 
favoured by Papineau: an unclassified list of charges, a 
statement of the resources expected to meet them, and a 
simple request for a grant for the current year to cover the 
remainder. The ostensible motive for this rapprochement was 
a desire for gradual change. Ryland recapitulated this in 
1826: the government ought to pursue "a conciliatory course 
which was calculated to bring them, degrees, to a con- 
stitutional and liberal mode of proceeding with respect to 
supplies for the support of the Civil Government. "32 The 
bill which actually passed was in the form Burton had asked, 
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but as it eliminated B3,330, it clearly infringed on the 
imperial policy that the Assembly must not reduce charges 
which the imperial authorities were determined to pay from 
the permanent revenue. John Richardson denounced the measure, 
but his formal protest garnered the signature of only one 
other Legislative Councillor. Plessis had mustered 
James Cuthbert, with six elderly Canadiens -- two literally 
carried into the chamber -- to supplement his "holy alliance" 
with Perceval, Ryland, and Hale. William Smith capitulated 
to the "reigning power", John Caldwell remained discreetly 
silent. Sewell admitted that the bill was technically legal 
and declined to take sides; William McGillivray, who would 
have supported Richardson, was too ill to attend; Roderick 
McKenzie of Terrebonne quit the capital in disgust when he 
heard what Burton intended. Two councillors from Trois 
Rivieres, Matthew Bell and Isaac Coffin, joined the majority 
reluctantly because of Burton's earnest pleas for their 
support. 
33 Despite opposition from much of the British 
community in Montreal, opinion at Quebec was generally 
enthusiastic over Burton's achievement. Only the attorney- 
general voted "no" in the assembly; only the official 
Gazette whose editor owed Dalhousie much personal gratitude 
and Ll, 000 besides, spoke against the compromise. Neilson 
recalled afterwards that "the whole country was in a state 
of joy at the end of our difficulties. " The Mercury lauded 
Burton's diplomacy: 
It must afford him the most gratifying 
sensations when he reflects, that he has 
happily succeeded in bringing together the 
contending parties... under his auspices, this 
happy arrangement has been effected. 
34 
Even the 1.1ontreal Herald praised the Assembly, though it 
continued to doubt the legality of the Bill. And John Simpson, 
an English-speaking supporter of Dalhousie from the district 
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of Montreal, wrote to the Governor to plead with him to 
acknowledge the compromise. Our debates, he said, showed 
unconstitutional intentions but the journals and the Act 
itself were innocent of irregularity. Credit for the good 
result, he hastened to add, belonged to the 23 new Assemblymen 
and not to the new head of government. But the measure 
must be allowed to stand: "it may be considered as the first 
dawning of sober reason on the part of the House and as a 
promise of perfect sanity for the next session. I freely 
hope therefore that the Financial difficulties of Lower 
Canada may be'consider'd as approaching their termination. 1135 
Simpson spoke for the majority of English-speaking Lower 
Canadians, who were disgusted with conflict between the two 
chambers and could see very little in the civil list issue 
to excite their own cultural uneasiness. But Burton's action 
involved more than just the colony; it implied that the 
Colonial office had been tyrannical or frivolous in demanding 
a more permanent appropriation, or that the rigid policy of 
previous years had not been devised by the Colonial Office 
at all, but by the local executive sheltering dishonesty 
behind the prestige of the sting's name. In fact Dalhousie 
had not been repudiated: Burton had merely ignored the in- 
structions of the Colonial Office for the previous four years, 
including one despatch received by Burton himself while 
administering the government. His defence of the bill, that 
"the Assembly have decidely acknowledged the right of the 
Crown to dispose of the Revenue arising out of the 14 of 
George the 3d" was a lie. 
36 The Colonial Office was faced with 
the choice of repudiating either the Governor or the Lieutenant 
Governor; and despite Burton's strong influence and popularity, 
Bathurst did no more than tolerate the bill for the present 
and order a return to past instructions in future. He had 
little choice, short of letting an underling dictate policy, 
then finding a new Governor for Canada. 
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f 
Burton was accordingly reprimanded, and Dalhousie went 
back to the colony with renewed instructions to maintain the 
rights of the Crown. But there could be no return to the 
peace of 1823. Both sides had tasted compromise, and only 
some Montreal merchants, Sewell, and a handful of younger 
men continued to stand by Dalhousie. The Executive Council 
was becoming cold and dilatory in handling the routine 
business referred to it; 
37 the Assembly treated Bathurst's 
despatches with disdain, accused Dalhousie of suppressing 
documents which would exonerate Burton's policy, and in the 
winter of 1825-26 passed a supply bill identical to the 
previous one. The Legislative Council, deprived of Burton's 
blandishments and whipped into line by Bathurst's despatches, 
took the unprecedented step of amending the supply bill, 
which naturally died in the Assembly. But there was no 
spirit of defiance, no will to fight. Richardson, Sewell 
and Stuart all advised Dalhousie not to dissolve the 
Assembly: "the utter ignorance of the Electors could not 
make any distinction in their choice, the same individuals 
would be returned [and] any measures to relieve the present 
state of things effectually must spring from the King's Govt 
at home. nothing was to be obtained of the Legislature 
here. , 
38 
The King's Government was receiving conflicting advice 
from W. B. Felton, a prominent land-holder and developer from 
the townships who was sent to London in the summer of 1826 
to advise the government on trade policy on behalf of the 
Montreal merchants. He also advised on constitutional matters: 
Much of the opposition and difficulty 
experienced in conducting the government 
heretofore may have been occasioned by the 
adherence of the Executive to the principle 
that all persons employed in the service of 
the public ought to look up to the Crown 
alone for the payment of their Salaries; in 
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practice... it has been customary to consider 
the Speakers of the Legislative Council and 
Assembly.... the Staff of the Militia, the 
schoolmasters of the Province and several 
other local offices, as solely dependent 
on the Crown both in respect to appointment 
and the amount and continuance of their 
Salaries. 
This, said Felton, would never fail to irritate "any body 
pretending to exercise functions at all analagous to those 
attributed to the popular branch of the Legislature in 
England. " He proposed to concede all the Crown revenues out- 
right in return for fixed quarterly payments from the 
legislature to the executive. 
39 
Felton's proposal, potentially inimical to the high 
constitutional principles of the leaders of the group to 
which he belonged, became the basis of a despatch to Dalhousie 
by Bathurst's successor, Lord Goderich, in 1827. But the 
financial question, as Dalhousie had predicted, was not to 
be settled in Lower Canada. The Assembly in 1826-7 
produced no supply bill at all; Dalhousie dissolved it and 
made up his mind not to accept Papineau as Speaker in the 
new one. The elections went against the government; Papineau 
was presented by the new house, and rejected by Dalhousie. 
The refusal was a harsh experiment, but was justified by two 
of Dalhousie's preoccupations. First, he was no longer 
interested in getting an accommodation with the Assembly, 
but in provoking the Colonial Office to increase the 
efficiency of government and the influence of the executive. 
Dalhousie's second preoccupation, reflected in his rejection 
of Papineau, was that the refusal seemed constitutional, 
though very rare. Blackstone's Commentaries asserted that 
the King's assent as well as the House's election was needed 
to qualify a Speaker; this assent had been refused in the 
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past -- a rather shaky case in England under James II, a 
shadowy one in New England early in the eighteenth century, 
and a firm and satisfactory precedent in Nova Scotia, well 
within living memory in 1806. None of these precedents 
satisfied the Assembly, which denounced the royal prerogative 
of approving the Speaker as a mere form, incapable of being 
asserted. The Assembly was quickly prorogued, the session 
of 1827-28 did not take place, and Dalhousie's gubernatorial 
career ended in ruins. 
40 
The struggle over the civil list continued under 
Dalhousie's successor, the administrator Sir James Kempt. 
More dignified than Burton, more flexible than Dalhousie, 
Kempt had governed Nova Scotia since 1820, and though he was 
older than Dalhousie he shared the attitude of the new breed 
of soldier-governors, typified by Sir John Harvey, an officer 
on the brink of a long career of government in British North 
America. In 1829 Harvey wrote to Dalhousie about Kempt's 
mission, 
If the King's Govt think fit to adopt the views 
" of the Assembly of Lower Canada, in God's name 
let them honestly say so to their Governor, to 
whom it must be a matter of Comparative 
indifference what is the line of Policy which 
he gives effect to. 
41 
Here Harvey exposed the root of Dalhousie's problems: he had 
attached himself, politically and emotionally, to an idea and 
a party which seemed intimately connected with British 
interests in Lower Canada. As long as this party -- the 
Montreal "British" party with its eagerness for economic 
expansion -- expressed political views in a manner which 
conformed to the policy of the home Government Dalhousie's 
position was tolerable, but after 1826, and particularly 
after Bathurst, it became clear that the Colonial Office was 
groping for a new direction and that Dalhousie had become an 
encumbrance, wedded to the notion that the Assembly could not 
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be trusted to govern wisely, and the people could not be 
expected to elect better representatives under the existing 
constitution. Shifting alignments in the British House of 
Commons, as much as the obvious bankruptcy of the Dalhousie- 
Bathurst policy, made it impossible for the new incumbents 
of Downing Street to carry on as before. 
42 
Dalhousie might believe that the colony could never 
prosper as long as Canadiens ruled in the assembly, but men 
as diverse as John Simpson of Coteau du Lac, Herman Ryland, 
and Thomas Cary of the Quebec Mercury had proved, during 
Burton's administration, willing at least to leave the 
question open, and such a conservative figure as Felton was 
advising the Colonial office to pay more attention to the 
Assembly's regard for itself as a House of Commons. So 
there were at least modest prospects for success when in 1828 
the new Colonial Secretary, Sir George Murray, instructed 
Kempt that "under the existing law, the Executive Government 
of Lower Canada cannot be relieved from a state of virtual 
pecuniary dependence upon the Assembly by any constitutional 
means, and methods of a different nature must not be resorted 
to. "43 In January 1829 the Chief Justice reported to 
Dalhousie that Hale, Ryland and Caldwell had capitulated to 
this view; Sewell professed deep contempt for those who 
invited all British settlers to throw themselves under the 
wheels of the "Car of Juggerhnaut", the power of the Assembly. 
Within a matter of weeks he himself had crossed over. 
Richardson was absent in Montreal when by a vote of 9-7 the 
council passed a retroactive supply bill for 1828 framed 
like that of 1825; and then the supply for 1829 was voted by 
a controversial margin of 8-7, with Sewell voting twice, 
once as a member to force a tie, and again as chairman to 
break the deadlock and see the bill through to Kempt's 
reluctant approval, and the even more reluctant assent of 44 
Sir George Murray. 
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The supply bill of the following year was a landmark; 
it was the last sent up to Kempt, who left the colony late 
in 1830; it was the last voted on the plan of 1825; it was 
also the last session of the legislature held with a tory 
government in London. It is therefore worth examining the 
structure of the vote in the Legislative Council on the 
supply bill as the end of an era in imperial policy, as well 
as the end of a phase in the local struggle. Once again the 
double vote of Jonathan Sewell passed a bill similar to that 
of 1825. Voting for the bill were Sewell, receiver-general 
Hale, Herman Ryland, John Caldwell, James Cuthbert, Jean-Thomas 
Taschereau, and Louis R. C. De Ldry; against these seven stood 
Richardson, Grant, Toussaint Pothier, Matthew Bell, Louis Gugy, 
Felton, and Judge Edward Bowen. The chamber was in no 
sense an accurate representation of either the politically 
articulate population of the colony or the "British party", 
but some interesting trends can be detected. (A vote for 
the bill favoured conciliation of the Assembly; it did not 
necessarily endorse autonomist policies. ) The tendencies are 
interesting, if not wholly surprising. Murray's conciliatory 
policy was rejected by two-thirds or more of the Montreal, 
Trois RiviA-res and townships members, townships landholders, 
and commercial men. It was rejected also by less striking 
majorities of the British-born and of Protestants. The 
seigneurial interest and small Catholic membership voted 
strongly for conciliation. The voting of placemen is 
interesting, but misleading; Richardson's B100 as Executive 
Councillor was a negligible part of his income; Felton was 
independently wealthy, and his official salary was not paid 
by the Assembly. Sheriff Gugy received only L150 of his 
large income from the Assembly, the rest came from fees. 
Only Judge Bowen of Quebec voted against his main source of 
income. At the same time a vote against the bill might have 
had serious consequences for Caldwell. Altogether the bill 
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gave L5400 to those who voted for it, and I3,137 to those 
who were opposed. If one regards Caldwell as dependent on 
government, and Richardson and Felton as independent, two- 
thirds of dependent Councillors voted with the Assembly and 
the Administrator. Papineau's measure had been carried by 
the very men whom he considered unfit to hold seats in the 
Council at all. 
iv 
This discussion suggests some interesting conclusions 
about the supposed alliance of merchants and bureaucrats in 
Lower Canada's politics. The civil list under Dalhousie's 
regime, and under Kempt's, was more rigidly supported by the 
merchant aristocracy of Montreal than by the officials whose 
pay was at stake. The dramatic defection of Sewell in 1829 
can be explained by the accompanying change in imperial 
policy, but the Chief Justice was only crowning a long 
tradition of bureaucratic willingness to conciliate the 
Assembly rather than confront it. Perceval in 1821, Ryland 
and Hale from 1825 at the latest, and a majority of high 
placemen after 1828 were willing to let the merchants fight 
their battle for them, and in the end to disown the cause 
altogether. 
Both groups, or at least the most conspicuous spokesmen 
for each, were broadly united in defence of the colonial 
constitution as they understood it. Both were under-represented 
in the Assembly, and the merchants had been willing to co- 
operate with the officials during the 1810s and 1820s, when 
judges and bureaucrats outnumbered merchants and seigneurs 
in the Council. But the interests of the merchants were 
always closely linked with the idea of change, while in many 
respects the officials were merely interested in returning 
to the quiet old days when the seigneurs and clergy ruled the 
habitants and salaries were paid punctually. Peace, not 
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progress, was the bureaucrats' chief concern, and peace meant 
a reconciliation of the officials' interests with the plans 
of the Assembly and the Colonial Office. 1826 showed that the 
opinion of the Colonial Office (not of the Governor) out- 
weighed all personal preferences, and 1829 drove the point 
home more firmly. By 1828 the old alliance based on 
nationality was being publicly denounced by the merchants: 
We have had frequent occasion to allude to the 
commencement... of an Oligarchy in the Government 
of Lower Canada, which, if firmly established, 
would have enabled the Country to vegetate in 
tranquillity, but would never have been 
essentially useful in anglifying the Province, 
and in rendering it a British Colony in fact, 
as it had been for half a century in name.... 
This Junta,... being the only Association which 
would tolerate the smallest innovation upon the 
French and Feudal Laws, its power was generally 
supported, or at least not reprobated, by the 
Merchants and Inhabitants of British origin. 
This anomolous body... must always exist under 
the present vicious constitution, so long as 
British ascendancy or influence shall not 
entirely depend upon military Force. 
45 
This repudiation of the alli, ance as a regrettable outcome of 
a vicious constitution, came to dominate the sentiments of 
non-bureaucratic members of the British community of Lower 
Canada. Indeed, Robert Christie alleged that as early as 
1823 the whole non-official part of the English-speaking 
population was out of sympathy with the bureaucrats, but 
muted this hostility because of an even stronger dislike for 
the nationalism of the Assembly. By 1834 the so-called 
alliance was completely in tatters, and since the following 
words were written by a new-comer to the colony, they may be 
viewed as a received opinion, not a personal one. The 
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British colonists, wrote Adam Thom, "mostly ranged themselves 
of the side of a vacillating and treacherous executive against 
the deadly enemies of... British interests. For want of a 
collective voice they could not, as a body, proclaim any 
intermediate and independent opinion. " The inference was 
that they had always wished to do so. 
46 
The alliance between merchants and officials had functioned 
best before 1810, when profound fears were felt for the 
external security of the colony; in reality, outside that 
context, it was an alliance not specifically of the two groups 
with each other, but of both, separately, with the Colonial 
Office and British Government. The outward appearance of 
alliance was eroded during the twenties, first by the debate 
over Canadian reunion, which the bulk of officials distrusted 
as an unnecessary irritant to the Canadiens, partly by 
periodic sniping at Michael Perceval, who was unpopular among 
the merchants in both Councils, and finally by the defection 
of the British government from the high constitutional stand 
of Bathurst and Dalhousie. After 1828 a few correspondents 
told Dalhousie that he was much regretted by all the British 
colonists, but it is unlikely whether this stood true except 
for a few younger journalists, sycophants, placemen, and 
John Richardson. 
For by 1830 'toryism' revolved around Richardson. His 
main rival for leadership of the English party, Jonathan 
Sewell, had begun to trim his sails after a quarrel with 
Dalhousie over patronage and a visit to London in 1826. 
James Stuart was too volatile to be a leader; it took him 
sixty years to learn to be more than a henchman. Head and 
shoulders above all contemporaries stood Richardson. And 
yet he belonged to the past; to an era when caution and 
fear, not impatience and optimism, were the marks of a 
prudent Briton in North America. "I am too old to change ray 
principles, and shall remain firm -- but few may follow my 
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example. "47 His brand of political fatalism seems 
characteristic of eighteenth-century politics, not nineteenth- 
century commerce. How far did the political rigidity of this 
highest of the haute bourgeoisie represent the interests of 
business as a whole, rather than the distinctive interests 
of the best-established houses in the forwarding trade, and 
the largest speculators in townships land? The pragmatism 
and flexibility which enabled the merchants to ride out 
numerous economic storms, deserted them when they took their 
seats in the Legislative Council. Birds of passage, the 
Canadiens called them, and yet they showed far more concern 
for the long-term constitutional stability of the colony 
than for the advantages that might be won in the short run 
by conciliation and compromise. They alone, who had most to 
gain from economic legislation, failed to believe that the 
Assembly would act more constructively when its power was 
established. The attitude of the die-hard merchants in the 
legislative council in 1830 suggested an astonishing 
confidence in their ability to prosper despite political 
deadlock, and a bottomless mistrust of their opponents. 
Such a view seems characteristic not simply of a minority, 
but of a powerful elite within a minority. John Richardson, 
as much as Papineau, spoke for certain aspects of the 
eighteenth century and left a trail of obstruction and mis- 
trust through the early years of the nineteenth. The highest 
spokesmen of the haute bourgeoisie, like those of the 
Canadiens, were still more conservative than innovative 
in their social and political vision. John Richardson and 
his supporters we're committed to an idea-of colonial 
subordination which even the Colonial office and its servants 
in the colony were beginning to shed. 
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Chapter 4: Constitutional Breakdown, 1825-1828 
i 
With the return of Lord Dalhousie to Lower Canada, politics 
entered a new and dangerous phase. Early in 1826 a session 
of the Legislature was wasted in raking over the coals of 
Burton's administration, the Assembly doing its best to 
persuade the people that the Colonial Office had not con- 
demned Burton's measures at all. Then in 1826 the grain crops 
failed, and a slump in the timber trade began in the same 
year. But there were also Fiuskisson's reforms of the old 
colonial system, reforms which in general were welcomed by 
the colonial merchants, who saw in them their own favourite 
mixture of free trade in principle, modified by protection in 
practice for colonial produce against Baltic and American 
competition. But protection was more necessary now; the 
St. Lawrence system was challenged in 1826 by completion of 
the Lrie Barge Canal, while the American administration 
continued to talk of seeking free navigation of the 
St. Lawrence. In Montreal, therefore, the general spirit 
was one of caution and apprehension. Some leading merchants 
tried to stimulate, through civic government, a spirit and 
habit of cooperation between British capitalists and leading 
Canadiens. Their effort to create an alternative to the old 
uneasy alliance between capital and bureaucracy was scotched 
by the mutual hostility of the Assembly and Council. Despite 
the anxiety of some to transcend cultural and political 
differences, the return of Dalhousie and the economic troubles 
of 1826-27 combined with the stagnant policies of the Colonial 
Office to deepen the hostility between patriotes and the 
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executive. NO supply bill passed in 1826,1827, or 1828. 
The Assembly was dissolved prematurely in 1827, and no regular 
sessions were held between March 1827 and November 1828. 
Despite the harmony of 1824-25, colonial society continued 
deeply divided between those who trusted the government and 
those who were anxious to check it. 
ii 
The complete collapse of relations between the execu- 
tive and the leaders of the assembly invites an examination 
of the ideological chasm between the two groups. This line 
of investigation is encouraged by the developing debate over 
the character of the political philosophies of ruling elites 
in British North America. This debate has so far skirted 
the Lower Canadian colonists, perhaps on the assumption that 
in the 1820s they were an English head poorly grafted onto 
a French body, and racial differences made it unlikely that 
attitudes would flow from one into the other. This may be 
true, but need not stifle the examination of what was going 
on inside that head, and to assess the importance of political 
ideas as an element in the clash between the patriotes of 
Lower Canada and the imperial centralists in their midst. 
l 
The study of this subject must take account of Durham's 
remark that the colonial tories were really frustrated 
liberals, backed into insincere conservatism by the demo- 
cratic rhetoric and tactics of their locally more numerous 
opponents. This was broadly true by 1838, and true of some 
prominent individuals in the twenties. 71 quondam president 
of the Bank of Montreal wrote a book in 1828 to explain his 
anti-popular views to his liberal merchant friends in 
England, arguing that when democracy was used to buttress 
feudalism, lovers of true freedom must seek strength where- 
ever they could find it. 
2 But this was not the only grounds 
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for opposing the patriotes in the twenties; not all the 
colonial tories were closet liberals. Their political ideas 
could not all be shaped by reaction to the French Canadians, 
for many of them were strangers to the colony until they 
arrived as adults. Richardson, Sewell and others had been 
profoundly affected by personal experience of the American 
Revolution; 
3 
others like Judge Kerr were products of British 
upper-class society in the late eighteenth century. All 
had learned to mistrust democratic ideas and republican 
regimes in the decades between the execution of Louis XVI 
and the Treaty of Ghent. Their special position as an 
influential elite in Lower Canada helped to keep them 
conservative in an age of popular turbulence; it was not 
required to make them so in the first place. 
There was little doubt in the minds of Dalhousie's 
supporters that the Assembly hoped to establish a French 
republic, and had learned nothing from recent events in 
France itself. "After 1822 the Assembly reassessed the 
relevance of British forms to Canadian conditions. Leading 
Assemblymen began to declaim not merely on the privileges of 
the Commons, but on the quite different doctrines of natural 
rights and popular sovereignty. To Francois Blanchet the 
Dalhousie regime was "un etat contre nature qui ne peut pas 
longtems exister" and to Jacques Labrie the British consti- 
tution itself needed to be re-interpreted, especially for 
"l'instruction politique de la Jeunesse Canadienne". His 
pamphlet undertaking this task declared that the King was 
the first servant of the people, with duties to the laws but 
no inherent powers; his honour and glory were received from 
the sovereign people as a reflection of their own majesty. 
The people did not actually compose any of the three branches 
of the constitution but -- what was more important -- they 
provided and inspired all three. 
4 
Consequently, Judge Kerr 
saw the Assembly in 1828 tending towards that state of 
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corrupted democracy described by Montesquieu, in which the 
people delegated power to various officials then nevertheless 
tried to dictate the deliberations of the senators, the 
regulations of the magistrates, and the verdicts of the 
judges. The Quebec Mercury complained in 1827 that "By and 
bye it will be 'illegal' to question their right to organize 
a provisional junto for the assumption of the Civil Govern- 
ment" and David Chisholme perceived in the local Assembly a 
determination distressingly like that of the Rump Parliament 
in 1648: 
That whatever is enacted or declared for law 
by the Commons in Parliament assembled, hath 
the force of law; and all the people of this 
nation are concluded thereby, although the 
consent and concurrence of the King or House 
of Peers be not had thereto. 
5 
One of the most remarkable anti-liberal political 
thinkers of the decade does not fit easily into the tradit- 
ional moulds. Chief Justice Jonathan Sewell was born in 
pre-Revolutionary Massachusetts, he was educated at Bristol, 
and moved to New Brunswick in 1785. His ideas were strongly 
anti-democratic but assimilated French traditions to the idea 
of a centralized British North America. One of the decade's 
most interesting political documents is Sewell's Essay on 
the Juridical History of France, So Far As It Relates to the 
Law of the Province of Lower Canada. This paper traced the 
roots of the French legal system up to the establishment of 
the sovereign Council at Quebec in 1663. Sewell criticized 
feudalism; he admitted that it suited a society constantly 
at war, but in peacetime it encouraged an unhealthy growth 
of power in the great nobles. In contrast to the proliferation 
of local (in origin, tribal) legal codes and the power of 
local magnates, Sewell represented as a laudable development 
the growth of royal authority in the courts of justice and, 
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after 1190, in making laws for the whole Kingdom, standard- 
izing procedures in matters of common concern. The Crown, 
it was clear, was the source and focus of the subject's 
protection from the arbitrary conduct of nobles and the 
Church. It is striking, considering the intellectual and 
social ferment in which Sewell grew up, that the written 
record of his opinions and beliefs shows little influence of 
any political theory developed in Europe after the fifteenth 
century. 
6 
Many colonists looked for guidance and support to 
William Blackstone, or to Montesquieu. The importance of 
Sir William Blackstone's Commentaries to conservatism in the 
rest of British North America is emphasized in the work of 
S. F. Wise. 
7 Blackstone's work was cited approvingly by 
Dalhousie in a memorandum on municipal government, and by 
the journalist David Chisholme in an essay on the royal 
prerogative-8 Blackstone was an attractive source book 
for conservatives in Lower Canada. His notion of a 
balanced constitution was congenial in itself; his 
Commentaries, unlike the writings of Locke or Voltaire, did 
not merely espouse a philosophical system but defined 
constitutional law through statutes and precedents. Third, 
Blackstone's endorsement of prescriptive legitimacy was 
peculiarly relevant to advocates of strong imperial initiatives 
in the colonies, where the prerogatives of the Crown were 
less compromised than in England by conventions and Acts of 
Parliament. In Canada, the power of the executive was the 
power of Britain; the Governor was loosely called the 
representative of the Crown, but he was actually a represent- 
ative in the sense of being an agent, not a counterpart or 
imitation in the same way as the Assembly "represented" the 
House of Commons in the colonial adaptation of the British 
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constitution. 
9 The Governor did not embody a hereditary 
tradition with deep roots in the local soil, but carried out 
in the colony policies dictated by the collective wisdom of 
all three estates of the British Parliament, as distilled by 
the Colonial Secretary. The position of the Governor was 
not established by ancient custom, but by sentiment, trade 
and legislation. Hence the importance of the surrender of 
1759 and the cession of 1763 to Lower Canada's conservatives. 
Appearances to the contrary, the colony was not an auto- 
nomous fragment set apart by geography and fallen into the 
lap of the British empire by French lassitude; it was an 
integral part of the British nation, held by an unbroken 
link of legitimate succession from its possessors since 
1608. 
The imperial link was also important to British conser- 
vatives in Lower Canada because it imported the doctrine of 
elite rule into a country where egalitarian ideas had been 
encouraged by an abundance of cheap land. But the imperial 
tie was also important to others who took little interest in 
political dogma, men to whom a strong and confident executive 
in the colony meant commercial preferences and imperial loan 
credits, and contracts for masonry and food-stuffs. Yet 
these men were not on the "conservative" side purely out of 
concern for their purses. They argued public affairs in 
Blackstone's language, preferring the constitutional law of 
England to the natural law of the enlightenment, because 
they believed in the right of property to govern and in the 
need for sovereignty to reside somewhere other than in the 
people. Hence they supported a mixed, dependent constitution. 
Many supporters of the administration made political 
statements which it would be difficult to trace to any 
of the main streams of political thought in either Europe 
or the United States. This was partly due to the colony's 
hybrid constitution in which the franchise was more 
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democratic, and the executive more independent of the 
local legislature, than in Britain. Many of the 
administration's followers were critical of the British 
representation. The Mercury in 1820 enthusiastically en- 
dorsed Lord John Russell's efforts to reform parliamentary 
representation, and a leader-writer in the Montreal Herald 
made some interesting remarks on the colony's own franchise. 
The passage was written during Upper Canadian elections, 
and deprecated the rise of American political tendencies, 
but the writer was obviously looking over his own shoulder 
towards Quebec. The "constitution of suffrages is framed 
upon a wiser principle with us than the methods adopted by 
any other nation" he wrote, then devoted a long paragraph 
to the elector's responsibility to use his vote to support 
good measures within the spirit of the existing constitution. 
He would be indulging in "the most detestable and despicable 
spirits" if he let private interests or an "abstract question 
of political tendency affect his vote. " When he approached 
the polls he must remember his status both as a free 
individual and as a member of a corporate society defined by 
its common allegiance: he was voting as the "representative 
of his own personal rights and property, as a member of the 
polity which authorized him to vote, " but he was also "the 
friend and supporter of the constitution and monarchy of his 
country. "10 This was philosophical tight-rope-walking, a 
demonstration (perhaps deliberate) that Lower Canada's 
English-speaking community had become a sort of intellectual 
dust-bin in which scraps of many political theories lay 
jumbled together, carried to the colony by a promiscuous 
mixture of immigrants, most of whom realized that political 
rigidity was neither wise nor necessary. 
The clash between the traditional and the new 
economic systems in Lower Canada was intertwined with the 
ideological debate, but it was not the cause of it. The 
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Montreal Gazette struck this note in the leading article on 
New Year's Eve, 1827: "British subjects.... have seen all 
attempts at improvement, all changes or ameliorations syste- 
matically opposed. " Yet the conviction remained in most 
minds that obstruction of capitalist development by the 
patriotes was a tactic rather than an ultimate goal; solving 
the ideological problems would make the economic one go away. 
Even in the depths of the political crisis of 1827 there was 
the anomalous gesture of a legislative grant of E25,000 
to the Welland Canal, a project whose importance was remote 
to Lower Canada except to the forwarding merchants of 
Montreal. That city's Gazette in 1828 explicitly turned 
its back on the idea that the crisis was rooted in a struggle 
between two economic systems. Of all the colony's troubles, 
it said, "the first and möst important" was the control of 
the executive through the civil list, which confronted the 
colonists with the contest of local control against imperial 
guidance, and of unchecked democracy against the balanced 
constitution. This constitutional question, said the 
Gazette, was the "futile source" to which "all the other 
difficulties might fairly be traced. "11 
Unchecked democracy was the enemy which all supporters 
of the executive opposed. British conservatism, economic 
opportunism, and muddled thinking made up the basic motiva- 
tions of the colonial "tories", as they are commonly and 
misleadingly called. But it remains broadly true that 
even those who supported Dalhousie out of a sense of 
expediency could not conceive of a government operating 
efficiently or justly if it was founded on popular sove- 
reignty; "democracy" was a relatively neutral thing as long 
as it was kept within its sphere in one of the branches of 
the Legislature. But when democracy threatened to burst out 
of the }3lackstonian equilibrium, which it regularly did in 
Lower Canada, Dalhousie's supporters were obliged to stress 
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the non-parity of the colonial and the British constitu- 
tions: "considering the rank democracy in the Lower House" 
said the Mercury in 1828, "the aristocratic Branch cannot be 
too governmental. " 
12 
An important series of letters from 
"Senex", who was probably Richardson, appeared in the 
Montreal Herald in 1825, of which the following extract is 
typical: 
The Assembly apparently aim at... two things 
incompatible with each other -- the power of 
the executive, and the check upon that power, 
which, put into the same hands, would produce 
practical tyranny in its worst shape, as 
being wielded by a popular body, necessarily 
capricious from being fluctuating. 
David Chisholme was more outspoken in 1827: "All power 
without a check is despotism: and of all despotism none 
is so barbarous and hopeless as that of the Populace. It 
is a tyranny without the possibility that the tyrant should 
ever be good or enlightened. , 
13 
Recollections of the French Revolution and of 
England's experiment with a unicameral legislature both 
reinforced suspicion of the patriotes. But unique 
circumstances within the colony gave added force to this 
sentiment, for the legitimacy of the leaders of the Assembly 
as spokemen for the people was suspect. This was simulta- 
neously reassuring (the people were truly loyal and peaceful) 
and yet worrying, because "the multitude of every country 
is giddy, and there are always self-styled Patriots ready 
to blow the coals". Even if the people were sound, there 
was a process of deception at work in the colony. According 
to the Montreal Gazette in 1826, the Assembly did not contain 
the "true representatives of the people" but "a number of 
individuals pretending to that high honour, and strutting 
about in all the coxcombry of legislative authority. " But 
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"illegitimacy" was the hall-mark of their views, and "ille- 
gality" that of their measures. "Demagogues, " whether French 
like Papineau and Cuvillier or British like Neilson and 
Leslie, played on the fears and prejudices of the people; and 
they were ruining the colony by debasing the stability of its 
constitution, threatening its connexion with Great Britain, 
and squandering opportunities for economic security and 
progress. 
14 These were not the legitimate leaders of the 
people: the people were peaceful, happy and secure, they had 
little need for leaders and were imposed upon by lies about 
imaginary threats to their land and their religion. This 
point was crucial to the supporters of the executive in Lower 
Canada: they did not see their constitutional stance 
particularly as a desire to "turn a racial minority into a 
political majority. "15 They took minority control for 
granted. The majority of colonial subjects were illiterate; 
they might have a nominal independence through possession of 
property, but in other respects they were as politically 
incompetent as the disfranchised classes in Britain or in 
Ireland. The political struggle in Lower Canada was not, 
therefore, between an oppressed majority and a privileged 
minority; it was seen by the British as a fight between two 
urban, articulate minorities for the right to protect and to 
forward the interests of the majority. 
According to this view, the advocates of popular 
sovereignty continued to be elected to the Assembly because 
they spoke the same language as the undiscerning electors, 
who had no practical grievances or aspirations to drive them 
to a closer scrutiny of their politics. " "To complain, " 
wrote Judge Kerr, "of the age in which we live, and to 
murmur at those in power, are the common dispositions of the 
greatest part of mankind. " John Caldwell represented the 
bulk of the representatives as "possessed of scarce any dis- 
cretion of their own" and he correctly perceived that the con- 
stitution of England was bound to work in unfamiliar and perhaps 
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damaging ways 
when brought into action with reference to 
a people speaking a Foreign Language, deeply 
imbued with Foreign Prejudices, and necessarily 
deficient in that Political Education, which 
can only be the gradual result of the 
operation of moral causes and the enjoy- 
ment of Practical freedom thro' successive 
generations. 
16 
Catholicism was widely believed to inhibit the sort of 
personal independence which enabled men to participate 
rationally in free political institutions. The damage was 
completed by the fact that the Government had nothing to 
offer either the habitant or the country gentry in order to 
set up a counterpoise to the patriotes. In Lower Canada 
there was no one in the country district with any vested 
interest in denouncing unchecked democracy and explaining to 
the people that the Governor's schemes for road-building and 
municipal government were honestly designed to improve the 
habitants' standard of living. 
In the view of the staunchest supporters of the 
administration, the illegitimacy of the patriotes' electoral 
victories did not stop at the door of the Assembly; the 
hierarchy of deception operated within that body itself. 
Dalhousie's popular predecessor, Sir John Sherbrooke, in a 
passage both warning and commiserating, wrote in 1822 that 
In an Assembly constituted as yours is, where 
many of the Members are totally uneducated & 
consequently easily imposed upon, & misled 
by prattling Attorneys, & designing Dema- 
gogues, It requires great patience & 
moderation as well as perseverance & firmness 
in a Governor, to carry a measure however 
beneficial to the Country. 
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Dalhousie himself wrote in 1827 that "There are in that 
House many men of respectable character who have submitted 
to be led blindfolded. " 
17 
The local constitution was an experiment, and it was 
apparently failing. But having been started, it could not 
simply be cancelled. R. A. d'Estimauville wrote in 1829 that 
the constitution of 1791 could be compared to 
the idea of feeding new born infants with roast 
beef and plum pudding. However, the evil is done 
and the stomach of the Canadians is too well 
accustomed now to that noble British food to 
relinquish it. You have improvidently given 
them a British Constitution and it would be next 
to an impossibility to take it back from them. 
18 
Yet optimism remained among the governing classes. Hope lay 
in improved communication between the government and the 
people, to correct the deficiency whereby, in Dalhousie's 
words, 
I have no means of conveying to the mass of the 
people in the country parishes (who are quiet 
and well disposed) such vindications of the 
character or the measures of Government as are 
from time to time rendered necessary by the false 
and mischievous assertions of the French Press. 
19 
Other observers felt that increased social and political 
contact between the two races' 61ites would promote a better 
understanding. W. B. Felton thought in 1826 that a measure 
to allow the Eastern Townships a few representatives in the 
Assembly would put a large enough English minority there to 
create an atmosphere of real debate and discussion and so 
separate "the natural leaders of the Canadian people from 
the demagogues of the Assembly. " In 1829, when the Assembly 
sent up a bill to give the townships eight members and the 
seigneuries a further 32, a majority in the Legislative 
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&Pprored it 
Councimoved by the belief as Judge Kerr recorded, that in 
a larger house the patriotes would decline in importance. 20 
The political ideas of the supporters of government can 
be generalized in this shape: the British constitution as 
installed in the colony was a wise and potentially useful 
instrument. But of the three elements in Canada as in 
Britain, the one most to be feared was the democratic one. 
In Lower Canada society was uniquely vulnerable to this 
hazard, for the people's language and religion disposed 
them to be swayed by deception, neither the "aristocracy" 
nor the Crown having sufficient influence to check this 
effort to take power without responsibility. But it was 
possible to reverse this process by increasing contact 
between the two races. 
iii 
Not only Dalhousie sought to influence the Canadiens by 
persuasion and co-operation rather than by the tactics of 
confrontation worked so skilfully by Papineau and clumsily 
by Richardson. Just as opinion at Quebec applauded Burton's 
compromises, a faction at Montreal was trying to shake off 
traditional divisions in politics. This movement was led 
by George Moffatt and Peter McGill. Moffatt was Durham-born, 
a forwarding merchant and former Nor'Wester, and one of the 
founders of the Bank of Montreal. At this period, he dis- 
trusted politicians, having no sympathy for canadien 
nationalism and deprecating every major political move made 
by Dalhousie in 1827. Moffatt regarded-himself as one of 
those "who desire to pursue moderate measures (and) ... 
cannot coalesce with either party. "21 He was in his late 
thirties, two years older than Scottish-born Peter McGill. 
Moffatt was destined to inherit Richardson's role as 
political leader of the British at Montreal; McGill would 
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follow Richardson as Lower Canada's leading financier. In 
the twenties McGill often sided with Richardson, conducting 
a spirited campaign against the patriotes on the financial 
question in 1827, but on the local issue of civic incorpora- 
tion, he stood with Moffatt * 
22 
George Moffatt's first venture into politics was provoked 
by an open sewer running through the commercial district of 
Montreal. This was the most conspicuous symptom of the 
powerless state of the city administration, a board of unpaid 
magistrates, and pressure mounted for the creation of a more 
effective civic authority. The Montreal Herald pointed-in 
1825 to two possibilities -- an elective city corporation or 
an appointed board of commissioners with enlarged powers. 
Either would require legislation, and the Herald, fearing the 
prevailing temper of the executive, advised its readers they 
would do well to settle for the appointive body. The 
Assembly persisted in the more popular measure, and its 
bill for an elective corporation died, as feared, in the 
Legislative Council. 
23 
Late in 1826 a majority of the magistrates tried to 
summon a public meeting to encourage the Assembly to persist 
in its efforts to obtain a corporation elected annually. 
This attempt to use the existing civic authority to agitate 
for incorporation was resisted openly by Samuel Gale, the 
appointed chairman of the municipal bench. Gale warned his 
colleagues that "a corporation in Montreal, until the 
population is more homogeneous & has less of hostile feeling 
towards what is English will produce a state of things far 
more unpleasant to the advocates of the measure than any 
inconveniences they have hitherto felt. " In a detailed 
letter to Andrew Cochran, Gale admitted that Montreal, with 
a civic revenue about one-third per capita that of other 
North American cities, was misgoverned, and that many 
necessary functions of local authorities were beyond the power 
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of the magistrates. But if monarchical institutions were to 
survive in Lower Canada, annual civic elections were a 
democratic menace that must not be contemplated. Some 
elective corporations did exist in England, but "many checks 
to the spirit they foster will be found there. " At the same 
time the respectable character of the magistrates proposing 
the measure made it difficult to oppose them. The French- 
Canadian magistrates, with one exception, were happy to stay 
aloof from this agitation and let their British colleagues 
carry the burden of advocating democratic institutions. 
24 
Although the question persisted until Quebec and Montreal 
were incorporated in 1833, the proceedings at the end of 1828 
belong to this earlier period. Late in November eight 
magistrates called a public meeting to revive the issue. 
Moffatt was unanimously called to the chair, and declared his 
conviction that incorporation would soothe many of the city's 
social tensions. 
Men of high consideration and of the purest 
principles, and whom he very much respected, 
were opposed to the measure, on the ground 
that we were as yet unfit to undertake the 
government ourselves... owing to the compara- 
tive infancy of our city and its population 
being composed of persons of nationally 
different origin... difference of origin 
should be altogether forgotten in the pursuit 
of their present object, and... they should 
all unite in promoting the general interest. 
Peter McGill countered the anti-democratic argument: "Fre- 
quent public discussions so far from being noxious or 
hurtful are calculated to produce the best and most salutary 
effect" and the jury system had proved the civic responsi- 
bility of Montreal's citizens. In a fascinating argument 
for assimilation in front of a largely French-speaking 
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audience, McGill recalled how the early Roman ruler Numa had 
given the Romans and Sabines common civic institutions so 
that the Sabines had ceased to be distinguishable from 
Romans; and he hoped a similar fusion would occur at Montreal. 
The Gazette did not record how the Canadiens reacted to 
this, but Robert Nelson, their new champion as MPP for the 
West Ward, declared that the measure of 1826 had only failed 
because "our late Governor was not a Numa. " A committee of 
twelve Canadiens and nine British was struck to bring the 
matter again before the Assembly. The incorporation bill was 
thrown out by the Legislative Council again in 1829 and 1830. 
There was still ample opposition in the colony to the moderate 
merchants' ambition of achieving racial harmony through civic 
democracy. 
25 
If democracy could not be tolerated in that city of the 
Province where British capital and population were most 
entrenched, it was energetically resisted at Quebec where 
the legislative machinery was immune to British and capita- 
list stimulation. But by 1827 the initiative had passed out 
of the hands of the old groups of bureaucrats and merchants. 
The summer crisis of 1827 was a crisis of Dalhousie's own 
making; his decision to dissolve the Assembly seems to have 
been taken entirely on his own. His instructions from 
Bathurst did not contemplate more than prorogation; his 
papers show no correspondence on the subject. His Executive 
Council, sunk in apathy from a sense of its uselessness, 
approved the dissolution with one dissenting voice. Proba- 
bly James Stuart relished a fight; Cochran surely did 
not. Jonathan Sewell was in England; at Montreal, 
Richardson was silent. The forces of conservatism were 
timid; Dalhousie rebuked a prominent Montreal K. C. who 
refused a seat as magistrate: "i regret to say that those 
who ought to stand forward in trouble are precisely those 
who shrink from all trouble in these times. " There was no 
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party organization to fight the elections for the governor. 
Cochran reported from Quebec just after polling began, "I am 
sorry to hear that the English and mercantile interest in the 
Lower town remains very inactive & indifferent. " At 
Montreal, the end of voting provoked these reflections from 
an unnamed writer: 
While the French Canadian faction shew much 
subordination to their leaders, the mixed 
multitude here called English, say Scotch, 
Americans, Italians, Germans, Jews &a few 
Irish orangers, are entirely divided and 
without any plan of party organization, 
rendering all efforts possible within the 
country totally inefficient unless the strong 
arm of the Imperial Government be stretched 
out.... 
26 
it was distinctly Dalhousie's election, brought on ahead 
of its proper term to bring the crisis to a head and force 
imperial intervention. 
This is not to suggest that Dalhousie intended to lose 
the election -- merely that winning it outright was second- 
ary to the great task of changing the balance of political 
power. When Dalhousie prorogued the Assembly in March he 
noted that when a new one met he would insist on a new 
Speaker and in April he wrote Horton a long and detailed 
despatch on the present Assembly and the compromise that 
might be reached with a new one. He enclosed and approved 
of an anonymous memorandum which proposed an Act of 
Parliament to give up the permanent revenues, conditional 
upon the legislature first passing a suitable civil list 
for the life of the King. The defection of Andrew Stuart 
from the patriotes seemed a good sign for the future, 
and patronage and common sense might divide that party 
further. Dalhousie had already ordered the translation of 
an able pamphlet on the financial question, and it had been 
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distributed to all the French-speaking members of the 
Assembly. A judicious mixture of persuasion and strong 
support from London might end the prolonged troubles of the 
twenties. 
} 
The election was fought by the patriotes as a personal 
challenge to Dalhousie; the campaign really began at pro- 
roguation in March, when eight Montreal-area MPPs issued an 
address claiming that Dalhousie was oppressing the people 
and misrepresenting the British government, and closed with 
the vibrant lines, "Public opinion is in itself a power to 
which the greatest functionaries are amenable in all cases, 
even when the Laws, in their ordinary course, cannot reach 
them. " In mid-July a large public meeting was held to choose 
a new candidate in Montreal's West Ward. The first candidate 
proposed by D-B Viger was George Moffatt; he demurred. He 
disavowed Viger's remark that he shared all the principles 
of the popular party, and said if he did become an MPP "I 
should enter... unbiassed by any party... I would pursue an 
independent course. " The meeting was marked by a violent 
speech by Cuvillier, demanding "shall we continue to be 
hewers of wood and drawers of water for those who reside at 
the chateau? " The city continued its custom of returning a 
British member in each ward, but even these were patriotes. 
James Leslie continued to sit for the East Ward, and the new 
member in the West was Robert Nelson, whose political career 
of unflinching opposition would culminate in his defying 
even Papineau in 1838, and proclaiming himself president of 
an illusory Lower Canadian republic. In 1827, Papineau had 
nothing to fear from these colleagues. Political propaganda 
on the government side concentrated on the traditional themes 
of economic development and prescriptive legitimacy, but 
Papineau's appeals to national origin and popular sovereignty 
carried the day. 
28 
The city's Irish population first came to prominence at 
this election; Bishop Lartigues' Irish chaplain and gardener 
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were conspicuous in the campaign, and speakers all over the 
city persuaded Irish voters that the executive at Quebec was 
identical to the repressive regime in Ireland and hoped to 
levy new taxes and oppress the Catholic church. The 
Protestant Irish replied by calling a public meeting at which 
a Mr. Johnston gave a staunch conservative discourse on the 
civil list and the leading speaker, Henry Driscoll, advocated 
Catholic emancipation in Britain but accused the patriotes 
of 
selecting amongst the lower classes of the 
Irish, influential persons, dubbing them 
chairmen and committee men, intoxicating 
them by the novelty of pseudo importance, 
and securing their services by flattering 
their vanity.... a cidevant footman... was 
invested with the dignity of chairman, and 
the prominent orator was a gardner, better 
had the one confined his exertions to Day 
& Martin's liquid blacking, and the other 
limited his superintendence to cabbages, 
potatoes, and other useful vegetables. 
29 
At the western extremity of the province was the county 
of York, one of whose members, John Simpson, had supported 
Burton but joined the minority against Papineau in March, 
1827. The other member, Dumont, had just been promoted in 
the militia. But at York the conflict over the militia law 
was brought to a head. The Assembly had sabotaged an attempt 
to renew expiring militia Acts, so that the more strict old 
permanent ordinances were revived. On spurious grounds, 
leading Assemblymen declared that the old ordinances were 
repealed and no militia existed; the summer musters could be 
ignored. Then Dalhousie conducted a general revision of 
commissions, cutting out inefficient officers and non- 
residents, who often included town-dwellers who held comm- 
issions in rural areas where their families were influential. 
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So in York, much of the opposition to Dalhousie was led by 
senior militia officers; in July Dalhousie dismissed nine 
officers in York alone, and lesser numbers elsewhere. One 
Jacob Barcelo offered to swing 200 votes to Simpson and 
Dumont if he could be reinstated, but the offer failed. Then 
the patriotes offered to support Simpson if he would denounce 
Dumont, but the battle continued. The cure, Father Keller, 
reputedly allowed liquor to be handed out to voters after 
Mass, and even threatened to withhold the sacraments from 
parishioners who voted for Dalhousie's candidates. Finally, 
amid growing threats of violence, Simpson withdrew, declaring 
that "should this faction prevail -- the contest will soon 
be for Civil Liberty, which the basest only will survive. .. 
30 
Downstream from Montreal, the two law officers were 
contesting borough seats. At Trois Rivieres Solicitor- 
General Ogden nearly lost his seat after a public squabble 
over a militia commission for one of the prominent Jewish 
merchant family, the Harts. Other officers thought the boy 
incompetent and a clumsy, illegal effort was made to revoke 
the appointment on religious grounds. The death of Ogden's 
mother on the eve of polling made him personally unable to 
campaign. But he unexpectedly got the vote of the grand 
vicaire and was able to displace the second sitting member, 
Amable Berthelot. 
31 
A few miles to the south-west, in the 
royal borough and seigneury of Sorel, Attorney-General 
James Stuart was defeated, 71-68 by Robert Nelson's brother 
Wolf red. Many voters were obliged to swear to, their property 
qualifications, and an informal poll-book in Dalhousie's 
papers has "perjured" written after eight names. (Several 
others are annotated "Traitor", a few merely "bad". ) The 
Sorel election also saw a clash between the local priest, 
Fr. Kelly, and the Governor. Dalhousie was in residence at 
Sorel, and was outraged to find Kelly's father working 
actively for Nelson. Dalhousie was deeply preoccupied by 
the problem of clerical intervention in politics, so summoned 
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Kelly to express his disapproval. Dalhousie wished to keep 
the matter on a personal level, but it leaked out and added 
to the extreme partisanship of the contest. 
32 
Two other head-on clashes took place on the south shore 
of the St. Lawrence. In Buckinghamshire, a British settler 
named Trigge faced the sitting member, Louis Bourdages. 
Trigge's hopes depended on a local magnate named Louis 
Legendre, newly commissioned in the militia. But Legendre 
pleaded a personal pledge not to oppose Bourdages, so 
remained silent, and Bourdages beat Trigge by a margin of 
two to one. 
33 Further east, Dorchester provided a struggle 
between the patriotes and the usually-dominant Caldwell 
interest. Papineau's brother, curd at the Beauce, was active 
in the campaign, and the correspondence about this riding 
provides the richest store of the kinds of rumours the 
patriotes circulated against government candidates. There 
were two general rumours -- threats to impose a poll tax on 
all Canadians, and to conscript young men for a standing army 
-- but John Davidson personally was accused of voting for a 
gift of 825,000 to Dalhousie from the public funds; of 
embezzling L800 himself; of deserting his wife and children; 
and of urging the British government to send 15,000 Irish to 
occupy Lower Canada and starve out the Canadians. The 
Mercur complained that 
the unfortunate Irish are pressed into the 
service of the faction in every shape which 
invention can suggest and those who court 
their assistance are the same who have hitherto 
railed against the English Government for... 
permitting the unfortunate Emigrants... to seek 
an asylum on this sacred soil. 
34 
At Quebec, the two city wards and the county returned the 
six old members, but there was an interesting challenge in 
each seat. As at Montreal, there was a tradition of dividing 
the representation between French and British. This was 
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challenged by the a tiotes in Quebec, Upper Town, where 
Andrew Stuart had drawn away from his colleague Vallieres and 
was endorsed by the Mercury. Nonetheless a joint meeting was 
held to promote re-election of both sitting members, then 
Amable Berthelot was suddenly brought from defeat at Trois 
Rivieres to stand against Stuart. This intervention (with 
the candidacy of George Vanfelson, who falsely claimed to be 
the government candidate) complemented Dalhousie's unusual 
order that military officers must not vote and nearly cost 
Stuart his seat; but he led Berthelot by a few votes and the 
British population retained a share of the Upper Town 
representation. 
35 
In the Lower Town the canadien member was easily re- 
elected and an effort to set up a second Canadien against 
T. A. Young came to nothing. Young's family was well- 
connected in England and Dalhousie had made him auditor- 
general in 1826. The Assembly refused to pay him and Young 
neglected the work, but he voted quite steadily with Tascherau 
and Stuart. The Mercury supported his opponent Thomas Lee, 
who had issued an interesting address denouncing the French 
civil law and seigneurial tenure, but remained mute on the 
financial question. Cochran reported on 20 July that Lee 
was defending Dalhousie energetically and would overtake 
Young. But Dalhousie was disliked in the Lower Town, where 
the merchants felt he had dishonourably protected Michael 
Perceval in a case involving illegal fees. The Lower Town 
took less than a week to humilate Lee. 
36 
The contest in Quebec county, where John Neilson and 
Michel Clouet retained their seats, was less hotly contested. 
The sole challenger was the assistant clerk of the Executive 
Council, George Ryland, a man conceded no hope at all because 
his "very name is detested by the Canadians in general. "37 
The Mercur printed several letters early in July reminding 
voters that Neilson, the well-liked Assemblyman, was also 
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Neilson the republican editor, but since his Gazette was 
bilingual, and at least as popular as the Mercury, and the 
county voters were 77.6% French, Ryland's position was 
hopeless; he retired, badly beaten, after five full days of 
polling. Clouet complimented Ryland on his moderate conduct, 
and the Mercury commiserated with "The young candidate... 
[who] stood forward, when older men, tamely prudent, feared 
to engage in the conflict. " Only 12 votes separated Clouet 
and Neilson: most electors simply voted for the two patriote 
candidates. One major source of interest is the striking 
support for Ryland from the Beauport area, where his family 
was settled. There he polled 59.5% of the votes compared 
with his meagre 18% across the whole county. A second 
interesting feature was the reserving of votes by 168 (10.2%) 
of the 823 electors who voted; of these 134 (79.8%) plumped 
for Ryland, 30 (17.9%) for Neilson, and only 4 (2.4%) for 
Clouet. This concentration of plumpers in the Ryland camp 
is accounted for largely by the political similarity of the 
two winners and the lack of a second government candidate. 
Half Ryland's voters plumped for him, but the remainder 
divided about equally, 71 voting also for Clouet and 61 for 
Neilson. This last figure showed nearly a quarter of Ryland's 
supporters (or 7.4% of all voters) also voted for the man at 
the opposite end of the political spectrum. This sort of 
ticket-splitting might be explained in terms of frivolity, 
personal esteem transcending politics, or votes split between 
the elector's personal preference and a hidden pressure or 
influence; but the racial factor seems the most obvious one. 
The other interesting racial note is that 37% of electors 
with British surnames voted for Neilson. Since all had the 
right to plump, it seems perfectly clear that here, as at 
Montreal, British emigration and settlement had not been an 
unmixed electoral blessing to the opponents of popular 
sovereignty and colonial autonomy. 
38 
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The returns from these seventeen of the colony's fifty 
seats point to a number of interesting facets of voting 
patterns, electoral influence and party discipline in Lower 
Canada in 1827. First of all, patriote party organization 
was, as Ouellet has said, 
39 
efficient and powerful. It 
was strong enough to overturn seigneurial influence at 
Dorchester and Sorel; it was able to mock the tradition of 
mixed representation at Montreal by electing English-speaking 
patriotes. Mixed representation survived at Trois Rivieres 
and at Quebec, Upper Town. The Ryland influence evident 
at Beauport and the correspondence respecting Barcelo in 
York, Legendre in Buckingham, and the Harts at Trois 
Rivieres all suggest that votes were rarely cast in enormous 
blocs determined by the direct influence of the leading 
patriotes with the habitants, but could be swayed by the 
intervention of local magnates who, as Dalhousie believed, 
might not be entirely closed to compromise and persuasion. 
On the other hand, Dalhousie's "passive" new bishop proved 
worse than useless; Panet's weakness in 1827 permitted the 
most blatant episodes of clerical intervention under the 
constitution of 1791.40 The racial factor in the election 
was complex, but it is safe to say that the existence of 
British patriotes like the Nelsons, Leslie and Neilson 
reflected a corresponding division of the English-speaking 
constituency at large. Finally, the government parties were 
utterly disorganized and everywhere, identification with the 
Chateau was a liability to a candidate. 
iv 
Dalhousie's position hardi 
most important development was 
1822 Dalhousie had referred to 
half. , 
41 But the Governor and 
med after this election. The 
the eclipse of Sewell. In 
the Chief Justice as "my better 
Chief Justice quarrelled over 
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patronage just before Sewell left for England and when he 
returned in mid-summer, 1827, he found his old pupil and 
enemy James Stuart firmly entrenched as the one man whose 
judgement Dalhousie really trusted. Calmer advice came 
chiefly from Andrew Cochran, whose loyalty to Dalhousie had 
never wholly blotted out his innate moderation and, 
incidentally, his concern for his career after Dalhousie's 
departure. But Stuart's was the rising influence at the 
Chateau. 
Dalhousie spent the autumn of 1827 retaliating against 
the worst offenders during the election campaign. Panet 
removed Fr. Keller from St. Eustache, and Stuart drew up 
indictments for libel against several editors. The legis- 
lature was summoned for 20 November; the patriote chiefs 
arrived from Montreal in high good humour, in a chartered 
steamer, revelling in the atmosphere of crisis created by 
the libel indictments and the rumour that Dalhousie would 
not accept Papineau as Speaker. The Governor met the two 
chambers with a frosty speech and then sent the Assembly 
back to elect a Speaker. So the ancient ritual began. The 
clerk of the House stood beside the empty chair and pointed 
silently at Louis Bourdages, who nominated Papineau, and 
then at Ogden who proposed Vallibres. The members divided, 
39 for Papineau and five (Ogden, Christie of Gasp6, Young, 
Andrew Stuart and Boissonault) for Vallieres. Papineau was 
then escorted to the chair by Bourdages and his seconder, 
the House passed a formal address to Dalhousie giving its 
choice, and then adjourned. 
42 
On the morning of the 21st, passions erupted. The 
Assemblymen filed into the Legislative Council to receive a 
reply to their address, and Sewell communicated Dalhousie's 
refusal to acknowledge Papineau and the instruction to 
proceed to another selection. The Assemblymen stormed 
back to their own chamber; Papineau resumed the chair, 
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Bourdages seized the mace and declared the House in session. 
Vallihres moved resolutions declaring that the prerogative of 
approving the Speaker had expired long ago from disuse, and 
its revival was oppressive. The resolutions carried easily 
as Vallieres led the house on Papineau's behalf and 
Boissonault deserted the tiny English minority. Dalhousie 
refused to acknowledge the address of the house, and pro- 
rogued it on the 22nd. He was warmly applauded by the 
Mercury, which declared that the royal prerogative of rejecting 
the speaker had fallen into disuse in England only because 
of the prudent restraint of the House of Common in never 
proposing a Speaker who had led a party against the Crown. 
43 
The Colonial Office never formally approved of the rejection 
of Papineau, but merely took steps to ensure that Dalhousie 
would never meet the Assembly again. This suited a growing 
feeling among the classes on whose behalf he believed he was 
governing. George Moffatt told a friend in Upper Canada, "As 
matters stand it is I think doubtful if the present Governor 
will ever meet the Assembly again and from the feeling which 
is gaining ground in the Country towards him the sooner he 
is recalled the better. "44 
Stuart in particular was repudiated by his own race and 
class. The colony had little stomach for extreme measures 
and the indictments for libel against Duvernay and Waller at 
Montreal, Mondelet at Trois Rivieres, and Samuel Neilson at 
Quebec encountered stiff opposition from the grand juries 
and judges. In the indictments for "gross perjuries" committed 
at Sorel, Stuart was embarrassed when his chief witness, the 
returning officer Griffin, mysteriously took a steam-boat 
voyage on the day his testimony was to be heard. Judges Pyke 
and Foucher bailed two editors at B50 and x, 25, and postponed 
their cases until March. Like the Colonial office, the 
judges seemed determined to postpone the quarrels until 
Dalhousie was on his way to his new posting in India. When 
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the cases came up again in March, 1828, a further delay was 
granted, which the attorney-general railed against as a clear 
attempt to obstruct justice. Pyke, Foucher, and Uniacke 
were "weak & changeable wherever [sic] popular feeling is 
interested". At Trois Rivieres, Dalhousie found his new 
chairman of the Quarter Sessions, Thomas Coffin, was "a poor 
puny paltry, politician -a man with the word Loyalty ever in 
his mouth, but trembling when called to do his duty. " At 
Quebec the contempt for Stuart was most marked: Jonathan 
Sewell and the sheriff, his son, assembled a grand jury, 
composed half of Canadiens, then named Amable Berthelot its 
foreman! Anarchy, Dalhousie concurred with Stuart, would 
be the natural result of these half-hearted proceedings. 
45 
But Dalhousie was permitted to escape from the colony 
with his self-respect intact. He had to wait until summer 
for exoneration from the Colonial Office, when William 
Huskisson declared in the House of Commons that Dalhousie 
had not exceeded his instructions; but in the colony vindi- 
cation of a sort came sooner. The reluctance of the Bench 
to persecute political offenders was, after all, coloured 
largely by hostility to Stuart and not to the Governor. 
The more the patriotes tried to discredit Dalhousie (and a 
new wave of insubordination in the militia followed the 
November session) the less latitude their opponents had in 
deciding whether or not to support him. Some opposition to 
Papineau had to be made, and for most British colonists it 
was unthinkable in 1828 (though not by 1835) to honour the 
British Crown while attacking its representative in the 
colony. Colonists could still only express their aspirations 
and their fears within the context of the British connexion 
-- appeals to independence or to annexation to the United 
States were not wholly unheard in the twenties, but they 
came only from an ebullient element at Montreal during times 
of extreme economic stress. 
46 
In 1828 the pleas and rhetoric 
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were solidly constitutional, and to Dalhousie, isolated at 
the Chateau with his indignation and disgust, addresses of 
loyalty and support began to stream in. His tactics and his 
public postures were wrong; his hostility towards the 
Canadiens was too rancorous to be truly popular, and yet his 
far-reaching objectives were in close harmony with those of 
the Scottish, English, and even American population of the 
colony. He had gone too far, but he had been driven: and 
while the patriotes were assembling an enormous pair of 
petitions of grievance to be sent to the British Parliament, 
individual localities throughout the colony presented their 
respects to Dalhousie. Seven thousand signatures from the 
city of Montreal proclaimed the constitution, as inter- 
preted by the Governor, "our chief refuge in danger, our 
strong tower of defence against feudal ascendancy, and our 
sole reliance against anarchy and confusion. " Twenty-seven 
hundred from Quebec approved of Dalhousie's conduct in 
proroguing the rebellious legislature, and urged an imperial 
inquiry into the colony's troubles. From Trois Rivieres, 
eight hundred persons called for the imperial government to 
support the colony against the Assembly's attempts to "destroy 
the whole fabric of our social compact". The royal seigneury 
of Sorel contributed a hundred names in support, and two 
hundred and fifty were appended to Roderick McKenzie's 
petitions from Effingham County and Terrebonne. The seigneuries 
of de Salaberry and Hatt at Chambly yielded nine hundred and 
fifty names; Antrobus at Berthier collected eight hundred 
signatures in an area where the seigneur was a traditional 
opponent of the administration. By the dozens and the 
hundreds the scattered farmers of the Eastern Townships 
joined the chorus. Judge Thompson forwarded two hundred and 
ninety signatures from New Carlisle, in the far-off district 
of Gaspe. 
47 
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Tactically, the campaign miscarried, for local addres- 
ses to the Governor could not outshine in London the mass 
petitions the patriotes were preparing for Parliament. 
Nevertheless there was comfort for Dalhousie in the form of 
the ate riote petition. It was marked with the crosses of 
the illiterate, and tarnished by sworn affidavits saying 
that school-children had signed it (the little girls using 
initials instead of Christian names), that many of the 
country people were told they were signing a loyal petition, 
that infants two years old were malting their crosses, that 
notaries inscribed the names of whole villages without 
consulting the persons whose marks he then affixed. Perhaps 
these allegations were untrue; perhaps the 87,000 names 
appended to the petition against Dalhousie were not as 
fraudulent as his supporters maintained. The fact remained 
that against nine thousand real signatures on the patriotes' 
petitions, fourteen thousand men had actually signed their 
names to the loyal addresses lauding the Governor for his 
stand against popular sovereignty and the rule of the 
patriotes in the Assembly. 
48 
The prolonged crisis which ended Dalhousie's Canadian 
career revealed a great deal about the divisions of English- 
speaking society and the evolution of conservative politics 
in the colony. First, talented and influential individuals 
of British origin were willing to co-operate fully with the 
patriotes. Second, the bureaucratic faction was almost 
solidly united against the Attorney-General, James Stuart. 
Third, the merchants of Quebec were out of temper with 
Dalhousie, and at Montreal the mercantile and legal com- 
munities were riven by disagreement over the issue of 
democracy in city government. Fourth, of the humbler 
classes of English-speaking colonists less can be said with 
certainty, except that the Irish Catholics were easily led 
towards Papineau, and the support given to Neilson and the 
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votes withheld from Lee indicated an inclination amongst 
ordinary English-speaking and mercantile voters to repudiate 
Dalhousie's government. 
moreover, it is instructive to note the extent to which 
the government's partisans concentrated on the civil list 
question. The financial question offered less occasion for 
eloquence or rhetorical refinement than any other political 
issue of the day. Yet the bulk of election propaganda seems 
to have turned on the abstract question of legitimacy and the 
technical one of the appropriation clauses of the Act 14 
Geo iii c. 88. On the assembly's neglect of public improve- 
ments Peter McGill's principal speech contained about three 
lines out of nearly a thousand; much of the rest was a 
lawyer's prose on the civil list. The obvious inference is 
that the leaders of the Montreal party believed these were 
questions on which the English-speaking elector needed to be 
convinced and cajoled, and not merely exhorted. Men like 
Moffatt and Leslie were anxious to compromise and collaborate 
with the Canadiens; one may readily believe that the same 
sentiment affected individuals at all levels in the English- 
speaking community at Montreal. 
The election of 1827 put an unmistakeable end to one 
of the historic political alignments of the colony. From 
the earliest periods of the British regime the country gentry 
and the clergy had been seen as part of a natural aristo- 
cratic buttress to British rule, helping stave off American 
and French republican influences. Ryland, Mountain and 
Craig had smashed this alliance between 1808 and 1811; 
Prevost, with the help of the American armies, had re- 
assembled the structure but left the task incomplete. 
Dalhousie saw the unjoined pieces swept away. He had feared 
the subtle opposition of Plessis and tried to neutralize it; 
he discovered that a weak bishop was worse than a strong, 
cunning one. The militia crisis showed the collapse of 
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relations with the gentry. It was both cause and symptom 
of Dalhousie's weakness: the militia had become permeated 
with patriotes. The Governor displaced popular but 
inefficient men in favour of potential political supporters. 
This underlined both his lack of effective patronage and his 
unsympathetic handling of men. The remark of one lieutenant- 
colonel on the militia difficulties may stand as the epitaph 
of Dalhousie's whole career in Lower Canada. What he did 
was not technically wrong, but "Lord Dalhousie allowed 
obstacles to be strewed in his path, without taking effectual 
measures to remove them., 
49 
PART III 
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Chapter 5: The 'British Party' Disowned - the Select Committee 
of 1828 
i 
The parliamentary investigation into Canadian affairs, 
conducted in the summer of 1828, marked a vital stage in the 
fumbling attempts begun by Goderich in 1827 to pacify the 
Assembly without sacrificing British prestige, constitutional 
principles, or economic and strategic interests. The report 
of this committee was adopted by every succeeding British 
government down to 1836 as a blueprint of Canadian policy, 
and for this reason its importance has been amply recognized 
by historians, as it was by contemporaries. Nonetheless 
a few observations need to be made on the origins of the 
report and of the select committee itself, on the character 
and shortcomings of the report in relation to the evidence 
on which it was based, and on its effect on the British 
community in Lower Canada. Dr. Helen Taft Manning has 
remarked on the report as a turning point: after 1828 
Governors' hands were tied by decisions made in London to 
an unprecedented extent. 
1 
This is true, but is one side of 
a paradox, for the major decision taken in London was to 
govern as far as possible in accordance with colonial wishes. 
This encouraged both sides in the colonial dispute to 
create political or quasi-political organizations designed 
to achieve social, economic and political change in the colony, 
and to impress partisan views on public opinion in Britain. 
The parliamentary inquiry was the logical outcome of 
Dalhousie's desire for public vindication and intervention 
by the imperial legislature, and of the Assembly's wish to 
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have its petitions thoroughly investigated. It was also a 
tempting route of escape for the new Colonial Secretary, 
William Huskisson. 1828 was a poor time to seek constructive 
policies on a minor issue. Party lines were blurred at 
Westminkster as ministers came and went; politicians looked 
to their honour and prestige, not to their departmental 
duties, and the more liberal whigs, those who seemed for the 
moment to have talent and prominence without immediate 
prospect of ministerial responsibility, nipped at the flanks 
of whoever happened to be in office at the time. The 
Colonial office was a favourite target for attacks by whig 
partisans and economic reformers, partly because of discontent 
at Cape Town and Quebec, partly because of the expense of 
colonial government and defence, and partly because of the 
lucrative and apparently wasteful patronage the colonies 
offered every ministry. Iiuskisson himself was one of the 
more liberal torfies, and therefore unlikely to rush enthu- 
siastically to Dalhousie's defence. He had inherited from 
his predecessor, Goderich, a vague consciousness that some- 
thing was wrong and the Assembly would have to be mollified; 
so he decided to refer the whole question to a select 
committee of the house of Commons. The committee would be 
safely ballasted with supporters of the government, but 
would have scope to conduct as wide an inquiry as possible. 
Bathurst at once objected to this move to throw open a 
question from which the opposition could easily profit, and 
Huskisson wavered; but having committed himself to an inquiry, 
he made his formal motion for it on 2 May. 
2 
Dalhousie's delegate to London, the-Montreal magistrate 
Samuel Gale, was inclined to condemn Huskisson for timidity, 
but the decision suited the times. Old institutions were 
insecure, assailed on grounds of principle as well as 
expediency, and Huskisson was among those questioning old 
orthodoxies from within the tory ministry. In private, he 
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vacillated on Canada: he reviewed the Assembly's case with 
Gale, saying "What defence can be made against charges like 
these? A British House of Commons will always support the 
control of the Assembly over the public monies., 
3 But Gale 
lectured him on the original purposes of the constitution of 
1791 -- to smooth the transition to British supremacy in 
Lower Canada -- and when the Assembly's delegates arrived a 
few days later they too complained of a very cold reception 
at the Colonial Office; they also had cause to complain when 
Huskisson made his formal motion for the selection of a 
committee, presenting the matter in a speech heavy with 
criticism of the failure of past Assemblies to improve the 
colony and its laws. 
4 
Huskisson thought he had taken precautions to make the 
proceedings fair without unduly embarssing either the 
governor or the former Secretaries of State whose conduct was 
on trial. But the committee's proceedings got out of hand. 
Samuel Gale, a competent lawyer at his desk but a poor 
performer in open court, was no match for the patriotes' 
delegates. 
5 The tories on the committee were an unenthusiastic 
lot, completely outgunned by three young whigs who professed 
a first-hand knowledge of the colony and for partisan reasons 
were committed to harassing the Colonial Office. They were 
all highly talented, destined to be in the front rank of the 
next generation -- John Evelyn Denison, E. G. Stanley, and 
Henry Labouchere. Labouch6re in particular made a strong 
maiden speech in answer to Huskisson's motion for the 
committee, in which he denounced anything like a repetition 
of Wilmot Horton's attempted constitutional reform of 1322. 
The enthusiasm these three brought to the committee's 
proceedings outweighed the tactics of the tories, who were 
content mainly to arrange regular consultations between Gale 
and the tory member Archibald Campbell of Blythswood, a close 
friend of Dalhousie's. 
6 
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The committee cast its net wide, taking notice of Upper 
Canada's controversy over church establishment, and Lower 
Canada's problems of civil law reform and government finance. 
But the drift of the testimony was closely directed by the 
members sympathetic to the Canadian delegates, Neilson, 
Cuvillier, and Viger. Gale was led into endless, boring 
disquisitions on matters of minor importance; even so he 
suffered the embarrassment of having some of his opinions 
contradicted by a member of his own party, J. C. Grant. 
John Neilson, on the other hand, answered his questions with 
the facility of a man who was both a working journalist and a 
popular and successful politician. Neilson emphasized that 
maladministration was the cause of the colony's troubles; 
when the opposite theory, cultural incompatability, was 
advanced by James Stephen of the Colonial Office, Neilson was 
recalled to recite extensive personal recollections of racial 
harmony amid the mixed settlements of Quebec County. Neilson 
adeptly refused to be drawn into discussions of political 
theory in the abstract, and though Viger and Cuvillier were 
less cautious, their republicanism and praise for the spirit 
of the old French laws of the colony was not successfully 
exploited by Blythswood as a point against them. Despite this, 
the committee broke up towards the end of the session with a 
non-committal draft report agreed upon. Many tory members, 
including Blythswood, were therefore out of town when Stanley 
had the committee reconvened to hear new evidence. This 
consisted of petitions Neilson had not produced earlier 
because they referred to events since his departure from 
Lower Canada; but he had had them for over a month when he 
came before the shrunken committee in the last week of June. 
These petitions related to the sedition trials and the 
militia disturbances, and Stanley used them as a pretext for 
rewriting the draft report and adding a strong condemnation 
of the executive's conduct in the wake of the 1827 election. 
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The report was circumspect in condemning the Governor out- 
right, but it denounced the ancient practice of paying the 
civil expenses on the fictitious assumption that they would 
afterwards be covered by a supply bill, and left the 
impression that Dalhousie was a liability in the government 
of Canada. The Governor's own summary, pieced together from 
reports by Blythswood, Gale and his own brother John Ramsay, 
summed up the feeling of tory observers. Huskisson was new 
to the situation, and when he quit office in mid-session he 
was replaced by somebody equally inexperienced, Sir George 
Murray. Then the "youngsters who ran thro' Canada in 1824 
when I happened to return to England had found the course 
clear of Ministerial interference -- they had the ball at 
their foot, and... they believed everything to be true that 
came as accusation against the Constituted authorities. " 
The adoption of the report, carried by Wilmot Horton's 
opportunistic casting vote, was a sign of the Government's 
slipping grasp of affairs, of inattention by Dalhousie's 
friend Blythswood, and of masterful parliamentary tactics 
by Stanley and his young accomplices. 
7 It does not follow 
that the report embodied the general sense of informed 
British opinion on the subject. Bathurst tried to get the 
report buried in oblivion, but this merely confirmed that 
he was losing touch with British as well as Canadian 
politics. The adoption of the report by Sir George Murray, 
like Huskisson's decision to appoint a Select Committee, 
seemed the only alternative to the unthinkable rekindling of 
animosities which had made Dalhousie's government so painful 
to himself and so perplexing, and time-consuming, to his 
superiors. 
The adoption of the report was made easier by the fact 
that although it used language the Assembly could applaud, 
especially on the financial question, it condemned the 
theories and tactics of the imperial centralists in Lower 
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Canada without disowning their social and economic goals. 
The report was full of modest support for the reforms the 
British colonists wanted, including representation for the 
townships and registers of land titles and encumbrances; it 
enthusiastically endorsed the rights of the Assembly, without 
commenting on the disparity between the British and the 
colonial electorates; and it dealt out some well-meaning 
nonsense on minor points. The report stood fully behind 
Neilson in blaming the troubles on corruption and mal- 
administration, and especially on the placemen in the 
Legislative Council: it therefore treated the Canadiens' 
objection to reunion of the Canadas as a conclusive obstacle 
to that measure. The report advised as strict as possible 
an adherence to the constitution of 1791 as interpreted by 
the Assembly, and permanent appropriations for the salaries 
of judges and the more important civil officers. The report 
failed to say anything on the question whose importance was 
growing throughout the 1820s and would be paramount in the 
thirties, the problem of accommodating the expansion of the 
British immigrant community to the conserving instincts of 
the French Canadians. Indeed, Neilson had taken pains 
to convince the Committee that the Canadiens considered the 
colony big enough for British immigrants as well as the 
Canadiens' natural increase. Neilson's testimony may have 
been wishful thinking rather than conscious deception, but 
its adoption by the Select Committee ensured that imple- 
mentation of the report would be hobbled from the start by 
the fact that it did not respond to the full range of fears 
of the Canadiens, or the whole aspirations of the British 
colonists. 
These points are essential to an assessment of the 
report of 1828; it did not grow out of the settled opinion of 
British politicians at large, but from partisan subterfuge 
and government distraction. The theory of colonial adminis- 
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tration which inspired the report had roots in the previous 
decades and was part of a long and honourable tradition of 
trying to govern the colonies with a minimum of intervention 
in their local affairs; but the report skirted difficulties 
by steadfastly refusing to consider the possibility that 
British interests might not be wholly in harmony with those 
of some classes of the colonists. The report assumed that 
defence and economic growth were both compatible with the 
conserving instincts of canadien society. The truths which 
Dalhousie had tried to reveal in his clash with the Assembly 
were hastily buried again by the Select Committee. It 
condemned the imperfect tools through which Britain sought to 
manage the affairs of Lower Canada; but it did not renounce 
the benefits which that rule had sought, however ineptly, 
for the British empire. 
ii 
The events of 1828 are customarily taken as the 
beginning of any detailed study of the 1830s. The report of 
that year was extravagantly praised by the Lower Canadian 
Assembly, and for the next nine years every Colonial 
Secretary tried to follow the report, as the best alternative 
to reviving the sterile tactics of Dalhousie in 1827, or the 
daring ones of Wilmot Horton in 1822. The acclaim for the 
report was not quite unanimous. Dalhousie was badly shaken 
by the implied criticism of his government, did not consider 
that he had been given sufficient credit for carrying out 
orders, and felt betrayed by the acceptance of ex p arte 
evidence from Neilson in the last sitting. In the colony, 
the British community continued divided. Dalhousie's whole- 
hearted supporters expressed their confidence in his judgement, 
but outside this little circle there was a widespread inclin- 
ation to trim sails to suit the new breeze. 
8 Dalhousie's 
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successor warned the editors of the official Gazette and of 
the Mercury that their official commissions neither required 
nor permitted them to speak for the executive in their 
newspapers. 
9 David Chisholme at Montreal drafted a series of 
violent articles against the effects of the new policy of 
avoiding conflict with the Assembly, but he could not find a 
printer for them in Lower Canada. Robert Christie's history 
of the second half of Dalhousie's administration died at the 
proof stage. John Richardson brought down to Quebec a strong 
refutation of the Select Committee's strictures on the 
Legislative Council; his colleagues received it so timorously 
that he flung it across the chamber, narrowly missing the 
head of one of his erstwhile supporters. 
10 The Council 
eventually adopted a tone of injured dignity instead of 
Richardson's bold remonstrance. It also accepted a represent- 
ation bill which erased English country names from the map 
and created a handful of "English" seats in the townships, 
and three times as many new "French" ones in the seigneuries. 
This period has been described by H. T. Manning as an "era of 
good feeling", and it certainly marked one of those phases 
when the Assembly, trusting in a new Governor, unlocked the 
treasury to build roads and schools, chiefly for the benefit 
ll 
of its own constituents but partly for the townships as well. 
There was some grumbling in the British community against 
annual supply bills based on that of 1825, and the omission 
from those bills of the salaries of some conspicuous men of 
the old regime, the chairmen of the Quarter Sessions. Coffin 
at Three Rivers and Crawford at. New Carlisle were casual 
victims of what was really a personal vendetta against Gale 
and Robert Christie. The latter not only lost his salary, 
but was expelled from his newly-won seat as member for Gaspe. 12 
Judge Kerr and Judge Fletcher, unpopular but not demonstrably 
corrupt, were hounded from session to session by committees 
investigating petitions against them. But on the whole these 
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were not bad years for the business interests of the colony, 
however poorly their constitutional scruples were regarded by 
the Colonial Office. The Assembly urged Kempt to begin work 
on the Chambly Canal, conditionally authorized in 1823, and 
Leslie steered through the Assembly the renewal of the bank 
charters for seven more years, and bills to aid the develop- 
ment of Montreal harbour, already stimulated by the Admiralty's 
renewed interest in the St. Lawrence waterway. The cities 
got their charters, with corporations elected by land-owners. 
But there was no reconciliation of races: the French went 
from success to success, viewing the tolerance of Downing 
Street and the Chateau not merely as redress of maladmini- 
stration, but as encouragement to their hopes of separate 
nationality. Acts to regulate the magistracy and the militia 
command resulted in a large-scale withdrawal from those bodies 
of British colonists, some because the landed property 
qualifications excluded them, others because they objected 
to the anti-British spirit evident in the new Acts. 
13 So 
the "era of good feeling" was highly artificial, a sullen 
and confused retreat by one party, a jubilant consolidation 
of power by the other, the whole confused and veneered by 
tactical magnanimity on the part of Papineau, who wished to 
retain the good opinion of the British Parliament as long as 
possible, without conceding anything essential in his quest 
for power for himself and the Canadiens. In short, the calm 
which followed the report of 1828 and the departure of 
Dalhousie was that period of optimism which usually greeted 
the arrival of a new governor, and was prolonged by. the 
departure of the Administrator Sir James Kempt before his 
non-committal stance had been eroded by the patriotes. Peace 
was also the period of grace John Simpson had looked for in 
1825, when the executive would make real concessions in one 
year in anticipation of "perfect sanity" in the Assembly 
in ensuing years. There was no real reconciliation -- 
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each party gave the other time to show its real intentions. 
The British colonists, however, were still not behaving 
as a cohesive political body. The settlers in the townships, 
pleased at receiving representation at last, sided with 
Neilson in believing that maladministration was the real 
cause of the patriotes' intransigence; the behaviour of 
Dalhousie's nominee as judge at St. Francis, John Fletcher, 
had helped to make a convinced oppositionist of at least one 
MPP, Ebenezer Peck of Stanstead; he and more than half of 
his townships colleagues voted consistently with the majority 
in the Assembly. 
15 For the old supporters of the executive, 
especially in the Legislative Council, the habit of obedience 
to the wishes of Downing Street posed a problem in politics, 
and even in ethics. Sewell was widely condemned for his 
sudden capitulation to the Ryland-Hale party, but Kerr and 
Bowen remained true to their old principles until orders 
from the Colonial Office made them stop attending the Council 
altogether. In the other House T. A. Young, broke with Ogden 
and Andrew Stuart in opposing the bank charters, though he 
voted fairly consistently with the minority in others matters. 
So the 1830s dawned with nothing that could be called a 
British party to be seen on the political horizon -- only a 
handful of individuals without a coherent purpose amongst 
themselves, or a clear set of roots in the British communities 
of Lower Canada. 
iii 
The 1830s are among the best-chronicled decades of 
Canadian history and Anglo-Canadian relations in the nine- 
teenth century. The initiatives of the Colonial Office, the 
growing intransigence of the Montreal "clique" which 
dominated the Assembly, the diminution of the Governor's 
authority and the more moderate behaviour of a virtually new 
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Legislative Council, have been amply covered in works by 
Manning, Ouellet, Burroughs, Buckner and others. The economic 
history of the decade is available in the works of Creighton 
and Ouellet. 
16 Some aspects of these issues still invite 
detailed study, but little can be added to them here: the 
following passages are intended merely as a commentary, and 
a summary of what is available elsewhere. But besides these 
well-known themes stands another, relatively untouched, which 
will provide the substance for succeeding chapters. The 
Select Committee of 1828, and the well-meant exertions of 
the governments which tried to carry out its report during 
the early thirties, eventually achieved what Richardson, 
Dalhousie, and the parti canadien had failed to do in the 
1820s: they stimulated the different classes of British 
colonists in Lower Canada to support each other in trying to 
take control of the province's destiny away from the lawyers, 
notaries, and convinced republicans who controlled the 
unsophisticated electorate. The story of Lower Canadian 
politics in the 1830s is partly bound up in the arid dis- 
cussion of constitutional theories between the British 
Government and the patriote Assembly, but it is also to a 
great extent the story of the way the English-speaking 
colonists organized themselves into bodies outside the con- 
stitution, to overcome the report of 1828 and its naive re- 
liance on the good intentions of the patriotes. 
Clearly the British colonists who were at odds with the 
Assembly could no longer call themselves the Governor's party. 
The position of the Governor of Lower Canada, unenviable in 
the 1820s, became nearly impossible after 1828. Dalhousie 
was succeeded by Sir James Kempt, a man six years his senior 
but of a different cast, friendly with Edward Ellice and well 
disposed to the whigs, considered somewhat foppish, but 
ambitious and able. Kempt recognized the chief command of 
Canada as a valuable step in his military career, but made 
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no secret of his intention to escape to Britain as soon as he 
decently could. l7 He concealed his distate at the vacillation 
of Downing Street and accepted, because he could see no 
acceptable alternative, supply bills which the Duke of 
Wellington was at first inclined to disallow. Like Dalhousie, 
he looked around for suitable Canadiens to promote in the 
public service, but he dug rather deeper into the barrel of 
radicalism than his predecessor would have done, putting 
Denis Viger into the Legislative Council, and transporting 
Remi Vallieres from the Assembly to Trois Rivieres as 
resident judge. Kempt appointed no new Executive Councillors, 
and of his appointments to provincial offices in the civil 
list, he gave 53% of commissions, bearing 80% of fees and 
salaries, to French Canadians. The Assembly seemed well 
pleased with all this: only Austin Cuvillier was perceptive 
enough to see -- or honest enough to declare -- that Kempt 
differed from Dalhousie mainly in being more "riant". 
18 
Kempt never opened his commission as Governor, acting as 
Administrator for two years and happily returning to England 
in the autumn of 1830. Of the six administrators of the 
1830s he shared with only Sir John Colborne the distinction 
of leaving the administration more tranquil than he had found 
it. 
. empt had survived trouble on the civil list by accepting 
annual bills which embodied the Assembly's veiled claim to 
dismiss officials by neglecting to pay them. He deferred 
more permanent provisions by referring to Sir George Murray's 
promise to surrender by an Imperial Act the bulk of the 
disputed revenues, fixing a modest civil list at the same time. 
This matter remained unsettled when Kempt left Canada, and the 
British tory ministry gave way to the whigs. The new ministry 
and new reign in Britain affected the Lower Canadian civil 
list, for the British civil list of 1830 was the first to 
prune away all administrative salaries, leaving the King with 
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permanent provision for no more than his household and 
personal staff. 
19 
The whigs redesigned the proposed 
Canadian civil list on nearly the same principle, pruning it 
down to the point where it was meaningless as a buttress to 
the independence of the administration, and then extending the 
concession even further by repealing the appropriation clause 
of the Revenue Act of 1774, leaving it to the Canadian 
legislatures to enact the proposed very modest civil lists. 
20 
This gave the Assembly the same power to strangle public 
business which was in theory held by the British House of 
Commons through the annual voting of the Mutiny Bill, and 
annual control of Supply for the administrative salaries. 
Yet the Assembly refused to make even this symbolic gesture 
as Papineau ominously denounced permanent civil lists as 
monarchical. The Legislative Council at last threw off the 
compromising tactics of Sewell and rejected the mutilated, 
one-year Supply Bill which the Assembly sent up in 1832. 
On this point the political battles of the next four years 
were fought out between an increasingly-powerful Papineau, 
a succession of Colonial Secretaries, and the second 
Governor of the 1830s, Matthew, Lord Aylmer. 
Aylmer was a very different man from Dalhousie or Kempt, 
but must have drawn largely on the experiences of both. 
Dalhousie had fought the assembly, but had obeyed his orders 
from London, and was ultimately made Commander in Chief in 
India. Rempt kept on good terms with the Assembly, at the 
cost of offending the Ministry in London, and was made a privy 
councillor when he arrived home. It seemed that Aylmer need 
only follow the advice of the Assembly when he could, be sure 
of his legal precedents when he could not, and it would not 
much matter whether he carried any measures or not; his 
reputation, even advancement, ought to be secure. He would 
neither bully nor cajole. He was not a lazy man, and like 
Dalhousie he had a zest for travel and an interest in 
- 133 - 
improvements; but he was not a meddler. His manner was 
sometimes patronizing, but his real errors were comparatively 
few, chiefly blunders in judicial patronage under the 
influence of Joathan Sewell and James Reid. 
21 His only 
policy was to follow orders from London and to try to bring 
forward the moderate men of all shades of opinion, and 
otherwise to give politicians as much leeway as they wished 
to take. When the Assembly addressed him to suspend the 
Attorney-General pending hearing of charges dating back to 
the election of 1827, Aylmer reminded the outraged Stuart 
that the case for carrying out the suspension was conclusively 
argued in Stuart's own proceedings against Monk and Sewell 
in 181422 Yet when the Assembly expelled a member for 
accepting an unpaid office Aylmer was equally scrupulous in 
refusing to issue a new writ for his seat. 
23 The Governor's 
celebrated "unripe grievances" message to the Assembly in 
1831, asking whether their resolutions of that session had 
really embodied all the concessions they wanted, was widely 
ridiculed by the British in the colony; but the incident 
became a standing reproach against the patriotes when they 
did subsequently broaden the scope of their complaints. The 
decay of the Legislative Council had been one of Dalhousie's 
great failures: Aylmer acted on the belief, common to his 
class and his era, that a state could not prosper if the men 
who held economic power were denied access to political 
influence; and he re-mgdelled the Legislative Council accord- 
ingly. Unlike Dalhouee, however, he paid little attention to 
his Executive Council, declaring on one occasion that he was 
reluctant to consult his councillors at all, as he did not 
intend to bow to their judgement if they disagreed with him, 
and did not need to mitigate his responsibility if they 
supported him. 
24 Aylmer carried out the Select Committee's 
recommendation that judges should stop attending the two 
councils, and did no more to the Executive Council than to 
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add, from 1831 to 1833, three French Canadians as honoary 
members. In executive patronage he shared Dalhouse's 
scruples against appointing men who had actively opposed his 
own administration, and therefore, like Dalhousie, he had 
difficulty in this respect as his administration wore on. 
25 
But Aylmer's relations with the majority in the Assembly 
were poisoned by much more than the age-old issues of racial 
bias in patronage, and maladministration. In May, 1832, 
three civilians were killed by troops during an election riot, 
and Papineau turned the resulting inquest into a contretemps 
between himself and the Governor, neither of them having any 
right to become involved in the normal course of proceedings. 
It was also Aylmer's misfortune to be in charge of the colony 
during the half decade when a rush of British emigration to 
the Canadas tipped the balance of population, in the two 
colonies, in favour of the British settlers: if the boundary 
of 1791 was abolished there would be no need to tamper with 
the basis of representation to ensure that half the respresent- 
atives were, if not "conservatives", at least British. The 
Canadiens were by no means subdued by this influx but were 
not yet confident of their cultural survival; so they did 
all in their power to inhibit immigration, to diminish its 
impact on the laws and institutions of the colony, and to 
revitalize the existing institutions of French Canada. 
Aylmer's years in office were also the height of Papineau's 
power: with Vallieres on the bench, Bourdages dying, 
Cuvillier and Neilson departed in disgust, the Speaker was 
truly the first of his race and of his party, and in his 
dealings with Aylmer he sometimes displayed the style of a 
tribal chief dealing with a foreign power, rather than the 
Speaker of a subordinate legislature in the British Empire. 
Aylmer let him go ahead, and in his official communications 
to the British government steered a course between letting 
Papineau's excesses speak for themselves, and telling the 
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Colonial Office how it might at least regain the stalemate of 
the 1820s, when the government had the power to pay its civil 
servants. By 1834, with the official salaries two years in 
arrears and the Assembly's celebrated Ninety-two resolutions 
declaring a determination to pay nothing until the British 
government yielded to democracy, republicanism, and French 
ascendancy, Aylmer proposed to the British government an 
exercise in self-exculpation, the appointment of a commission 
of enquiry to visit the colony and assess the degeneration of 
affairs since the Select Committee reported in 1828.26 
That recommendation eventually marked the end of Aylmer's 
career as a colonial Governor. Three Colonial Secretaries in 
rapid succession considered his recommendation of a special 
commission. All liked the idea because, like Fiuskisson in 
1828, they preferred to spread as widely as possible the 
responsibility for finding a way out of the morass, especially 
if it seemed to require coercing the Assembly. But in each 
of these schemes there was no place for Lord Aylmer. Whether 
cause or scapegoat of the Canadiens' discontent, he could 
hardly stand by idly on the sidelines while a newcomer took 
account of his administration, nor could he decently go away 
on leave, with his ultimate return dependent on the verdict 
of the commission. 
Thomas Spring Rice, the first Colonial Secretary to 
adopt Aylmer's idea of sending a commissioner to Lower Canada, 
envisaged the mission as one to review on the spot the 
conclusions of a second Select Committee on Canada, which in 
July 1334 had reported that the recommendations of its 
predecessor had been faithfully carried out as far as lay 
in the power of the British government and colonial executive. 
Rice's commissioner would enquire into two points -- a court 
of impeachments for judges and other high officials, and the 
terms of a civil list that would be acceptable to the Assembly 
-- and he was to do nothing conclusive about the Legislative 
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Council. In general the commissioner would try to smooth the 
ruffled feathers of the patriotes, who were deeply offended 
by some of Lord Stanley's despatches, without abandoning the 
hope of a small permanent civil list or making the Legislative 
Council or Executive Council an echo of the Assembly. 
27 
Then Spring Rice went out of office with the dismissal of 
Melbourne's ministry in November, 1834; the Peel ministry and 
its Colonial Secretary, Lord Aberdeen, also preferred to try 
the commission scheme rather than issue further instructions 
through Lord Aylmer. The government had already publicly 
named its commissioner, Lord Amherst, when the whigs returned 
to office in mid-April, 1835. 
Manning has remarked that the Peel ministry was determined 
in 1831 to have a final confrontation with the Assembly and 
let the "Canadians... rebel and be done with it" if the last 
concessions of the British government were not acceptable. 
28 
The tories were indeed unwilling to leave many questions open 
to fresh inquiry, unless Amherst found that earlier govern- 
ments had acted on misinformation; but rebellion was not 
seriously anticipated despite some rumblings in the Ninety- 
two Resolutions and the inflammatory speeches of Hume and 
Roebuck. It was one of the axioms of British thought, in 
London as in the colony, that "Jean Baptiste would as readily 
swallow a musket as take it up in Civil War. "29 By 1834 the 
colony had not tasted the worst of the deprivations which by 
1838 would shake communities loose from the habit of obedience 
to their priests and seigneurs; the British in the colony and 
at home correctly appreciated that the Canadiens by themselves 
could never assemble the supplies or leadership needed for a 
successful uprising; and almost to the very last the 
authorities miscalculated the possibility of an uprising with- 
out the essential resources for success. The tory govern- 
ment of 1834-35 did not contemplate a rebellion; it intended 
to show Papineau he could gain nothing by intransigence -- 
the civil list must be conceded, the Legislative Council must 
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survive as an independent buffer between the demands of the 
people and the settled interests of the Empire. There was 
no clear expression of what the tory government would do if 
the Assembly refused these terms. It seems likely they 
intended nothing more than the course contemplated by 
E. G. Stanley in 1834, to revive the repealed clauses of the 
Revenue Act of 1774. This would rescue the executive, with- 
out doing anying for the merchants. But one paper in Lord 
Aberdeen's records did propose courses Stanley had considered 
objectionable or premature, namely reuniting the Canadas or 
carving up Lower Canada to create a British majority through- 
out Canada except in the seigneuries and the district of 
Quebec. 
30 (In the fluctuating state of Upper Canadian 
politics, this course might have been as unpleasant to the 
executive as it was congenial to the merchants. ) The tories 
were spared from having to untangle the possible failure of 
their commissioner by the series of defeats in the House of 
commons which brought the whigs back to power in the spring 
of 1835. 
In the next two months the whigs severely modified 
Aberdeen's plan, drifting back to Spring Rice's and then 
beyond. Early redrafts of Amherst's instructions kept most 
of the features of the tory plan, but the government soon 
decided to have an inquiry into the future as well as the 
past; to broaden the scope to cover disputes and grievances 
which had ripened since 1828, not merely the ones dealt with 
then; and to regain the momentum of Aylmer's early success in 
splitting the patriotes by patronage and flattery, as well as 
strict fairness. All this would take time, and was beyond 
the powers of a single commissioner. Amherst resigned, as 
the whigs hoped he would; he was replaced by three men drawn 
out of obscurity, Sir Charles Grey, Sir George Gipps, and the 
Earl of Gosford. The least inconspicuous of these was Gosford, 
one of the representative peers for Ireland; he was made 
Governor in Chief as well as head of the commission. His role, 
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for which his genial character suited him, was to avoid the 
sources of recent conflict between Aylmer and Papineau, 
regardless of the rights involved, and to dissolve, rather 
than smash, the Assembly's determination never to pass another 
Supply Bill until the demands of the Ninety-two Resolutions 
had been met. To secure such forebearance, Gosford was to 
govern (as Kempt and Aylmer had been told to do) in accord 
with the report of 1828, and to use patronage fairly and 
with an eye to influencing the leading Assemblymen. Gosford 
had the added advantage of secret instructions as commissioner, 
empowering him, with his colleagues, to report on and recommend 
anything they thought could reconcile conflicting interests 
in the colony. This, the government hoped, would put the 
Assembly on its best behaviour. The instructions to the 
Commission privately expressed the government's repugnance to 
election of the Legislative Council, but the idea was not 
totally forbidden. Lord Howick, the erstwhile colonial 
undersecretary who thought Aylmer personally responsible for 
squandering past opportunities for reconciliation, insisted 
that the commissioner, if he was to be anything more than an 
instrument of delay, ought to have power to negotiate an 
agreement with the different parties. The whigs could see 
several obstacles to Howick's aggressive plan: it was 
indecorous for the King to negotiate with his subjects; a 
negotiation carried out in that fashion might recommend 
something the government felt compelled to reject; and 
negotiations might simply break down, bringing the crisis to 
a head at an inconvenient time. So despite Howick's 
repeated interventions in June and December 1835, and May 
1836, the Commission remained what Glenelg intended it to be, 
a body designed to investigate and report, with full dis- 
cretion reserved to the home government to take whatever it 
chose of the Commissioner's advice. 
31 One embarassing result 
of this proceeding was that Gosford could hardly move without 
consulting the British government, for fear that some 
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administrative decision as Governor might prejudice his 
report as commissioner. On some very important issues, such 
as filling up the Executive and Legislative Councils, the 
delays at the Colonial Office strangled whatever good effects 
might have flowed from the Governor's well-intentioned plans. 
So far as the British colonists were concerned, 
Gosford's reputation never recovered from the effects of his 
first weeks in office. At his first public function he 
outraged high society by giving social precedence to the 
mayor's wife. Name. Caron may have been the ranking Canadienne 
present but she left in her wake a bevy of furious British 
women who outranked her by birth or marriage. 
32 Such a gesture 
caused ripples of indignation in a very narrow if important 
circle, but all levels of society reacted angrily when public 
revenues to the amount of B22,000 were made over to the 
Assembly for its contingent expenses at the start of the 
session of 1835. In this measure Gosford was merely carrying 
out orders from Downing Street, imposed on him because the 
whigs knew there could be no session at all if Gosford refused 
to advance the contingencies on the mere address of one 
house. But neither Gosford's flattering manners nor Glenelg's 
hazardous concessions broke Papineau's hold on the patriotes. 
The executive departments fell into disarray; until the eve 
of the rebellion Gosford's Executive Council was the rump of 
Dalhousie's, without even the merit of containing any of the 
high officials whom Dalhousie thought should pool their 
talents and co-ordinate their efforts in that body. The 
civil servants were unpaid between 1831 and 1834, and not 
paid again in full until the late summer of 1837; they were 
demoralized, going through the motions of their official 
duties. 
33 Gosford used official patronage much as Kempt had 
done, giving a majority of posts, and a greater majority of 
salaries, to French Canadians, and outraging the British 
colonists by going half-way down the list of the Quebec Bar 
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to put a well-known patriote onto the Bench. There were no 
concessions from Papineau. The charters of the city 
corporations were allowed to expire. Appropriations for 
public works, buildings and waterways amounted to exactly 
E1,000 during Gosford's administration, of which half went 
unspent. Neither the concesssions from the executive nor 
the paltry revenge against the merchants satisfied the 
patriotes -- they continued to agitate for complete control 
of the whole machinery of legislation and administration. 
At length, in the celebrated Ten Resolutions of March, 1837, 
the British Parliament stepped in to check the Assembly; the 
patriotes' outrage spread across the colony, feeding on the 
agricultural distress as well as the fears and simple 
ignorance of large sections of the population. By mid-July 
Andrew Cochran was back at the Chateau, patiently explaining 
to Gosford, from his recollections of 1827, how to go about 
disposing of troublesome militia officers and magistrates, 
and supplying from his files, for Gosford's use, a copy of 
Dalhousie's message closing the refractory session of 1827.34 
To radicals in Britain and patriotes in the colony, these 
were just further steps in the repudiation of the enlightened 
spirit of 1828; to the British colonists they were hesitant 
steps, long overdue, that might bring the colony back to 
sanity. And they felt themselves better prepared for a new 
dispensation by the changes which ten years of conflict had 
wrought in the different elements - conservative, reforming, 
and inert -- which had made up the political complexion of 
the British community of Lower Canada. 
iv 
Between 1828 and 1838 there was no British party in the 
colony identifed with the executive, apart from a few years 
when Aylmer's course happened to agree with what the British 
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colonists wished him to do; even so, his withdrawal from the 
colony was lamented more on political than personal grounds, 
and by 1837 Dalhousie was still honoured in the colony when 
Aylmer's name was hardly mentioned. To a limited extent the 
Legislative Council replaced the executive as a focus for the 
British colonists' allegiance to Britain. This was partly 
because the Council was odious to the patriotes, partly 
because Aylmer had given it a British but non-official 
majority, and partly because its most energetic new member, 
George Moffatt, united the old and the new in politics and 
commerce at Montreal: he was much more than the political 
heir of Richardson, he became the British colonists' 
equivalent to Papineau, spokesman for the aspirations and 
fears of men who looked for quick, uncomplicated solutions to 
deep-rooted, many-sided antagonisms. But the Council was 
essentially a body of the dignified and prominent, and was 
calmer than its predecessor of the twenties. Moffatt seldom 
carried the battle to the patriotes' camp as Richardson so 
loved to do, though he certainly flourished in defence. For 
defence the Council was valuable, but when the British 
colonists wished to take the initiative, they created 
political, social, and commercial societies and corporations 
which ultimately united their community, with some well- 
disposed Canadiens, in a public defence of their rights and 
the advancement of their own view of a prosperous future, 
unshackled from the intricacies of the colonial legal system 
and the patriotes' suspicion of capitalism and economic 
development. 
These colonial associations comprised purely commercial 
ventures, including a new bank and a railroad; but private 
gain was only part of their scope. The story of the 1830s, 
usually written in terms of the struggle between the 
executive and the Assembly, can be approached with equal 
interest from the third side, the side of those whom neither 
the executive nor the Assembly would officially encourage, 
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the ordinary British colonists and the leaders of their 
business interests. Four separate groups, closely linked at 
the top in personnel, launched the British colonists' attempt 
to mould the colony's future. The North American Colonial 
Association in London was a commercial lobby which developed 
a strong line of political argument. The British American 
Land Company, a joint stock concern organized in Montreal 
and London to solve the appalling disorder hindering settle- 
ment of the eastern townships, was the second group. Third, 
the constitutional associations throughout the province 
created in 1834-37 the nearest thing that ever existed to a 
broadly-based British political party in the colony. Various 
social organizations and political protest groups beyond the 
fringes of constitutionalism also flourished in these years. 
The fourth great political engine of the British in Lower 
Canada was conceived in the Montreal Constitutional 
Association, legitimized by an Act of the imperial parliament 
in 1838, and born through the efforts of the Montreal 
constitutionalists almost as soon as Lord Gosford was out of 
the colony. This was the Special Council of Lower Canada, 
which met the British colonists' long-standing dream for a 
legislature which could advance colonial economic development, 
without assaulting the guaranteed religious and cultural 
privileges of the Canadiens. The efforts of the NACA in 
London and the constitutionalists in Lower Canada were really 
instrumental in making this non-elected legislature possible, 
even if they earned a share of the blame for making it 
necessary. A narrative of the efforts of the Colonial 
Association, the land company, the constitutionalists, and 
the Special Council, will round out the already-familiar 
story of the achievements and failures of the Colonial Office, 
colonial executive, and patriote reformers of Lower Canada 
during the extended crisis which followed the parliamentary 
investigations of 1828. 
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Chapter 6: The North American Colonial Association 
i 
The North American Colonial Association, embodiment of the 
hopes and fears of the London merchants trading to Canada, 
was formed in 1831, a direct result of Lord Althorp's 
controversial budget in that year; but some of its roots lay 
in the report of the Select Committee report on the Canadas 
in 1828. That report convinced many interested parties that 
Britain was fundamentally and dangerously ignorant of Canada, 
and that the merchants engaged in trade with the colonies had 
a vital defensive role to play in dispelling that ignorance. 
Before 1828 these merchants kept an eye on the colonies' 
political and commercial state, and would occasionally dash 
off a letter to accompany a petition from North America or 
a remonstrance of their own, almost invariably on commerical 
questions. 
1 But these gestures were sporadic and directed to 
specific topics. This changed in 1829, when the timber 
merchant Nathaniel Gould began to publish narratives of his 
trips to North America, and to send unsolicited advice to the 
Colonial Office, usually enclosing rather alarming letters 
from unnamed sources in Lower Canada. About the same time 
letters on Newfoundland began to arrive at the Colonial Office 
from George Robinson, the M. P. for Worcester. 
2 
But a formal 
junction between the two men's efforts had to await a political 
crisis for the commercial community: the establishment of 
the whig government, with a prominent free-trader as Vice- 
President of the Board of Trade, and a Chancellor of the 
Exchequer who held the City's opinion in contempt. In self- 
defence, the General Shipowners' Society called for establish- 
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ment of smaller associations wherever there was still 
reverence for the attitudes encompassed in the slogan "Ships, 
Colonies and Commerce"; the NACA was duly formed. 
3 
The Colonial Association served a unique function for 
a limited period. It survived at least until 1849, but it 
was busiest during the second half of the thirties, and 
passed from the height of its influence at the end of 1837 
to its nadir in the autumn of 1839. The Association's 
vitality in the thirties was due to a number of factors. 
The divorce between economic and political power in Lower 
Canada prevented the appointment of a Lower Canadian agent 
in London and forced the merchants to create private channels 
of communication to the Colonial Office. At the height of 
the Association's activity there was a two-pronged attack 
on the protected colonial trades by progressive free-traders 
in Britain and reactionary anti-capitalists in the colony; 
these movements had to be opposed both in Parliament and out 
of doors. The end of the Bathurst regime at the Colonial 
office and the impotence of the chateau clique after 1828 
deprived the merchants of even the small comforts they had 
enjoyed within the old network of personal and political 
contacts. All these circumstances encouraged, indeed forced, 
the establishment of a Canadian lobby at Westminster. The 
existence of this lobby has always been recognized, yet has 
never been scrutinized, either as a manifestation of links 
between business and politics in England, or as a cog in 
the machinery through which colonial policy evolved. 
4 
Historians, like contemporaries, have been apt to dismiss 
the NACA as "the Gould gang" -- an unholy alliance of Gould, 
bowie and Co., with Gillespie, Moffatt, Finlay and Co., an 
alliance formed to peddle political opinions for much the 
same reasons as the firms sold grain and timber -- for private 
gain. 
5 This derogatory portrait of the NACA has the merit 
of being largely true; but this is not reason enough for 
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disregarding the Association. 
ii 
The lack of a proper colonial agency in London was the 
fault of the deadlock between the Assembly and Council in 
Lower Canada. Normally, before 1826, the business interests 
of Lower Canada approached the government and parliament 
privately or by petition; Adam Lymburner had been allowed to 
address the House of Commons from the Bar in 1791 against 
the division of the Canadas, and no doubt politics occupied 
some of the discussion at the handful of colonial coffee- 
houses and at the meetings of the Canada Club which was 
formed in 1810. The Assembly by contrast had two paid 
agents in London during the session of 1823, and three in 
1828. From 1828 to 1831 the Assembly enjoyed the unpaid 
support of a number of young whigs, but Henry Labouchere 
and James Stephen failed in their concerted effort to have 
the Assembly and Council at Quebec unite in appointing to 
a formal agency the young liberal MP Hyde Villiers. From 
1831 to 1834 the Assembly was represented by the pedantic 
lawyer and Legislative Councillor Denis-Benjamin Viger; 
6 
he was joined in 1834 by Augustin-Norbert Morin, a nervous 
young barrister whose pronouncements convinced many British 
observers that the Assembly's pretensions would have to be 
curbed before an effective settlement could be reached. 
When Viger and Morin went home in 1834, they left behind as 
the Assembly's spokesman the Canadian-raised John Arthur 
Roebuck, now radical MP for Bath. Roebuck was hobbled by 
the violence of his own style, speaking, as John Cam Hobhouse 
remarked, "not to our heads nor our hearts but to our 
throats"; 
7 
and by the growing disquiet in London at the sombre 
news from Quebec. But Roebuck possessed real strength in his 
position among the philosophic radicals, whose votes in 
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parliament were part of the whigs' frail majority after 1835. 
Thus the support for the Assembly in Britain came mainly 
from politicians on the radical fringe, influenced by Joseph 
Hume's long antipathy to the Colonial Office in the twenties 
and by the scepticism towards formal imperialism shown by 
the political economists. The opposite view was, predictably, 
centred in the tory party and also in the representatives 
of colonial trade. The latter put up creditable performances 
before the parliamentary select committees on the timber 
trade in 1820 and 1821,8 but they were only intermittently 
represented thereafter by James Stuart, W. B. Felton and 
Samuel Gale. In01831 the Committees of Trade of Montreal 
and Quebec named/commercial agent, the young barrister Henry 
Bliss, a native of New Brunswick who was already agent for 
that colony and Nova Scotia. This still left the British 
colonists without effective representation or direct access 
to the Press in London. It was this gap Nathaniel Gould 
set out to close in 1829, with articles in the morning Post 
and Blackwood's, and a letter to the Colonial Office enclosing 
private correspondence from Quebec, one passage of which 
spelled out the task to which Gould applied himself in the 
coming decade: "Unless some men like yourself can stir up 
the public mind as to the folly of exposing their flank by 
making this Country French or American.... the English here 
will be bound hand & foot & cast into the sea. "9 
Nonetheless it was commercial considerations which 
precipitated the formation of the mercantile lobby in 
April, 1831. Lord Althorp's budget early that year sent a 
general alarm through the protected trades. Indian cotton, 
Cape colony wines, and British North American timber and 
shipping were threatened; the interested parties milled 
around Westminster, descending on Althorp and briefing 
Ellenborough, Murray, Goulburn and Herries to lead the 
counter-offensive in Parliament. Ellenborough's notes on 
- 147 - 
these meetings indicate how emigration, a secondary issue in 
the investigations a decade earlier, had come to dominate 
discussion of North American trade: 
At 2a deputation of Canada shipowners & timber 
merchants came to me. The most important fact 
I got from them was that the whole agricultural 
population of Canada is employed for the five 
winter months in the felling, hewing & carrying 
of timber, and that there are saw mills on 
every stream.... Last year there were 40,000 
emigrants from G. B ...... All these were 
absorbed, & there was no distress. 
10 
Althorp laughed; when he was told the budget was opposed by 
the moneyed interests he replied "That is its best 
recommendation. " 
11 The budget was premature and the timber 
preferences survived; yet the colonial interests remained 
organized. The General Shipowners' and Colonial Committee 
advised its members to form separate associations. On 
16 April, eighteen of the most prominent Canada merchants 
in London met to form the North American Colonial Association. 
In the chair was George Moffatt's London partner, 
Alexander Gillespie jr.; the leading resolution was proposed 
by Nathaniel Gould, and an Association was formed, with seats 
on its managing committee ex officio for Bliss and other 
agents of colonial legislatures. The constitution of the 
Association resembled that of the East India Company, providing 
for election of the Committee by ballot, apportioned according 
to the amount of a member's subscription, and directing that 
members should retire in rotation and be ineligible for re- 
election for a year. But the quorum was set as low as three, 
and in practice the Association functioned as a committee 
of five: Gould, whose firm of Gould, Dowie and Co. exported 
textiles, imported timber, and owned ships; the two 
Gillespies, who dealt in Canadian corn and British manufactures, 
and through Moffatt were deeply interested in the forwarding 
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trade to Upper Canada; and Robert Carter, secretary of the 
NACA, who was a founder in 1836 of the Bank of British North 
America and as a partner in Carter and Bonus, dealt in ships 
and timber. These four, with Henry Bliss, all shared the work 
of addressing the Colonial Office, playing host to visiting 
Canadian dignitaries, and publishing a steady stream of 
pamphlets on politics, emigration, and the beneficial con- 
sequences of the corn and timber preferences. 
12 
The North American Colonial Association was conceived as 
a commercial lobby, to stem the tide of free trade. But it 
also become a political engine, operated against the influence 
of the French Canadians and fueled in part by letters from 
a member of one of the Councils, presumably George Moffatt 
himself. 
13 As a commercial lobby, the NACA acted to impress 
upon members of Parliament and the Press the importance of the 
North American colonies and the improbability of their being 
able to prosper without the corn and timber preferences. The 
colonies were not only a strategic counterpoise to the 
United states; they imported nearly four times as much from 
Britain, per capita, as the United States, and their potential 
as a base for smuggling to the northern states, though 
ostensibly dormant, was a guarantee against even higher 
American tariffs. The colonies were thus of great benefit 
even to those self-confident manufacturers who were clamouring 
for Free Trade. These arguments did not do much to discourage 
the diligent radical statisticians of the Board of Trade, but 
they helped to show that the shipping interest was still one 
of the powers of the land -- powerful enough to draw the 
teeth of Poulett Thomson's attack on the timber duties in 
1835.14 
As a political organ the Association aimed its efforts 
at a more diffuse audience, for it hoped to draw into the 
anti-patriote camp liberal businessmen who were indifferent 
or hostile to the protected trades. The only natural allies 
of the French Canadians were the O'Connellite tail in 
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Parliament: Roman Catholic, flattered and courted by Papineau, 
and devoted like Papineau to breaking up the existing structure 
of the British Empire, the Irish repealers had only one reason 
to tread softly on Canadian questions. They were reluctant to 
throw out the Melbourne ministry after 1835, and although there 
was never any doubt which way O'Connell's feelings lay on the 
Canadian question, his partisans' votes on Canada were incon- 
sistent and were never cast against the government except when 
its majorities were secure through tory support. The next 
most probable allies of the Canadiens were the philosophic 
radicals. Roebuck found no difficulty in persuading 
fellow radicals that all that mattered in the colonial 
struggle was that the British government was resisting the 
declared wishes of a democratically-elected Assembly. Racial 
tensions were simply evidence of misgovernment by an Anglican 
faction: the cure was to be found in giving the French 
Canadians more power, not less. 
15 
The NACA countered this view with the familiar argument 
that the French Canadians would always return an anti- 
British faction to power because they were ignorant and misled. 
The NACA admitted that the colony had been in "a disturbed 
state... under a former Governor" but the Association never 
wavered in its view that neither the excesses of Dalhousie 
nor the survival of abuses justified surrender to Papineau. 
In this respect the NACA was probably in harmony with the 
opinions of commercial men generally, for it is noteworthy 
that the members of Melbourne's ministry who most nearly 
represented the commercial point of view, Hobhouse and 
Thomson, were also consistently most unsympathetic to the 
Canadiens. The NACA never managed to infilitrate the liberal 
reviews, the Edinburgh and the London and Westminster; but 
its attitude was supported, and perhaps its assistance was 
sought, by the foreign and colonial writer for Blackwood's, 
Alfred Mallalieu, and by the Hon. Thomas Courtenay in the 
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bipartisan Foreign Quarterly Review. 
16 Gould found an outlet 
for his own articles in the Brighton Gazette. The Morning 
Herald, second only to the Times in circulation, was an early 
supporter of the NACA and in important leading articles in 
1834 the Times fell into line with the Association's anti- 
French views. By the end of 1836 the whig ministry itself 
was secretly deciding to legislate an end to the assembly's 
obstruction of public business. 
17 This gradual hardening of 
opinion against the patriotes grew as much out of Papineau's 
excesses as from the positive declarations of his opponents; 
but in Britain the NACA formed a useful source of information 
for the bipartisan counter-offensive against the Lower 
Canadian Assembly. 
iii 
The bipartisan nature of this campaign needs to be 
emphasized. In general English and Irish radicals have been 
portrayed as the friends of the patriotes, the tories as friends 
of the colonial eelites, and the whigs as reluctant intermediaries 
basically well-disposed to the Assembly but eventually appalled 
and driven to reaction by its agressive nationalism. In the 
period from 1828 to 1837 this is tolerably correct as far as 
it extends to the front benches in Parliament; but the NACA 
did not reflect this simple classification. Granted Gould and 
Robert Gillespie were both numbered among the "City Tories", 
but until 1837 the NACA was represented in parliament by whigs, 
not tories. The two men concerned, George Robinson and Patrick 
Maxwell Stewart, were not warm admirers of Grey or Melbourne, 
but both were returned as "reformers" by their respective 
boroughs, both helped to bring down the Peel government in 
1835, and neither was replaced by a whig when they lost their 
seats in 1837.18 
George Robinson was born in 1781, the son of a West 
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Country surgeon. He entered commerce and lived for some 
years in Newfoundland, made a fortune, returned to England, 
and became an East India proprietor and large-scale merchant 
and ship-owner. He was an early promoter of the British 
American Land Company and subsequently became a director of 
the Bank of England and, in 1834, chairman of Lloyd's. In 
1826 he was returned as one of two whig MPs for Worcester, 
a reasonably open borough which he held with good majorities 
until 1837, when a radical was elected in his stead. He was 
the type of merchant-politician who stood completely outside 
the partisans' jockeying for office, but nonetheless felt 
his views and information were valuable to the House and the 
country at large. One of his self-appointed tasks during 
the thirties was to come down to the House early and 
scrutinize the petitions being presented by radicals, 
especially Joseph Hume. After he stood down in 1837 one of his 
supporters wrote to the Times to deny that he was a tory. He 
never, "while in Parliament, servilely crouched to the 
Ministers; and... though a Liberal, he is doubtless an honour- 
able and independent man. " Robinson made his first 
parliamentary speech on Canada in 1831, criticizing colonial 
church establishments and expressing suspicion of the 
Legislative Council. He next spoke on the colony's affairs 
more than three years later. In the meantime he had come 
into contact with Gould and the Gillespies, with P. M. Stewart 
and no doubt with Peter McGill himself, and from 1834 to 1837 
he spoke in seven major debates on Canada, usually shadowing 
Roebuck. Most of Robinson's speeches inevitably suffered 
from his vested interest in the Land Company, but his major 
speech was a powerful one. When Lord John Russell introduced 
the Ten Resolutions in March, 1837, the first two sympathetic 
replies were from Robinson and Stewart. Russell had been 
answered by R. E. Leader for the radicals, and Robinson 
followed: he gave vent to the growing impatience with the 
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Canadiens, not only in the City but in the private feelings 
of many whigs, including ministers. His speech quoted some 
of the most damning passages from the Minerve, but Robinson 
was scrupulous in deferring to the traditional privileges of 
the Canadiens, concentrating his argument against the 
Assembly's menaces to the British parliament itself, to 
British colonists, and to the Constitution of 1791. The 
impact of this speech was not seriously weakened by the 
speaker who rose next, Daniel O'Connell, his speech was 
competently answered by Patrick Maxwell Stewart, who had also 
come down to the House prepared with samples of the more rabid 
semi-official patriote pronouncements. 
19 Neither Robinson 
nor Stewart ever made as good a speech on Canada again, for 
both were out of Parliament within four months. The remark- 
able fact was that in the most important debate on Canada in 
fifteen years, the first three speakers for the measure were 
the Leader of the House of Commons, and the two spokesmen for 
the North American Colonial Association. 
Patrick Maxwell Stewart was a less interesting figure 
than Robinson, but important in his own sphere. He was born 
in 1791, fourth son of a Scottish baronet and MP. P. M. 
Stewart served as chairman of the oriental Steam Navigation 
Company and of the London and Westminster Bank before his 
death in 1846; he helped found the British American Land 
Company in 1831. The Canadian radical agent, Henry Chapman, 
reported in 1835 that Stewart belonged to the "Derby Dilly", 
and his seat at Lancaster may have depended partly on the 
Stanley family's interest; this would help explain his defeat 
by a tory in 1837. He filled out his parliamentary career 
as MP for Renfrewshire, where his family's influence was strong, 
from 1841 until his death. In general Stewart was less prominent 
in Parliament than Robinson, and made only five recorded speeches 
on Canada between 1834 and 1837, one his rebuttal to O'Connell 
in 1837, and 1miD other the presentation of a Constitutionalist 
petition from Montreal early in 1835. The debate in Hansard 
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seems a fairly dull affair, but Chapman alleged that Stewart 
spoke so poorly that Stanley, Rice and Peel, all present, 
refused to parry Roebuck's counterthrust. "For the purpose 
of upholding the objects for which the CONSTITUTIONALISTS 
contend", gloated Chapman, "he is a thousand times more 
inefficient than the 'Jobber', of Worcester -- Mr. ROBINSON, " 
Observers of the opposite bias alleged that Stewart spoke 
well, but was poorly reported by the Press. 
20 
Another occasional spokesman for the Canadian lobby in 
Parliament was George F. Young, the chairman of the General 
Shipowners' Society. His speeches, though delivered from the 
tory side of the house, were studiously non-partisan. He 
added nothing of importance to the debate on the government's 
Bill suspending the Canadian constitution in 1838; he was not, 
in short, an adequate replacement for Robinson and Stewart. 
Even less effective was the veteran Canadian merchant, Hart 
Logan, who was engaged in the NACA's activities in the mid- 
thirties. He was elected to the safe conservative county 
seat of Suffolk West in 1837, but died two years later without 
ever having made a maiden speech. 
21 
One of the most interesting aspects of the parliamentary 
links of the North American Colonial Association was the 
absence from its ranks of one important house in the Canada 
trade: Ellice, Kinnear, and Company. Although Russell Ellice, 
the tory brother of the whig politician, was president of the 
NACA in 1839, the firm was not among the early members of the 
Association. This is quite understandable: the NACA was 
initially set up as a check on the government of which Edward 
Ellice was a member. Moreover, Ellice had reasons of his own 
for remaining reticent. His advice to the Select Committee 
in 1828 had flattered neither side in Lower Canada and was 
disregarded in the Committee's report. In the next decade 
Ellice never spoke publicly on Canada, though his views were 
often expressed privately against the whigs' conciliatory 
policy. Not until 1838 did he begin once more to speak on 
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Canada. He generally confined his remarks to fulsome praise 
of the ministry's measures, though he did overturn some of 
their details. His one major effort to advise the government 
on a new constitution for Canada, prepared at the end of 1838, 
was complicated and unconvincing. 
22 And he remained totally 
divorced from the formal apparatus of the North American 
Colonial Association. 
It becomes evident, therefore, that the NACA did not 
present a very formidable appearance in Parliament. The NACA 
had no real spokesmen in the House of Lords, though prominent 
tory lords could always be found to present a petition. 
23 
The NACA did share in the success of the general lobby against 
the timber duties, but in Lower Canadian politics its 
successes were more limited. Stewart did not speak often or 
well; George Robinson spoke rather too often in defense of 
that unfortunate political football of which he was Governor, 
the British American Land Company. Both men developed fully 
as competent speakers on Lower Canada affairs just months 
before losing their seats. The NACA was a very poor match 
for the seemingly bottomless pool of Irish and radical 
speakers who were willing to rise in the House, up to the 
rebellion and even after it, to put the best possible face on 
Papineau's attempts to cement a French character more firmly 
on Lower Canada. 
iv 
There is a paradox in the study of pressure groups, for 
copious written evidence of their work may be evidence of 
energy, but not conclusive proof of influence. Formal letters 
to officials carry with them a confession that the writer's 
private access to men in power is narrow. Social intimacy 
with a Minister is generally worth more than a dozen petitions, 
but leaves far less trace on the record. The NACA always 
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carried on the bulk of its business with the Colonial Office 
in writing, and never had an obvious spokesman in the cabinet 
or the inner circle of whig politicians. Ellice was a 
sympathizer, but not a contact. This was all especially true 
before March, 1833, when Lord Goderich was Colonial Secretary 
and his headstrong Parliamentary Undersecretary, Lord Howick, 
was responsible for the North American colonies. Both were 
suspicious of colonial representatives and of the tory- 
appointed Governors in the two Canadas, so they tried to make 
important decisions on the basis of their own reasoning. The 
distance between the NACA and the Government on political 
subjects is emphasized by the apparently closer relations 
between them in dealing with administrative and legislative 
points which did genuinely concern the members of the NACA 
as London-based traders. Political subjects were accordingly 
broached in private communications, often with an alarmist, 
hyperbolic style of which Goderich was privately contemptuous. 
But the managing committee of the NACA as a whole was brought 
into the constitutional debate by the Assembly's Ninety-two 
Resolutions of March, 1834.24 
Informally the firms in the NACA had been critical of 
Lord Aylmer's administration throughout the early thirties; 
this antipathy was no secret, and came to a head over the 
suspension of James Stuart as attorney-general. In 1833 
leading traders petitioned Lord Goderich and then Stanley 
in protest against Aylmer's treatment of Stuart. Stanley did 
not restore Stuart to the office by then being competently 
filled by Charles Richard Ogden, but he did offer him the 
vacant post of Chief Justice of Newfoundland, which Stuart 
refused. Stanley also worked with some of the NACA's leaders 
to clear away the last obstacles in the way of the fledgling 
British American Land Company. 
25 To some extent Stanley may 
have been responding to the initiatives of the NACA, but it 
seems more likely he was merely reacting against what he 
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believed to be the imprudent leniency of past whig policy. 
Stanley went out of office a year later, leaving a Select 
Committee of the Commons reviewing events since 1828 in the 
Canadas. It was, in effect, a reconvening of parliamentary 
survivors of the previous committee, leavened by some rising 
young men and other interested parties, notably Howick and 
Roebuck, Robinson and Stewart. The committee was an energetic 
and prompt response to the Ninety-two Resolutions, and really 
marked the advent of Lower Canadian disputes as a subject of 
prominent, if intermittent, public and partisan interest in 
Britain. The Committee was proposed by Roebuck, but was 
quickly turned by Stanley into an effort to discredit 
Goderich's complacent handling of Papineau and so justify 
Stanley's own plan, strongly supported by Ellice in private, 
to suspend Howick's revenue act of 1831. Although the NACA 
placed its two MPs in the Committee, the managing committee 
consulted with Stanley, Lord Sandon, and other influential 
whigs, and decided not to bring its case forward. 
They were... advised that it was needless for them 
to produce any evidence, as those Delegates [Viger 
and Morin] had not only failed to make out their 
case, but had exhibited themselves so decidedly in 
the character of violent partisans,... that the 
only impressions created by them were unfavourable 
to the views they sought to support. 
26 
Stanley evidently wished to keep the matter in the hands of 
the politicians, rather than the interested parties out of 
doors, and he would have been embarassed if the NACA had 
brought up the question of reuniting the Canadas, which he 
thought premature. But Stanley, like Huskisson in 1828, 
lost control of the proceedings by going out of office. His 
successor, Thomas Spring Rice, was reluctant to proceed with 
Stanley's measure; Rice appears to have been influenced by 
a fact pointed out forcibly by Howick, that the division 
lists on the Ninety-two Resolutions showed Papineau had been 
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deserted by some seigneurs and influential city members, 
notably Neilson and Cuvillier. The Select Committee was 
therefore induced to issue a terse report vindicating 
Goderich's and Murray's administrations and studiously avoid- 
ing the problem of how to deal with the Assembly if it 
continued obstinate. The Colonial Association was severely 
disappointed. 
27 
But from the time of Spring Rice's term at the Colonial 
Office the Colonial Association began to aspire to a strong 
voice in the private deliberations of the Colonial Office, 
and sought to be informed of the government's views before 
these were made public. The Association was helped by the 
quickening pace of politics in Lower Canada. The Assembly's 
behaviour caught the attention of the British Press, and 
doomed the patriotes as the favourites of British liberals. 
Howick noted during the select committee's proceedings that 
although Morin was "very intelligent" his testimony on 
emigration and settlement "shewed so unreasonable a dis- 
position, & was so unfair in his construction of the acts of 
Govt as to produce a stronger impress 
nagst the Assly than 
anything that has yet taken place. "28 The NACA from this 
moment onward had a better chance of impressing the Colonial 
office than the patriotes had, even if it lacked the strategic 
advantage of Roebuck's parliamentary following; and Gould 
confidently included copies of the Ninety-two Resolutions in 
his dossiers of anti-patriote literature. The Assembly's 
new militancy also strengthened the constitutionalist cause 
in the colony. From the middle of 1834 Stewart and Gillespie 
were fortified by possession of a petition from Montreal 
with nearly 12,000 signatures, including more than a thousand 
Canadiens. 
29 
The possession of a petition, and the ability to speak 
for a wider constituency than a clutch of traders, did not in 
itself give the NACA policy or tactics, though it gave the 
managing committee a certain status and respectability it had 
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previously lacked. Individual members of the NACA might 
favour reunion of the Canadas or, in the case of Gould, 
annexation of Montreal to Upper Canada; 
30 but their brief as 
agents of the constitutional meeting did not go beyond 
ensuring that the government, and public opinion generally, 
were awake to the profound discontent of the colony's loyal 
population. The NACA was hampered by the fact that it wished 
to influence the Government, not harass or embarrass it. The 
correct tactic was therefore to try as far as possible to 
identify the Government with the apprehensions of the 
constitutionalists, and the immediate objective was to get 
the Colonial Secretary to present the constitutionalists' 
petition in Parliament. After much vaccilation Rice did not 
present the petition. The parliamentary session was drawing 
to a close, and after consultations with Rice and Lord Sandon, 
Patrick Stewart decided the petition should be withheld until 
the next session. Stewart seemed satisfied with the arrange- 
ment, and the delaying tactics might have succeeded had 
Spring Rice not suddenly been thrust from office with the 
rest of the Melbourne ministry in November. At the time of 
his departure Rice was on the point of choosing a commissioner 
to go to Lower Canada to resolve the crisis on grounds that 
would have been acceptable to most signers of the Montreal 
petition. 
31 
The change of ministry brought to the Colonial Office, 
reluctantly, the Earl of Aberdeen, whose real m6tier was 
foreign affairs. Early in January, 1835, Gould briefed 
Aberdeen thoroughly on the NACA's view of recent events, and 
Gillespie forwarded more rather outrageous correspondence 
from Montreal. Changes in the attitude of the Colonial Office 
were subtle, but real. The NACA's correspondence began to 
be filed with official letters, not with the private effusions 
of miscellaneous individuals. 
32 New instructions were drawn 
up for a commissioner and they embodied the same sort of 
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determination to check the expansion of patriote power with 
which Spring Rice had satisfied Stewart six months earlier. 
At last, on 24 March, Aberdeen did what Rice had avoided 
-- he rose in Parliament to present the petition from the 
Montreal contitutionalists, the same petition which Stewart 
had just presented in the lower House. 
33 The remarkable thing 
about these activities is that they were bipartisan at a time 
when the Ministry was struggling unsuccessfully to survive. 
The issue's new-found prominence was due not so much to the 
efforts of the NACA as to those of Papineau and Roebuck. 
Roebuck's rising interest in Canada was easily explicable in 
terms of his boyhood spent in the colony, and an anxiety to 
assist Joseph Hume in advocating the claims of the Canadian 
radicals. Roebuck may also have been trying to widen the 
rift between Stanley and the whole liberal opposition and, 
Gould alleged, he was striving to earn the full salaried 
agency which he did receive in 1835.34 Roebuck's intervention 
brought before the public one starkly simple interpretation 
of an issue most politicians were trying, in the interests of 
conciliation, to keep blurred and indistinct. Henry Chapman 
provided an amusing analysis of public opinion for the 
Vindicator. His premise was that British opinion was un- 
formed on Canadian affairs, and that all publicity would 
ultimately benefit the Assembly. 
The papers apparently against you, but in fact for 
you, are the Times and the Morning Herald. The 
Times gives you a broadside now and then, say once 
in three or four months. The Herald fires off a 
small shot on the arrival of every-packet. The 
Times.... treats you with a column, and then 
forgets your very existence almost. The Herald 
on the other hand, vouchsafes you a dozen lines 
or so, once a fortnight.... but [the Herald's 
articles] are utterly incomprehensible by every- 
body here, except a few Canadian merchants who 
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understand Colonial slang.... I can only say 
of the Times that the crying sin of Canada 
is, that her cause is advocated by such men as 
Roebuck and Hume, supported by O'Connell, 
Molesworth, Grote and so forth. 
On the other hand the Globe, Morning Chronicle, Spectator, 
True Sun and Atlas, reported Chapman, had all reprinted from 
the radical papers in Canada. 
35 
Chapman's analysis was stimulating, but his conclusions 
were upside down. He and Roebuck misled Papineau seriously 
throughout 1835 about the prospect of increasing radical 
influence in British politics. The Quebec and Montreal 
Gazettes were closer to the mark in gloating that the Times 
was worth far more to the constitutionalists than Roebuck 
could ever be to the patriotes. Early in February 1835 the 
Times printed a strongly worded complaint from an anonymous 
Canadian, stressing that "The want of education among the 
French majority, and their consequent inability to form a 
correct judgment of the acts of their political leaders, have 
engendered most of our grievances. " The Times warned its 
readers that the maintenance of the old laws in Lower Canada 
"assist the sordid and oppressive policy of the race of 
French Canadians against those of British blood. " Blackwoods, 
too, published a lengthy review of Ithe patriotes' benighted- 
ness in its June number. 
36 The orinal material for this 
journalistic compaign against the Assembly doubtless came 
principally through the leaders of the NACA; but political 
events in Britain were to neutralize this temporary advantage. 
Throughout the same session which saw such a strong 
presentation of the constitutional viewpoint, the newly- 
elected House of Commons was moving to oust Peel's ministry. 
The crucial votes came in February on the election of a 
Speaker, and on motions for partial disestablishment of the 
Church of Ireland in April. The ministry resigned on the 
night of 8 April. The mechanism behind this overturn was 
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the Lichfield House Compact, an informal agreement among 
whigs, radicals and Irish repealers to ignore their mutual 
differences in pursuing the common cause of turning Peel out. 
The paradoxical result of the election of 1835 and the 
Lichfield House Compact was to strengthen the tory party in 
the Commons, but to bring the whigs to power, dependent on 
radical and Irish support. This alliance looked extremely 
unstable, since leading members of Melbourne's second 
ministry had sat in tory cabinets during the twenties, but 
many ministers had special concerns which would have suffered 
under any other coalition of parties in the existing House. 
Although the sympathy of the country moved steadily towards 
the tories between 1834 and 1841, the ministry shifted to 
conciliate its indispensable radical supporters. An early 
casualty of this marriage of convenience was the loose sense 
of common purpose between ministers, the permanent staff of 
the Colonial Office, and the NACA. The new cabinet in 1835 
would try again to conciliate the French Canadians * 
37 
To the commercial concerns of the NACA, the return of 
the whigs to power did not justify the abuse their members, 
particularly Bliss, hurled at the departing ministry in 
November, 1834. Spring Rice as Chancellor was not an 
ambitious, reckless reformer as Althorp had tried to be. The 
new political under-secretary at the Colonial Office, Sir 
George Grey, was helpful and sympathetic in the long-disputed 
matter of vice-admiralty court fees at Quebec; and Poulett 
Thomson's dreaded select committee on the timber duties was 
hobbled by the shipping interest, and only the comparatively 
unimportant preference on colonial hardwoods was lost during 
the later 1830s. On Canadian political questions a heavy 
correspondence continued, but it soon became clear that the 
Colonial Secretary, Lord Glenelg, might be driven by circum- 
stances but would not be led by argument to offend the 
patriotes. The tories' instructions to Lord Amherst as 
commissioner were redrawn many times, each time losing a 
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little of their edge until even the question of electing the 
Legislative Council, firmly rejected by Peel and Aberdeen, 
was shrouded in woolly equivocation. The commission was 
enlarged and its scope of inquiry broadened, its scope for 
action almost nullified. The fundamental failure of the 
NACA to influence the government's views was evident in 
the commissioners' instructions. Amherst was to act: Gosford 
was to delay. Procrastination was defended by Glenelg in 
1836 on the grounds that it had allowed the government time 
to allay the really constitutional disputes in the other 
North American colonies, but none of this could gainsay the 
additional animosities which delay had caused in Lower Canada 
itself. 38 
At the same time the NACA began to grow in importance. 
Early in 1835 the fledgling constitutional associations of 
Quebec and Montreal named two delegates to visit London and 
collaborate with the NACA. They met Glenelg, Rice, Melbourne, 
Stephen and Grey, and Chapman found the whigs' attitude much 
warmer than the treatment Viger, Morin and Roebuck had 
received in 1834.39 Undoubtedly the alliance with the NACA 
gave this deputation an ease of access to official and social 
life in London which had been denied to the patriote delegates, 
and the grievances of the constitutionalists were appended 
with a host of minor topics to Gosford's brief; but this did 
nothing to instil in the commissioners' instructions the 
notion that the non-payment of official salaries was only a 
secondary aspect of the struggle between Papineau and his 
antagonists. The ineffectiveness of these delegates and of 
the NACA in 1835 must be attributed in part to the whigs' 
reluctance to appear to be acting under the influence of any 
of the colonial parties, and their 61itist inclination to 
make policy through their own official advisors and other 
experts. Another clue to the impotence of the NACA at the 
time must be sought in the character of Gillespie's corres- 
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pondence. These letters enclosed correspondence from Montreal 
and Quebec which frequently asserted the British Lower 
Canadians' willingness to break off from Britain if there 
was further truckling to the French-Canadians. One letter 
written from Montreal at the end of 1834 feared a canadien 
insurrection with help from France, and mentioned the writer's 
making duplicate copies of business records for safe-keeping 
in upper Canada. 
40 This was not representative opinion, it 
was not even good inflammatory journalism, and for Gillespie 
to send it to Aberdeen along with some much sounder material 
must have prejudiced his Association's chances of getting a 
friendly hearing in dealing with a new ministry still inclined 
to suspect that the Canadian correspondents of the NACA were 
themselves among the instigators of the few legitimate 
grievances of which the patriotes could complain. 
The NACA continued to perform poorly during 1836, despite 
reverses for the whigs' policy in Quebec. Roebuck scored a 
minor success in Parliament by curtailing the charter of the 
Bank of British North America. The promoters of this 
institution, which was designed to reduce the chaos in 
exchange transactions between London, New York, and the 
colonies, included Robert Gillespie and Robert Carter. 
Roebuck induced Parliament to limit the bank's charter to 
Britain, and force it to act without a charter, or to seek 
local charters, in each of the individual colonies. 
41 Even 
the Press began to take an independent line. In mid-1836 
the Times printed a series of letters by the Upper Canadian 
reformer Egerton Ryerson. Ryerson was quite as anti-French 
as Gillespie, but he probed the politics of the Lower 
Province with constitutional argument and a wealth of detailed 
knowledge which contrasted favourably with Gillespie's 
frights and alarms. In the leader columns the Times always 
sought policies which would keep in view the known wishes of 
the existing colonists instead of looking always, as the 
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NACA was apt to do, to the putative British majority which 
emigration would create. 
42 It was only at the end of 1836, 
when Gosford's failure was patent, that Gillespie's advice 
again began to show some similarity to the actual problems 
being discussed at the Colonial Office. 
The end of 1836 was a time of turmoil at the Colonial 
Office. When Elzear Bedard failed to pass the arrears in 
February he was promoted to the Bench, so it was a foregone 
conclusion when the Assembly met again in August that 
papineau would have a clear field. In mid-November, there- 
fore, a secret memorandum from the Colonial Office advised 
ministers to consider another partition of Canada to 
segregate British from French colonists. The colony would 
be divided along the St. Lawrence, and Glenelg grimly noted 
that if the French in their area remained intransigent, "the 
task of further coercion would be comparatively easy". This 
impracticable proposal was before the cabinet when Robert 
Gillespie's "Remarks respecting the Canadas" were delivered 
early in December. These were divided into two parts, the 
first a covering letter summarizing courses of action open 
to the government, the second a rambling discourse on the 
effects of letting the present crisis continue to its inevitable 
sequel, the dissolution of the Empire: "Deprive Great Britain 
of her Colonies and the Sun of her glory 
is set, she will 
soon lose Ireland, and from being the most powerful nation 
in the world, take her place by the side of Denmark. " The 
memoranda were curiously inconsistent; the covering letter 
endorsed legislative union of the Canadas, but the memorandum 
accurately predicted that the reformers of Upper and Lower 
Canada would co-operate in seeking self-government for the 
united province. It is impossible to say how much influence 
these papers had on Glenelg, but the next proposal from the 
Colonial office was more nearly consistent with Gillespie's 
advice, and Stephen assured a sceptical Howick that the NACA 
would definitely approve of it. According to this plan, 
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French and British colonists would be again divided into 
separate legislatures in a loose federation. This proposal 
shared the NACA's determination to govern in the interests 
of the British settlers and also showed the creeping influence 
of the idea of Canadian reunion. 
43 But once again the whigs 
panicked and fell back on the advice of an expert, in this 
case Sir Charles Grey, the first of the commissioners to 
return to England; and largely under Grey's influence the 
plan of December was scrapped during January. 
Grey was customarily spoken of as the commissioner most 
sympathetic to the aspirations of the "English party" in 
Lower Canada, but he was in no sense connected with that 
party or its interests. (He even stood as a whig against 
G. F. Young at Tynemouth in July, 1837. ) In fact Grey wrote 
energetically of the need to conciliate the British, not the 
French, portion of Lower Canada, but his objections to 
Glenelg's plans were weightier than any original proposal he 
could initiate. The ministry then fell back on the general 
report of the commission and prepared the celebrated Ten 
Resolutions of March, 1837. Those resolutions obtained a 
notoriety beyond their constitutional importance; they never 
became law. They were inspired by the commissioners' remark 
that the best measure the government could devise would be 
whatever seemed most likely to command the largest majorities 
in Parliament, and detailed plans and analyses were therefore 
scrupulously avoided. The resolutions were greeted warmly by 
the NACA in parliament; Robinson and Stewart supported the 
government enthusiastically, but also defended the mass of 
the French Canadians from the British radicals' allegation 
that all wished for independence, and Robinson particularly 
stated his willingness to continue the cultural privileges 
enjoyed by the Canadiens since 1763. The parliamentary wing 
of the NACA was happy to be generous in its victory. 
44 
The resolutions provoked a storm of protest in Lower 
Canada, even though they were never carried out in full. 
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(The Executive and Legislative Councils were enlarged, and 
the salary arrears were paid by a loan from the British 
Treasury, in August. ) Colonial society had never been so 
polarized, yet individuals continued to leap from one camp to 
another. Meetings which stopped just short of treason were 
held throughout the seigneurial counties all that summer, and 
when Gosford called one last session the Assembly did not 
even proceed to business, and left many useful temporary acts 
to expire, including the provincial bank charters. Once 
again the NACA took fright. An important letter from Robert 
Gillespie late in November said that although rebellion was 
not imminent, the colony had no legislature and the Imperial 
Parliament must fill the gap with its own enactments. The 
Cabinet had already set a precedent during the summer by 
giving royal charters, identical to the expiring legislative 
ones, to the colonial banks. Gillespie proposed to carry 
this precedent much further: 
Unless certain Acts are passed by the Imperial 
Parliament for the Establishment of Register Offices, 
the abolition of Lods & vends & other feudal rights, 
the Improvement of the internal Navigation harbours 
&c there will be no peace in the Province. 
These reforms would not dampen the ardor of the French, but 
would mollify the British colonists for a time. This letter 
was quickly overtaken by events, but on 21 December Gillespie 
wrote again. 
Let the hands of Government My Lord be strengthened 
.... Let 
the Government & Revenues of the Province 
be vested in a Governor and Council for a time with 
power to legislate; let this Legislature pass such 
laws as the Province requires and when matters 
settle down (as they would soon do) the Representative 
system might again be resorted to as more agreeable 
when better understood to all parties. By such 
means the Home Government would divest themselves 
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of much responsibility, much trouble, and after all 
Parliament might not enact Laws suited to the wants 
of the people. 
45 
In substance this is precisely what was done, but this 
striking similarity is not conclusive evidence that Gillespie's 
advice was decisive. Certainly there was much confusion in 
Cabinet over what sort of interim authority should rule the 
disturbed province, but by 30 December all ministers seem to 
have accepted the need for an emergency Council with at least 
some of the powers of the erstwhile Legislature. On 
2 January Gillespie sent a draft act to the Colonial Office 
which with minor exceptions became the bill enacted by the 
House of Commons on 26 January. Some extraneous material 
introduced into the government's bill by Howick, which 
Gillespie disliked, was removed by Russell after strong public 
opposition from Peel and Ellice and the reading of Gillespie's 
letter in Cabinet. 
46 In short, the similarities between 
Gillespie's proposals and the plan enacted by Parliament seem 
too striking to be coincidential; the NACA and the Colonial 
office, after drifting apart during 1835 and 1836, were by 
the end of 1837 thinking along almost identical lines. 
v 
At this stage in the crisis the Montreal constitutionalists 
took charge themselves of the presentation of their case, 
as George Moffatt and later William Badgely arrived in London. 
The NACA withdrew from formal contact with the government, 
though Gillespie did send a warm note to Durham in April, 
welcoming his appointment, and wrote to John Neilson at Quebec 
at the same time, advising him to be friendly and open with 
the new Governor. Gillespie was associated with Badgely as 
the NACA's delegate to the Colonial Office when Moffatt went 
home in April, and was sole agent for the constitutionalists 
after Badgely, too, returned to Montreal in August. 
47 
The 
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NACA was almost at once embroiled in the crisis over disallow- 
ance of Durham's ordinance banishing prominent rebels to 
Bermuda. A special meeting of the managing committee was 
called to echo the feeling of the "British" party at Montreal, 
that Durham's ordinance was perhaps too lenient, but was well- 
intentioned and ought to have been supported. This 
resolution was so moderately expressed that it did not chill 
the government's friendly relations with the NACA. Gould and 
Gillespie were regular callers at Downing Street and at 
length, after news of the second rebellion reached London, 
the Colonial Office unbent in its attitude to Gillespie, 
adopting a tone that seemed genuinely more friendly than in 
earlier communications. "Lord Glenelg will be happy to receive 
from you any further information or suggestions which you may 
be disposed to communicate. "48 Glenelg was losing his grasp 
of affairs: utterly alienated from the French Canadians, 
disillusioned and betrayed by the government's own emissaries, 
and aware that the British in Lower Canada must be courted 
and conciliated as assiduously as the French were wooed before 
1837, the Colonial Secretary was eager to hear any reasonable 
proposal, even from the interested parties who had formerly 
been kept at arm's length. 
And yet the NACA forfeited the privilege of being an 
important adviser to the government. Once again the 
Association's plans for the short term were enacted with small 
modifications: the Special Council was enlarged and its powers 
extended. This had also been recommended by the Governor, 
Sir John Colborne. 
49 
But the Association's long-term 
proposals were shelved by the Colonial Office until delivery 
of Durham's Report, which once again prompted the government 
to turn to the inner circle of its own experts. The report 
caused the government some difficulties but it contained two 
major features which would make it difficult to disregard: 
it recommended union of the Canadas, which the whigs had been 
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groping towards and Montreal constitutionalists clamouring 
for since 1836; and it revived one of the cherished principles 
of whig optimism, that the French Canadians could be led where 
they could not be driven, to an acceptance of the growth of 
the British community in their midst. The managing committee 
of the NACA summoned a special meeting to consider the report. 
it flattered Durham, glossed over the disreputable aspects 
of his short mission, and praised the principle of union. 
But it quoted one of Russell's Ten Resolutions, which 
condemned responsible government, and it denounced a 
legislative union if the franchise and representation were 
"based on population alone without distinction between the 
loyal and Insurgent Inhabitants. ,50 This was the keynote of 
agitation by the NACA during 1839, and was an important 
element in an able pamphlet published by Henry Bliss as the 
NACA's contribution to the propaganda campaign waged around 
Durham's Report. The NACA advised redrawing electoral 
boundaries to give the British settlers a majority in Lower 
Canada itself, because the French were not to be trusted with 
a franchise which they put blindly at the disposal of 
seditious leaders, and because the British inhabitants were 
one-third of the population (an exaggeration), carrying on 
"almost all the Commerce of the Country and holding a vast 
amount of its property and originating and conducting its 
only improvements" -- an argument for a whiggish franchise. 
The Government eventually adopted the compromise which Sir 
John Colborne favoured, to weight the representation towards 
the British by giving the smaller population of Upper Canada 
equal representation with the lower province. (Even this 
plan had a fairly rough passage through Parliament. ) 51 The 
NACA would have been wiser to support this scheme rather than 
the wilder one of basing a constitution on the presumed dis- 
loyalty of large districts of the colony. 
The autumn of 1839 saw the complete destruction of the 
NACA as a party to whom Government could turn for advice. 
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The disgrace occurred when it became known the Ministry would 
appoint the free-trader Charles Poulett Thomson as the new 
Governor-General. The NACA panicked; its tory chairman, 
Russell Ellice, wrote to Melbourne on 22 August that Thomson 
could not expect the cordial support of anyone in the colony; 
Melbourne's answer was so charmingly irrelevant that the 
frustrated Ellice sent the correspondence to the Times. The 
whig Mornin Chronicle retal4 ated with an unfair attack on 
the whole managing committee of the NACA: it was composed, 
said a leading article, of tories, blindly disposed to 
r 
embarass the government; of Nova Scotian and New Brunswick 
traders who cared more for the timber preferences than for 
the real interests of the Canadas; and of profiteers who 
wished the troubles, and hence the garrisons, to continue in 
Canada. 
52 
Undoubtedly the NACA was right to say the great majority 
of British Canadians would have preferred to keep Sir John 
Colborne, and if a civilian must be sent to them, they would 
not have chosen a Baltic timber merchant. But this would 
not "necessarily deprive him of their confidence, " and the 
merchants of Quebec and Montreal, urged by Gould to petition 
against Colborne's recall and Thomson's appointment, welcomed 
him instead as a fellow-merchant. The NACA also misjudged 
the Governor himself. Thomson had a curious mixture of 
conscientiousness and opportunism which had permitted him to 
spend four years as President of the Board of Trade, making 
steady but piecemeal amendments to the British system of 
tariffs, and without forcing doctrinaire or extreme measures 
on his colleagues. Moreover, as Ellice ought to have known, 
Thomson was staunchly anti-French, opposed to Howick on 
Canadian conciliation, and strongly committed to the reunion. 
Finally, Thomson's appointment was part of an elaborate 
readjustment of the Cabinet and could not have been rescinded 
at the last moment without great difficulty. So the Press 
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campaign and petitions from London, Birmingham and Glasgow 
against the appointment merely served to discredit the NACA 
as a participant in the formation of Canadian policy. 
vi 
The North American Colonial Association continued to 
exist. Its last formal representation to the Colonial Office 
was a fruitless support for Gladstone's attempt in 1849 to 
have the Rebellion Losses Act disallowed. The Association 
continued to correspond with the whig Colonial Secretaries 
after Glenelg's departure, and worked sympathetically with 
Stanley in the 1840s to try to rationalize the Canadian corn 
preferences. 
53 But as a political organ it reduced itself, 
by the Thomson incident, to its original status as a 
miscellaneous correspondent pleading on behalf of vested 
interests. In retrospect, it enjoyed modest success in 
advancing the purely commercial interests of its members. 
Its political interventions were less effective. Canada 
would doubtless have been a major political and journalistic 
issue without the efforts of the Association, though the NACA 
was a useful channel of information to the Press and public, 
drawing attention to what was significant in the Canadian 
newspapers. The NACA's influence at Downing Street was 
limited to Aberdeen's few months in office and the period 
from early 1837 to the end of 1838 when the Government had to 
face the desperate task of regaining the confidence of the 
British in Lower Canada, and had little faith in its Governors 
in the colony. Ministers were thankful' enough for the support 
of Robinson and Stewart in 1837, and Gillespie may fairly be 
regarded as an architect of the Special Council of 1838-41. 
But by concentrating after 1838 on the military threat of the 
United States and the need to proscribe the French Canadian 
rebels indefinitely, the Association lost touch with the real 
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options facing the Colonial Office which, especially with the 
appointment of Thomson, reverted to the traditional policy of 
trusting to its own experts. The brief success of the NACA 
was an accurate reflection of the bankruptcy of Lord Glenelg's 
policy during his last year in office. But on the whole it 
is not surprising that the whigs clung to their resilient 
tradition of governing in accordance with what they conceived 
to be liberal principles, as interpreted and applied by the 
inner circles of their own party. 
- 173 - 
Chapter 7: The British American Land Company 
i 
Land was among the crucial issues dividing colonial opinion 
in Lower Canada before the rebellions, especially after 1828. 
it posed an administrative problem containing all the elements 
that divided constitutionalists from patriotes. It was a 
financial issue: after 1826 the ungranted lands were seen as 
a source of revenue, not yet at the disposal of the Assembly. 
Administration of land was a partisan issue: the Executive 
Council made grants before 1826, and the Commissioner of Crown 
Lands after that date could influence the selection and price 
of lands to be brought onto the market. It posed moral 
questions: the Council before 1809 and some township agents 
after 1820 were corrupt. Political theories clashed in their 
rawest form: did the lands belong to the existing habitants in 
trust for future generations of Canadiens, as the advocates 
of popular sovereignty thought, or to the Crown for all its 
subjects by right of conquest and treaty? For these reasons 
the administration of land was a potent element in the 
cultural rift in Lower Canadian society: Canadiens and 
British colonists looked to the large, unsettled fertile 
tracts of the Eastern Townships to determine the issue 
of demographic and thus political superiority. The checks and 
balances between imperial initiatives and colonial obstinacy 
worked in this field as in so many others, for the executive 
jealously retained power over new grants, while the Assembly 
after 1817 guarded the funds which might have been used to 
facilitate access and stimulate settlement in the Townships. 
Neither, acting alone, could make an efficient effort in the 
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interests of its own partisans, nor could it correct the grave 
impediments which the system of crown and clergy reserves, 
and the improvident grants of 1802-09, had created. The 
executive had the power but not the funds to settle the town- 
ships; the Assembly had so much power in other respects that 
successive Colonial Secretaries, if they thought about the 
problem at all, were reluctant to intervene in the matter. 
The answer to all these problems, it seemed to some interested 
observers, was a private corporation which would relieve 
government of the odium of day-to-day administration of land 
grants for settlement and revenue, and at the same time carry 
out the British government's covert policy of checking the 
patriotes without challenging them directly. The mechanism 
which the Montreal and London merchants evolved for this 
political, social and economic strategy was the British 
American Land Company. 
ii 
One sidelight of the dispute over township lands was 
resolved early and easily. The granted township lands were 
held in free and common soccage, but there was no legal bar 
to the government's making new grants en fief et seigneurie. 
The Select Commitee of 1828 suggested new seigneurial grants 
might be made beside seigneurial lands when the latter were 
filled up. 
1 These qualifications amounted to a refusal, 
though the Committee may not have realized it. In 1831 the 
question was put to the test when Lord Aylmer sent the Colonial 
office an application for enlargement of a seigneury by a 
grant from adjacent Crown lands. James Stephen reported: 
"These are not times in which it is possible to gratify such 
whims when their indulgence can only be had at the expense of 
great national objects. 
"2 John Neilson and Andrew Stuart, 
3 
and many British seigneurs 
in the Montreal district, had 
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successfully settled British emigrants onto seigneurial lands, 
and owners of such lands tended for obvious reasons to 
encourage the idea that the "feudal" burdens were no worse 
than what the emigrant farmer was accustomed to put up with 
at home; ' but the entrenched opinion was that extension of 
seigneurial tenure would discourage British emigrants from 
settling in bower Canada's "waste" lands, while if French 
Canadians declined to settle on soccage lands it was a sign 
of apathy or ignorance. Seigneurial tenure involved free 
grants with a small but permanent rent to a private individual, 
the seigneur; soccage tenure involved an early outlay of capital 
and a few early and fairly heavy payments ending with freehold 
ownership. The soccage system encouraged accumulation of 
capital before purchase, and concentration on cash crops 
afterwards. Tenure en fief was consistent with the survival 
of subsistence agriculture and, through payment of rents in 
kind, with barter. These economic facts, and a vague 
theoretical dislike for the remnants of vassalage in the 
seigneurial system, underlay the British colonists' disgust 
towards seigneurial tenure in the countryside. After 1831, 
no serious effort was made to extend the seigneurial system 
into ungranted lands. The decision placed the Canadien, not 
the emigrant, at a psychological (though not a material) 
disadvantage in respect to taking possession of Crown lands. 
The political opposition of the patriotes was not the 
only bar to filling up the vacant lands. The administrative 
machinery was cumbersome. An early decision had been taken 
to centralize the granting of lands so the executive could 
control settlement; the intending settler, having chosen his 
lot, still had to go through expensive and cumbersome legal 
processes in far-away Quebec City. This was evaded in the first 
years of the nineteenth centruy by the system of "leaders and 
associates", a legal fiction creating, in effect, small private 
corporations taking free grants and then selling them piecemeal 
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for profit. This spontaneous system coped tolerably well with 
Loyalists and post-Loyalist immigrants from adjoining parts 
of the United States. 
5 But a further obstacle was the crown 
and clergy reserves. Out of every nine lots granted, one 
was reserved to the Crown and another for the support of a 
Protestant clergy. The Crown would speculate in its own 
lands, leaving these lots in wild state until private land- 
owners had improved adjacent lots and made the reserves more 
desirable. In fact the reserves held back the improvement of 
settled lots, for the settler in remote districts could have 
few more valuable assets than helpful neighbours, and the 
unsettled reserves played havoc with the administration of 
the road laws. The reserves grossed only a negligible income 
from nominal purchasers, who paid a downpayment, stripped the 
timber, and abandoned the lots in a more unpromising state 
than before. A potential asset was squandered, and the 
inconvenience to bona fide settlers remained. Even more 
damaging were the huge grants made to friends of the executive 
and to members of the land board -- the Executive Council 
itself -- under the administration of Sir Robert Shore Milnes. 
These abuses were largely curtailed under Sir James Craig, 
but left a permanent legacy of inconvenience as a result of 
corrupt grants to speculators. 
6 
The term "land speculator" or "jobber" had derogatory 
overtones even in the early nineteenth century. Yet commenta- 
tors as different as Edward Ellice and Charles Buller both 
testified in 1839-40 to the benefits which legitimate specula- 
tion had brought to the United States and might provide in 
Canada. In Buller's analysis, land speculation worked well 
in the United States because it stimulated settlement and the 
private provision of amenities. The ingredients of this 
success, wrote Buller, were an atmosphere of optimism which 
attracted capitalists with ample resources, buttressed by a 
small tax on wild lands to discourage excessively long-term 
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speculation. In Lower Canada, by contrast, almost every 
owner waited on the efforts of his neighbours, and little 
was done except ironically by squatters, who inadvertently 
performed for many grantees the small settlement duties with- 
out which free grants were nominally subject to escheat. 
7 
Finally, the Eastern Townships suffered from the rival 
attractions of unsettled lands in Upper Canada and the 
American midwest, further from the sea but with adequate 
transport. But the main obstacle seen by Buller and others 
was the lack of capital for speculative development of lands, 
not just speculative purchase. A list of large township 
holders in 1838 showed many tracts in the hands of trustees 
of estates, and included few of the really prominent and well- 
to-do who might be expected to find the capital for improve- 
ment. 
8 For as Edward Stanley observed during his visit in 
1824, what the Townships really needed were a few eccentric 
speculators who were willing to spend large sums on improve- 
ments without any hope of seeing a profit in their own 
generation. 
9 There were in fact a handful of such speculators 
in a small scale: Edward Ellice reinvested in improvements 
virtually all the profits of his valuable seigneury of 
Beauharnois during the early 1830s. John Richardson in the 
early twenties helped pay for a public road from Sorel to 
Drummondville, which passed by lands he owned. W. B. Felton, 
who acquired large grants near Sherbrooke both before and 
after becoming Commissioner of Crown Lands, candidly admitted 
in 1829 that "his object in settling in this Country was to 
obtain lands and form an Estate for his family, and that to 
accomplish this, he has already expended a very large sum of 
money. " 
10 But by 1831 this sort of private venture seemed 
inadequate, and the obvious solution lay in the new form of 
corporate organization, the joint stock company. The advant- 
age of such a system was already being tested in Upper Canada 
by the Canada Company, and was appealing in the lower 
province. 
11 First, it would provide opportunities for 
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constructive speculation by newer members of the mercantile 
61ite who had not shared or inherited the free grants of 
twenty years before. Second, it would provide convenient 
access to the British money market -- capital was perennially 
short in the colonies, and loans for improvements to real 
estate were rarely made because of the uncertainty of old 
titles, mortgages, and surveys. A joint stock company would 
spread the risks and, by seeking a large fresh grant from the 
Crown, would hold the bulk of its assets under undisputable 
title. Third, a well-capitalized venture could buy up 
awkwardly-placed Crown and clergy reserves, and unimproved 
small-holdings. Fourth, the company could co-ordinate 
encouragement and information on both sides of the Atlantic 
for intending emigrants, and could provide in the townships 
themselves local land agencies which were denied to the 
settlers of most townships by the cumbrous centralization 
adopted before 1800. Fifth, in the political sphere, the 
Land Company could with the co-operation of Government pre- 
empt a huge tract of land, preventing unpredictable 
concessions to the patriotes by future Colonial Secretaries. 
The British American Land Company would be, in its own 
limited sphere and profiteering fashion, a venture in 
colonial self-determination for the capitalists of Montreal. 
For there was no doubt, almost from the start, that the 
Land Company should be an instrument of public policy in the 
hands of anti-patriotes on both sides of the Atlantic. In 
Britain as in the colony, opinion might differ on the wisdom 
of antagonizing the Assembly, as formation of the Company 
would surely do; doubts would also exist about the viability 
of the fledgling company itself and 'the propriety of the 
proposals it made to Government for the purchase of Crown 
lands, but a broad spectrum of opinion held that British 
emigration to the Eastern Townships should be encouraged, 
stimulated and directed with an energy that the Government 
could not muster. In Britain, the opposition to this view 
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was miniscule, and was located in the extremes of politics. 
On the tory side, the emigration expert Colonel Cockburn 
outraged Dalhousie and others in the twenties by echoing the 
patriote line of argument that Lower Canada was chiefly 
valuable to Britain for the cannon fodder that the habitants 
provided, and that the cultural differences between the 
habitants and their southern neighbours were well worth 
preserving; according to this view, the Eastern Townships 
should be set aside for the growth of the French Canadian 
nation and British emigration should be directed elsewhere. 
12 
This was only slightly more progressive than the old and 
wholly ineffectual policy that a belt of twenty miles along 
the entire frontier should be impenetrable, unsettled 
wilderness. 
13 On the other political extreme, a few philo- 
sophic radicals supported the patriotes' claim that the 
Crown's rights could not override the existing population's 
right to self-determination in all matters including 
administration of land. Between these extremes lay a broad 
consensus that the lands of the colony were the patrimony of 
the empire, and should be open to British emigrants as a 
matter of public policy, important equally to British security 
in North America and to the relief of the British and Irish 
labouring classes. In 1836 John Arthur Roebuck, putting the 
worst possible face on these opinions, nonetheless admitted 
their strength in a warning letter to Papineau. Most British 
politicians agreed, said Roebuck, that the administration of 
land should eventually be given up to a colony as "a means 
of supply to meet the peculiar exigiencies, of a new country. " 
But when should these hypothetical advantages be bestowed on 
the colony rather than on the empire at large? Obviously not 
for a long time "in a colony just called into existence and 
dependent wholly on the metropolis. " But Roebuck believed 
that when a colony bore the whole cost of its government, 
which he erroneously suggested Lower Canada did, then it 
should control its ungranted lands too. 
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The majority, I believe, of the House of Commons 
are opposed to this opinion. They have not it is 
true formed any very distinct idea as to the time 
when the exclusive administration should pass to 
the colonies, but as far as I could ascertain, the 
general feeling is, that so long as the colony 
remains a colony and is not an independent state, 
the wild lands belonging to it should be considered 
the joint property of the colony & the metropolis 
and that the proceeds thereof should be applied to 
their joint purposes.... [Because of] The press- 
ing difficulties of Ireland.. the waste lands of 
the colony will be applied (if possible) to the 
dispauperizing of the estates of Irish Landlords. 
14 
This British sentiment was totally at odds with the campaign 
of the patriotes, chiefly through the Minerve, to check 
immigration to the townships; 15 it was much more nearly in 
harmony with the Montreal Gazette and the inflammatory leading 
article which cost Robert Armour his commission as King's 
Printer in November, 1832: 
ENGLISHMEN! SCOTCHMEN! IRISH! BRITISH SUBJECTS 
ALL!.... The lands of CANADA were purchased of 
FRENCHMEN by our brave countrymen on the battle 
plains of ABRAHAM, and your renowned progenitors 
paid the price with their hearts' blood.... CANADA, 
therefore, BRITONS, is yours. The lands washed by 
the ATLANTIC on the east, and by the PACIFIC on 
the west, as far north as the POLAR Seas, are all 
yours. They are yours, for colonization, at your 
own time and pleasure, as it shall suit you to 
appropriate them to your use and benefit. 
16 
The Canadiens, the article emphasized, were also British 
subjects, and should be equally privileged with other British 
subjects from older parts of the Empire, but no more so. On 
this vital question the opinion of British statesmen differed 
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from that of colonial 'tories' only in the degree of vehemence 
with which they expressed themselves. Of all the issues 
dividing races and parties in the colony, it was on land and 
emigration that the British colonists spoke most nearly with 
the same voice as the metropolitan society of which they were 
a fragment. 
iii 
A joint-stock land company for Lower Canada was first 
projected by W. B. Felton, Sir Francis Burton and others in 
1825, but initial optimism withered in the financial crisis 
of the following year and only one such company took the 
field in the twenties, the Canada Company in the upper 
province. Interest in Lower Canada came to a head again in 
November 1831, with the appearance of a prospectus for the 
"Colonial Land Company", naming a typical group of nine City 
figures and assorted MPs as a provisional committee. 
Nathaniel Gould was in this group from the start, as was 
Patrick Maxwell Stewart. Three other MPs named were the 
unaligned member for Caithness, George Sinclair, and 
interestingly, two Irish Repealers, John Browne and E. S. Ruthven. 
Initial support for the company was encouraging, and by 
February 1832, a new provisional committee had taken shape, 
showing a more obvious concentration of British North 
American merchants, for it included George Robinson MP, 
Alexander Gillespie Jr., and Gould's partner James Dowie, as 
well as Henry Bliss. A report to shareholders on 2 February 
spoke optimistically about the Crown lands, estimated at 4m 
acres, and the "many private properties in the market, could 
purchasers be found on a scale commensurate with the quantity 
of acres to be sold. " Emigration to the Canadas had reached 
a peak of 55,000 the previous season, and this, with the 
apparent success of the Canada Company, promised well for a 
17 
new concern. 
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Optimism in the City masked a more complicated situation 
in the colony. While Gould was drafting the prospectus, Lord 
Aylmer was warning Goderich against too hasty or too improv- 
erished an emigration. He had already expressed his strong 
doubts about one consequence of such an emigration during the 
summer of 1831: 
I myself partake of all that partiality which so 
particularly distinguishes Englishmen [sic] in 
favor of their own Laws and Institutions, and 
should be most happy to see them universally 
established in all British Colonies; but in the 
case of this particular Colony it well becomes 
all those who are so eager to Anglify the French 
Canadians, to consider what those French Canadians 
would become on ceasing to be what they now are? 
Would the change make them Englishmen, or Americans? 
He feared their character and principles would become more 
American, and the boom in pauper emigration excited all his 
apprehensions. The Minerve immediately justified his fears, 
denouncing British emigration as a plot to Anglicize the 
colony by stealth, and urging the Assembly to take control 
of the situation. 
l8 
In London, rthe secretary of the BALC and Lord Howick 
were just begi4ing nearly eighteen months of negotiations to 
establish a company with the avowed object of changing the 
cultural demography of Lower Canada. Howick had other problems 
at the moment, not apparently related to the company's request 
for a charter and a substantial purchase of Crown Lands on 
favourable terms. The Colonial Office was struggling to 
support the Church of England overseas, but the Chancellor 
had promised the House of Commons to eliminate the parliamentary 
grant for colonial clergy and the Lower Canadian Legislature 
would never pay for more than the Catholics and, perhaps, the 
Presbyterians. The grant to the Church of England might be 
shifted to the growing fund of Crown Land revenues, but what 
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would then become of it when that fund was turned over to the 
Assembly in exchange for a civil list? Howick's private 
belief was that every effort to support a minority church 
would bring it into disrepute, but he found Goderich so rigid 
that "I will make no further attempt to urge the very strong 
objectns I feel. "19 Then came the letter from John Galt, 
secretary to the BALC as he had been to the Canada Company. 
Galt held out the prospect of an artificially accelerated 
sale of Crown lands in the very colony whose Church finances 
seemed most intractable. As soon as capital subscriptions 
were well advanced and a more formal prospectus issued, 
Goderich agreed to meet Galt: almost the only stipulation he 
made initially was that the "improvement moiety" (half the 
purchase price which the government would spend in the tract 
sold) ought to be applied in part to churches, parsonages, 
and improvements to glebe lands for the established church. 
20 
This consideration, more than any other, apparently let Galt 
get his foot in the door at Downing Street. 
Gradually an agreement began to take shape, influenced 
by Howick's fear that the company might try to speculate on 
a grand scale, and by Galt's determination, first to get terms 
no worse than those given to the Canada Company five years 
earlier, and second to give the company flexibility in choos- 
ing its holdings. 
21 The company was stubborn; the Colonial 
Office was ill-informed, dilatory and erratic, accepting the 
company's terms in mid-May and upsetting the whole arrangement 
again two weeks later. There were constitutional niceties 
surrounding incorporation by both royal charter and Act of 
Parliament, and there were other "objections... in a political 
point of view". This referred to strong representations 
against the Company by the Assembly's agent 
in London, D-B 
Viger, and to a recent warning received from Lord Aylmer, 
22 
who sent a summary of available lands, but warned that the 
Minerve was hot on the heels of the company. It would 
become a "standing grievance" and one could only hope that it 
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would work well. In any case, Aylmer added, the executive 
must retain control of some funds because of the Assembly's 
determination "to controul the Executive Government in every 
possible way without regard to those Constitutional principles 
which regulate the practice of the Mother Country. " 
Aylmer afterwards referred to this despatch as favouring 
the company, but the warning bore more fruit than the rather 
lukewarm encouragement, and the reference to retaining control 
of the revenues was not likely to affect Howick, the architect 
of the Colonial office's conciliatory policy. Nor was much 
attention paid to Aylmer's subsequent private letter a month 
later, written in the wake of the Montreal election riot of 
21 May, retracting his earlier support for the cultural survival 
of French Canada and urging increased facilities for immigra- 
tion, and reunion of the Canadas. 
23 The government held to 
the course explained to the directors of the BALC in mid-1832, 
that they could get a charter and buy land on terms to be 
settled later, but could expect no special treatment on 
political grounds. Most of the summer was consumed in the 
company's efforts to prepare a charter, and then further 
delayed by Howick's refusal to proceed until the capital was 
pledged. Howick also objected to the clause permitting the 
company to hold up to 3m acres at a time: 
land was rising in 
value so rapidly that the Government should not sell more 
than was needed at one time. "Let them take any moderate 
quantity for which they choose to pay ready money, & let them 
hereafter encrease their purchases at the price of the day. " 
Gait added the new argument that lands in the Eastern Townships 
were worth at best 75% of the value of new lands in upper 
Canada, and invoked Edward Ellice's name in support of the 
company, though he would have been mortified to see how Ellice 
fulfilled his promise to write: "These Canada people plague 
me to write to you about their Land Company", 
he said; but he 
went on to argue that 
if the Colonial Office could realize 
3s an acre it would receive twice what the land would be 
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worth in Howick's lifetime or his own. 
24 Negotiations still 
lagged; Gould complained that the Assembly's hostility had 
cost the company all its financial support in the colony. 
Bickering continued on whether to value the land at Quebec or 
in London, and Gould warned in December that the Commissioner 
of Crown Lands and most Executive Councillors held township 
lands themselves and might be tempted to inflate the price. 
At the end of the year, Howick summed up the futile state of 
affairs by assuring Aylmer that the Colonial Office was 
willing to encourage the company's success, but had seen only 
objectionable offers. 
25 
In the colony rumours ebbed and flowed. During the 
September by-election at Quebec in 1832, George Vanfelson 
warned the Irish voters that the Land Company was intended to 
create in Lower Canada a problem of absentee landlords similar 
to that of Ireland. 
26 Then Aylmer urged the Colonial Office 
to enter the business of land development itself: he and 
Felton had long believed, he said, that this plan was even 
more desireable than the establishment of a joint stock 
company; and he advised Goderich to raise a loan or mortgage 
of B10,000 and begin to settle Megantic township, near Quebec. 
27 
In the Assembly, Papineau at last took the field in mid-March, 
deriding the township settlers' migratory habits in contrast 
to the deep-rooted attachment of the Canadiens to the soil. 
"They who had quitted the land of their birth, were willing 
to sell that of their adoption -- to sell for dollars -- all 
they had, and part with the asylum they had chosen for them- 
selves for dollars -- dollars appeared to be their only aim. " 
An address against the land company was passed by the Assembly 
and forwarded by Aylmer with the information that more than 
half the seigneurial lands remained unconceded, and the 
Government must not allow itself to be swayed by the "highly 
objectionable" views in the Assembly's address. 
28 
In London, Gould published in Fisher's Nautical Magazine 
a series of articles condemning political economy and urging 
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establishment of the BALC to introduce "new wants, new capital, 
new energies, and, what is most required, new feelings, among 
those inert descendants of the first French dispossessors of 
the Indians". 
29 And late in February 1833 the company, 
represented now by John Reid as secretary, tried again. Reid 
tendered for Im acres only, the company's conservative 
estimate of the whole remaining crown lands in Mississquoi, 
Drummond, Megantic, Nicolet, Sherbrooke, Stanstead and Shefford 
counties. Aylmer was to report on availability and price, 
and the company would choose from his list those lands it felt 
were advantageously priced. At last the Colonial Office 
received Aylmer's report. He advised the government to limit 
the company at first to half the available lands, recommended 
3s an acre as a fair price for the unsurveyed "St Francis 
block" in Sherbrooke County, and said the lands should be 
settled first from the American frontier, creeping northwards 
as the southern sections filled up. 
30 
By this time Goderich and Howick were out of office, and 
the more decisive, if impetuous, E. G. Stanley was in charge. 
Stanley was preoccupied early on with the abolition of slavery, 
but once he turned his attention to Lower Canada he took little 
time in coming round to Ellice's view, that something must be 
done to ensure the financial independence of the Executive. 
Stanley decided there was little point in waiting for either 
conciliation or immigration to change the politics of Lower 
Canada; it was time for the government to act, and c artering 
the British American Land Company was part of the ag essive 
policy that now seemed necessary. It may be of more than 
passing interest, too, that Edward Ellice became an important 
advisor to Stanley on Canadian policy, and that Russell Ellice, 
not an original promoter of the company, took a substantial 
interest in it some time before the end of 1834.31 Negotia- 
tions were reopened in August, 1833, and led to an agreement 
on 3 December. 
32 Although the Colonial Secretary clung to 
many of the principles of his predecessors a more cordial 
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spirit permeated the negotiations; Stanley's strong interest 
in augmenting the Crown revenues, and the company's impatience 
to start operations after two years in limbo were the moving 
forces behind the agreement, which was signed on 3 December. 
Aylmer's report on values and availability of land had 
also swept away one of the main sources of contention between 
the Government and the BALC, and it was substantially in terms 
of his recommendation that the agreement was framed. The 
government offered an unsurveyed block of nearly . 6m acres in 
Sherbrooke County at 3s. an acre. In addition the company was 
offered all available crown reserves and other surveyed blocks 
in the counties of Sherbrooke, Shefford, and Stanstead. 
33 
This was a substantial modification of early proposals. The 
size of the sale, 847,661 acres, was well within the early 
quantities applied for, and the concentration on the three 
named counties meant that the Company would have to purchase 
on the open market a foothold in Mississquoi, the most fully 
settled of the border township counties, and in Megantic, 
Drummond, and the soccage portions of Nicolet. The company 
received neither a long common frontier with the seigneurial 
counties, nor ready access to the St. Lawrence. 3s an acre 
at 4% interest over ten years was a fair price for the 
St. Francis block; 3s 6d was an advantageous wholesale price 
for the rest. Patents of grants were to be made, without fees 
to local officials, in proportion as the payments were received, 
so if the company kept up its payments and interest it would 
hold free title to the whole tract in a decade. This was 
arranged by Stanley to discourage the company from selling 
off the detached lots and then abandoning the less accessible 
block. The sixth clause pledged the government to spend half 
the purchase money -- the improvement moiety -- in public 
works to make the company's lands more accessible and more 
attractive to emigrants. The company might advise, but could 
not dictate, the apportionment of this fund for such objects 
as "canals, bridges, high roads, market-houses, court-houses, 
- 188 - 
school-houses, the erection of churches and parsonage houses, 
[and] the clearing and improvement of glebe lands. " 
To retain the application of the improvement moiety seemed 
a sensible precaution, but it was unworkable. The Government 
knew nothing of the unsurveyed block except by occasional 
surveys by the department of the Surveyor-General, Joseph 
Bouchette; and although Bouchette was a fine old gentleman, a 
polished courtier and the father of modern economic geography 
in Canada, the early work of his department was as badly de- 
ranged as his personal finances. 
34 The expenditure of b6,000 
a year in the Eastern Townships would compel the Government 
to hire a full-time surveyor resident in the townships, would 
add to the work of Bouchette's department, and would probably 
require two or three superintending commissioners. Planning 
and administration might consume a quarter of the fund before 
a workman ever picked up his spade. On 6 August, 1834, Spring 
Rice agreed to reverse the roles of government and company 
in spending the improvement fund. 
35 Governors from Aylmer 
to Durham all approved the company's plans and estimates 
virtually without scrutiny. 
36 The government saved itself 
some trouble and expense, but the company became to all intents 
and purposes a department of public works for five townships, 
and earned by its establishment the enthusiastic support of 
the British settlers of the townships, and the denunciations 
of the majority in the House of Assembly. 
iv 
The early history of the BALC divides easily into three 
periods of which the second, from 1834 to 1838, encompassed 
the beginning of operations, the early promise of success, 
and the series of crippling injuries, only some'of them self- 
inflicted, which brought the company on its knees to the 
Colonial office at the end of 1837. The royal charter was 
granted early in 1834 and George Robinson steered through 
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Parliament the incorporating Act, which received the royal 
assent on 22 May. 
37 The company was authorized to hold up to 
3m acres in the townships or seigneuries of British North 
America, with an authorized capital of L300,000. The company 
had claimed B3 per share from each subscriber to the B50 
shares, and the Act limited calls on the stock to B5 a share 
semi-annually. The full capital would therefore be paid up 
by May 1839, but not sooner unless a general meeting of share- 
holders authorized a special call. The shares of the company 
traded first at a premium of 2%, but gradually slumped over 
four years to a discount of nearly 50%. 
38 But the proprietors 
continued to meet the calls of the directors and thereby staved 
off disaster for four years, while the company struggled to 
meet its annual obligation of 812,000 plus accumulating 
interest, simultaneously consolidating its holdings by 
purchases of private lots and Crown and clergy reserves. From 
the first the company struggled to'maintain its double role 
as a political machine for stimulating British settlement in 
the townships, and a private corporation seeking both 
long-term and immediate benefits for its shareholders. 
Dealings with the Colonial office, so important before 1834 
and after 1838, were reduced in the interim to niggling 
disputes on minor expenses. 
39 
The London committee of the company projected operations 
from the beginning of 1834, and the commissioners -- Moffatt 
and McGill -- were instructed to pay particular attention to 
the improvement fund: "Upon the judicious and economical 
expenditure of this money the success of the Company mainly 
depends. , 
40 As soon as the charter arrived the commissioners 
bought land opposite Trois Rivieres to build landing-stages 
and warehouses for the new town of Port St. Francis; and the 
company signalled its intention to concentrate its efforts 
around Sherbrooke, 103 miles by road from Montreal, by 
purchasing extensive holdings in the town from W. B. Felton 
and the former MPP for the County, C. F. H. Goodhue. By the 
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end of July the company had agents at Quebec, at Stanstead 
on the American frontier, and at Melbourne, a village at the 
northern limit of the company's tracts. The company also 
bought a woollen mill, grist-mill, carpenter's workshop and 
seven houses in Sherbrooke, where the confluence of the 
St. Francis and Magog Rivers offered ample water-power. 
Controversy touched these investments, for they seemed 
speculative, and one of the buildings housed the county's 
radical newspaper, whose proprietor refused to negotiate 
a lease on the company's terms and lost his premises just 
before the election campaign of 1834.41 These investments, 
with substantial purchases of uncleared and semi-cleared lands, 
did not put a serious dent into the company's finances, for 
at the annual meeting in March, 1835, Robinson was able to 
report that the BALC had L12,000 invested in American state 
securities, 811,000 in its London bank, and a further-L2,000 
in Canadian banks. Individual shareholders betrayed some 
apprehensions on political grounds, but the year's business 
ended with commissioners, directors, and shareholders in good 
spirits. The company had not yet sold any land. 
42 
Operations progressed in 1835. Surveys and soil tests 
were carried on, 
43 
with emphasis placed once again on improving 
access to the company's lands from the St. Lawrence. Port 
St. Francis offered the only deep-water landing on the south 
shore from Levis to Sorel, and the company built there a 
permanent wharf 500 feet long, a storehouse, six emigrant 
houses, stables and carriage sheds. These improvements cost 
L4,240 currency. A few tons of merchandise had already been 
shipped to Sherbrooke by that route, and thrice-weekly stages 
ran to the same town. The Governor had approved expenditures 
from the improvement fund of L12,000 to build roads, including 
one cutting the distance to Sherbrooke by 14 miles from Port 
St. Francis, and another shearing 13 miles from the distance 
between Montreal and Sherbrooke. The LaPrairie-St. John's 
railroad (in which Peter McGill was also interested) was 
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also expected to enhance the value of the townships, though 
proprietors were not told it was chiefly important to the 
Richelieu Valley, where the company had very little land. 44 
In 1836-37 operations were less ambitious. In May 1836 the 
company moved its Canadian headquarters to Sherbrooke with 
Arthur C. Webster as sub-commissioner for sales and labour 
contracting. For most of this year the company concentrated 
its efforts in Sherbrooke. In 1837 the stage service from 
Port St. Francis was doubled, and L1,000 for a road into the 
unsurveyed block was approved by the London Committee; but 
operation was already being pinched by an unfavourable cash 
flow. 
45 
There can be no doubt the BALC's investments were of 
considerable public importance and convenience, but the con- 
centration of effort on Port St. Francis and the improvement 
of the route to Richmond, outside the company's tracts, 
continued to emphasize the lack of a suitable infrastructure 
for the ambitious scheme of peopling three inland counties. 
At the rate of L170 a mile the BALC could build only 35 miles 
of road a year from the improvement fund, and all other 
investments had to come from the capital and profits of the 
company itself. In its first five years of operation the 
company could expect L300,000 from its shareholders; in this 
same period it was obliged to pay the government 1664,160. 
This would leave an average of L47,168 a year for private 
improvements, administrative costs, surveys not covered by 
the improvement fund, recruitment and assistance to emigrants, 
and further purchases to round out the company's holdings. 
On this basis the company was not under-. capitalized, but if 
it wished to invest heavily in additional lands -- which it 
did -- it was necessary to stimulate a steady flow of cash- 
paying settlers into its lands. 
46 
it was in this crucial aspect of the company's operations, 
its raison d'etre after all, that its failure was most stark. 
This must be viewed against the background of immigration 
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patterns before and after the establishment of the company. 
From 1828-32 the average annual arrivals at the port of Quebec 
reached 31,541; this average fell to 22,444 in 1833-37. 
In 1835 the Quebec Gazette reported several hundred settlers 
with considerable capital had gone into the Eastern Townships, 
but 1836 and 1837 were the critical years for the company. 
For the former year the superintendent of emigration at Quebec 
reported 6,000 new settlers had gone to the townships, a 
surprisingly disproportionate 62% of the figure for Lower 
Canada generally; in 1837 the figure had slipped back to 1,500 
(37%). In 1838 immigration virtually ceased. 
47 The political 
disorders which had been mounting since 1834 took their toll 
on public opinion in Britain. In Sussex, Colonel Wyndham's 
emigration organizer reported only one family offered to go 
to Canada; in far-off Sutherland, the Duke of Sutherland's 
factor reported a "dread of Canada" and an interest in 
Australia; and a Scottish settler in the townships wrote to 
his brother in Bute the sort of letter that must have reached 
hundreds of modest homes throughout the British isles: 
I observe that from the circumstances mentioned in 
your letter that it is uncertain whither you will 
be able to acomplish your design of leaving the 
Country... next Spring. I am extreamly Sory to 
inform you that even if there was no Obsticle in 
the way there. the lamentable state of Canadas 
(I mean the lower provence) is at presant in a 
horible condition indeed. so much so that it 
would be hazardous for any uropian to land in it. 
The Country are now and has been for some two 
months past in a Compleat State of Rebellion a 
great dale of Blood has been already spelled 
and very many lives lost. 
48 
Thus the risings along the Richelieu completed the work of 
discouragement the patriotes had begun with newspaper attacks 
and the handbills they circulated to emigrants arriving at 
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Quebec, denouncing the BALC's titles as invalid. The company 
was never given a chance to succeed. In February, 1838, the 
BALC admitted the appalling fact that it had sold only L4,500 
worth of land -- perhaps 13,000 acres -- realizing only b1,650 
to date. 
49 
Those 6,000 immigrants in 1836 were anything but an asset 
to the company. They were paupers, recruited chiefly from 
Norfolk, Suffolk and Hampshire by a team of agents co-ordinated 
at considerable expense by the London committee. Others came 
from the United States, Upper Canada, and Cape Breton. 50 The 
BALC made energetic efforts early in 1836 to interest Wyndham 
in its operations, but his travelling agent, Dr. Brydone, had 
already toured the tract at the suggestion of Peter McGill 
and reported critically: 
I think favourably of these townships, as combining 
a certain proportion of the useful with the 
ornamental, to gentlemen already possessed of a 
Moderate independence, I do not consider them of 
half the agricultural value of the Upper Province,... 
to the poor man -- much inferior in climate and 
not superior in salubrity to the tract I have 
selected. 
And yet it was to the very poor that the British agents 
unwisely turned. When Webster proposed that these settlers 
should receive assistance, the London committee told him to 
avoid giving them anything more than winter tools, and to try 
to recover the value of those at the end of the season. Early 
in 1837 the directors advised Webster they would not employ 
"any Gentlemen as travelling Agent this season" and had 
"discouraged all applicants who appear wholly destitute of the 
means of providing for themselves. ". The Gosford commission 
had praised the BALC as a device for offering emigrants 
"facilities or advantages that it would not be prudent or 
proper for the Government to offer", such as 50-acre farms and 
flexible credit. But was it prudent for the company either? 
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By 1838 it was reporting a loss of b17,300 on the emigration 
of 1836.51 
Speculation was the other side of the company's operations. 
E. G. Stanley had feared the company might sell off the surveyed 
lots at a profit and then decamp, but the company's strategy 
was just the reverse. Instructions to McGill and Moffatt early 
in 1834 advised the commissioners to concentrate on selling 
the lands in the main block, leaving the value of more accessible 
tracts to appreciate in the company's hands. 
52 This policy was 
bound to stretch the resources of the company, yet it seems to 
have been persisted in for some years, as the decision in 1837 
to press ahead with the road from Victoria to Otter Brook showed. 
In this policy the company was rejecting the experience of the 
Canada Company in Upper Canada and mimicking the government's 
policy of establishing reserves in 1791, speculating in its 
own lands with one hand while trying to enhance their value 
with the other. 
53 Initial prices to settlers were to be kept 
low, not merely "to induce settlement and give a favorable 
impression of the company's liberality, " but also to keep 
"down the price of adjoining lands" to facilitate further 
purchases by the company. Lands might therefore be sold for 
as little as 5s. an acre (though by 1838 wild land was advertised 
for 6s 3d to 10s 5d an acre) and the commissioners were advised 
to give better credit terms than those offered by the Canada 
Company -- a foretaste of the BALC's more streamlined operations 
in the next decade, when farms were sold on 14 years credit, 
with only interest payable during the first decade. 
54 But in 
purchasing lands the Commissioners in Montreal seem to have 
been left to their own discretion, for Samuel Gerrard reported 
to Ellice early in 1835 that there would be little prospect of 
selling Beauharnois; McGill was choosing remote lands which 
could be purchased cheap. The company's report to shareholders 
at the end of March 1835, noted that 32,000 acres had been 
bought from private individuals, and had been paid for, while 
another 13,600 were under option: these figures included the 
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townsites and adjacent lands bought from Felton and Goodhue 
at Sherbrooke. The Company had also bought 59,200 acres of 
clergy reserves, paying 25% down. This brought its holdings, 
including lands under option, to 952,461 acres, an increase of 
12.4% in a year. 
55 
The second annual report a year later reported holdings 
of 1,094,272 acres, an increase of 14.8% over March 1835, and 
of 29.09% over the original purchase. The total cost of all 
the company's lands had reached L170,321, or about 850,000 
more than the original debt to the government. The additional 
äm acres must accordingly have cost slightly over 4s an acres. 
The largest single purchase from an individual was apparently 
55,486 acres of quondam Crown and clergy reserves in Drummond, 
bought by the former MPP T. H. Moore at the upset price after 
an uncontested auction. These reserves were in four townships 
astride the St. Francis River, not far from the seigneurial 
county of Yamaska. Of these four only Grantham, the site of 
Drummondville, had more than 1,000 settlers; Wickham and 
Westover had fewer than 500 each, and no serious effort had 
been made to settle Simpson at all. Although Drummond was 
outside the three counties of the company's initial purchase, 
it lay across its major road works which would increase the 
value of the Drummond lands; the whole 55,000 acres were 
bought from Moore at an unstated advance on the original 
purchase price, which was probably around E8,000. The BALC 
also bought Crown and clergy reserves direct from the 
government, up to the end of June 1836, in the following 
counties: 
56 
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County Purchases 1834-36 Original Purchase 1833 
Drummond 8,381 -- 
Shefford 26,305 48,047 
Stanstead 17,959 36,362 
Sherbrooke 48,135 166,927 surveyed 
596,325 unsurveyed 
100,780 847,661 
Total public lands bought December 1833-30 June 1836 
948,441 acres. 
But the failure of sales and the increasing constriction of 
the London money market in 1836 cut off speculations. Hitherto 
the commissioners in the colony were authorized to pledge up 
to L15,000 every six months, preferably on long credit. On 
21 December, 1836, the London committee warned McGill and 
Moffatt that they had actually spent, in Canada, L56,877 to 
the end of October, disturbingly close to the L60,000 that 
could be called from stockholders. The commissioners were 
warned not to spend any remaining balance from the last 
allotment for speculation. The company reported "great alarm" 
at its financial position in April 1837, and tried to suspend 
all expenditures except its debt to the Government. The 1.2m 
acres advertised for sale by the company in May, 1836, 
represented the greatest extent of its holdings at any time 
in its half-century of existence. 
57 
Within two years of receiving its charter, the BALC owned 
or held options on 41.6% more land than the original offer from 
the government, but less than half the permissible maximum. 
The deliberate policy of the London office had been to develop 
the least desireable tracts first. It also speculated in 
cheaper private holdings, though not to any appreciable extent. 
The quarter of a million acres bought privately seem substantial 
enough, but this should be viewed in comparison with the equal 
quantity of Crown lands remaining in the single adjacent county 
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of Mdgantic. The company's total holding was about equal to 
the scattered holdings of ninety individuals, estates and 
companies in the Lower Canada townships, reported in 1838 after 
the BALC had completed its major private acquisitions. 
58 When 
the company failed to meet its instalment due on 20 March 1838, 
aggressive speculation had undoubtedly contributed to its dis- 
orders. Nonetheless antagonists were utterly mistaken to fear 
that it would become a monopolist, and prevent the investment 
of capital from other sources in the townships. Purchases in 
Sherbrooke gave the BALC a monopoly in the most eligible town- 
site, but in this sphere it merely became one large holder, 
under shareholders' pressure to develop and sell, in place of 
two holders under no such pressure. It is extremely difficult 
to assess what would have been a good or a safe investment for 
the BALC to make in wild lands, because the mere fact of its 
existence affected land values, while Felton's practice of 
bringing Crown lands onto the market in larger quantities than 
the market could absorb meant that the minimum upset price 
became a maximum, to be paid by speculators, not settlers. It 
may be further argued in defence of the company's speculations 
that they were completed before the really disastrous con- 
sequences of 1836 were known. The additions the BALC made to 
its holdings in 1834-36 gave a dubious colour to its principles 
and management when difficulties pressed most heavily in 
1838-41, but the worst that can be alleged against it was 
that it was too eager to protect itself from private rivals, 
and tended to underestimate the grave effects that would 
accrue from its geographical disabilities and the political 
convulsions to which its existence was intimately connected. 
V 
The company signalled its condition late in 1837 by 
asking for permission to suspend payments to the government 
for five years. Without a special call on the shareholders, 
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which directors shrank from and might have failed to receive, 
necessary expenditures would be postponed. Once again Spring 
Rice proved obliging -- just before the 1838 instalment fell 
due, Treasury approved a suspension of payments for a year. 
But of all the interests that had suffered from the rebellion 
"that of Emigration and the Company's enterprize may be the 
latest to recover", and the company began to lobby for a 
renegotiation. The company tried several different tacks in 
seeking better terms, usually involving manipulation of the 
original terms of the improvement fund. One proposal was to 
have the cost of internal surveys refunded to the company; 
another sought to let the company count as part of the improve- 
ment moiety the unrecoverable half -- B8899 -- of the cost of 
the 1836 emigration. This, too, was refused, as were the 
proposals to abolish interest charges, or to double the 
improvement fund, ending direct cash payments. The Colonial 
Office did not reject outright a proposal to divert the 
L6,000 annual payments to assisting emigration, but referred 
it to Durham with a request for a general survey of the 
company's affairs. Durham doubted the BALC's sincerity and 
set in motion the series of proposals which culminated in 
the company's surrendering its option on all but a fraction 
of the St. Francis block in exchange 
for a discharge from its 
debt to Government. 
59 
Durham's Report in 1839 was surprisingly mute on the 
question of the British American Land Company; so was the sub- 
sidiary report from Charles Buller. The evidence in Buller's 
report contained virtually nothing on the company's affairs 
except some mildly derogatory remarks from the new Commissioner 
of Crown Lands, John Davidson, who, with Bouchette, seems to 
have inspired the suspicion of the company which Durham 
expressed in a major despatch on the BALC at the end of July, 
1838. Durham began by asserting that the government must be 
wary of making special terms with one debtor on grounds of 
hardship, or with one group of capitalists on grounds of 
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obstruction by the Assembly, because these criteria could be 
used by almost every landowner or investor to cause endless 
claims against the government. Durham also blamed the BALC 
for some of the opposition, because it had named two prominent 
Legislative Councillors as its first resident commissioners. 
But more important, Durham doubted the seriousness of the 
Company's financial position: he had just received a petition 
for äm acres from the projected Megantic Land Company asking 
similar terms to those received by the BALC. Durham said 
that if "the disposal of Crown Lands in this Province be 
placed on an uniform system with a view to emigration" the 
company's profits would be "very high"; the BALC's problems 
were mainly short-term, cash-flow difficulties and the 
application for special consideration was unwarranted. This 
analysis begged several questions, the main one being the 
government's ability to reorganize the land system on the 
basis which Durham was to propose in his Report in 1839, not 
dissimilar to that proposed by Felton in 1832 and revived by 
the BALC, Canada Company, and other large landholders in 1841. 
But the British government was reluctant to apply the whole 
of the land revenues to encouraging emigration to the colony, 
and killed the proposal effectively by deciding to surrender 
control of the Crown lands and revenues to the Legislature of 
the reunited province. And the BALC's fate was virtually 
settled before this, because Durham's despatch contained the 
seeds of a solution to its problems. As a-test of its 
sincerity, he suggested, the government should offer to buy 
back the whole 847,661 acres at a fair valuation and allowance 
for improvements. 
60 
Treasury reacted by advising the Colonial Office it would 
not sanction an agreement which actually involved paying money 
to the BALC, but might treat for the lands still unpaid for; 
this proposal was made to the company on 17 October. The 
company responded to these feelers cautiously, still trying 
to get better terms within the broad outlines of the original 
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deal. The directors proposed, for instance, that Government 
should allow them L6 a head for settling pauper emigrants on 
their lands. They also sent a hastily-concocted proposal 
that the Government might buy up all their holdings for 
XB207,890, a suggestion which the new Governor-General, Thomson, 
rejected contemptuously. Thomson, to whom the Colonial Office 
transferred all responsibility for negotiations in June, 1840, 
took the blackest possible view of the company's activities, 
pointing to their purchase of 825,000 worth of reserves, and 
investment of B64,000 in Sherbrooke and Port St. Francis, as 
evidence that they were speculators, not serious developers. 
61 
Thomson's analysis was the most sweeping denunciation of 
the company's motives and management to date, and it is unfort- 
unate there was no less partial report. The colonial bureaucracy 
seems to have been jealous and critical of the quasi-public 
nature of the company's operations -- Felton in particular was 
considered by Gould to be hostile, and Davidson showed his 
bias to Buller's sub-commission: Bouchette was also highly 
critical of the scale and expense of the company's surveys. 
Amongst governors in the thirties, Aylmer wavered between 
support for the BALC and a preference for having the govern- 
ment go into land development on 
its own account; Gosford 
was friendly but vague; Durham was sceptical and Colborne 
non-committal. But Thomson fell 
into a class by himself: he 
was not fundamentally a dishonest man, 
but his prejudices 
were colourful and vigorously-defined, and 
it is debatable 
how impartial, he could be towards a company whose leading 
figures included Russell Ellice and Nathaniel Gould! Whether 
partial or not, Thomson's judgement was that the government 
should offer the company no better terms than resumption of 
the original tract and refund of B18,000. The improvements, 
he said, were a liability and should not be paid for. If the 
company refused this stringent offer, 
it should be dealt with 
like any delinquent debtor. After further negotiations, 
- 201 - 
Attorney-General Ogden called the company before Judge Fletcher 
at Sherbrooke to answer a charge of breach of contract. 
62 
Eventually the Governor's position softened, ostensibly 
because examination of the townships indicated that the 
unsurveyed block, sold at 3s an acre, was actually more 
valuable than the accessible lots sold more dearly. Negotia- 
tions at Kingston involving Fraser, Sydenham and Robert 
Gillespie from London resulted in a new agreement, signed on 
5 July 1841, to wind up the intolerable situation of the 
company's being three years behind in its payments, while the 
wilderness reclaimed the improvements. 
63 The new agreement 
cut through the contempt of Thomson and the extravagent pre- 
tensions of the BALC in four short paragraphs. The second 
article extinguished the government's claim to all further 
payments from the company. Thus the company's eventual 
holdings were bought for L37,200, paid in 1835-37. Those 
holdings were defined in the third clause: it affected only 
the 847,661 acres sold by Stanley: of these, the im acres of 
Crown reserves and detached lots remained in the company's 
possession. Of nearly . 6m acres in the St. Francis block of 
Sherbrooke County, the company retained only 85,088 acres 
east of Sherbrooke, in three townships where overgrown roads 
to decaying villages named Gould and Robinson attested to 
the failure of operations in 1836. If the value of these 
"improvements" is left out of account, as Durham and Thomson 
said it must be, the Company bought 336,424 acres for about 
2s 21d an acre. 
vi 
The company's ambitious schemes, by miscalculation, not 
corruption, were doomed from the beginning of 1834. It should 
be emphasized that under the revised agreement of 1841 the 
BALC did a modest but profitable business for another forty 
years, set on the road to solvency by the efforts of John 
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Galt's son, Alexander. But Galt's success depended on reversing 
some of the early blunders of the directors in London. The 
first flaw was the position of the company's lands themselves. 
Early proposals to operate in Nicolet, Megantic, Drummond and 
Mississquoi as well as Sherbrooke, Stanstead and Shefford were 
more realistic than the eventual decision to concentrate the 
company's holdings in the three last-named and least accessible 
counties. The directors' decision to settle the St. Francis 
block before the scattered lots compounded the original folly. 
These decisions compelled the unproductive expenditure on 
Port St. Francis and the Drummond County roads. Emphasis on 
the St. Francis townships suited Lord Aylmer's preference 
to have the American frontier settled thickly, but on any 
other rational ground it was wrong: 
if the intention was to 
forestall settlers from reaching the lands above Montreal, 
Drummond and Megantic were the more accessible places and 
Quebec the proper port of entry. Sherbrooke's natural 
metropolis was Montreal, but even 
from there it was not very 
accessible. When the company advertised 
its lands in 1859, 
it emphasized the sharp rise of land prices in Upper Canada, 
the existence of a stable, semi-autonomous government, and 
quick railroad communications to Montreal and Quebec. None 
of these facilities existed 
in 1834, and their absence made 
the whole existence of a company to develop those lands, at 
that time, questionable. The public did not lose a great 
deal by the establishment of the company and its early 
reverses. Indeed, 
from 1831 to 1844 the company's districts 
increased in population rather faster than the rest of the 
province, a short-term success within 
the long-term failure 
to increase the British element in Lower Canada by stimulating 
settlement of the townships. 
64 At least some of this dis- 
proportionate increase was probably due to stimulation by the 
British American Land Company. But the parties who really 
suffered from fundamental errors and subsequent 
maladministration were the company's ordinary shareholders. 
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They were taught, in miniature, the lessons the government 
was also learning about the difficulties of letting politics 
and speculation mingle with a sincere ambition to increase 
the productive population of a colonial wilderness. 
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Chapter 8 The Constitutional Associations of Lower Canada, 
1334-1838 
i 
Montreal's Windmill Point on a freezing day in January, 1836, 
seems at first glance an unlikely time and place for a bigger 
political demonstration than the city had ever witnessed. No 
by-election was in sight; politicians were at Quebec for the 
legislative session. Yet a cheerful crowd of three thousand 
or more turned out to meet a four-wheeled covered carriage 
bringing a jaunty young lawyer back from London by way of : few 
York. The hero of the moment was William Walker, short, 
nervous, excithble, lamed by duelling wounds and often not 
perfectly sober. An unlikely moment, and an unlikely hero, 
but the crowd who cheered Walker's arrival had almost elected 
him to the provincial parliament nine months earlier, had 
sent him to London to express their fears and their grievances 
to the Prime Minister himself, and now gathered in the winter 
air, summoned by handbills and following the thumping of a 
band and the waving of banners, to demonstrate that British 
Montrealers of all classes and origins were united in opposition 
to the Assembly. 
1 
The welcoming of William Walker was not the only or even 
the biggest display of Anglo-Canadian solidarity in Lower 
Canada between the election of 1834 and the rebellion of 1837. 
Massive assemblies met regularly after the autumn of 1834 at 
Montreal, at Quebec, and on an appropriately smaller scale in 
almost every village and market town in Lower Canada. These 
wholly peaceful demonstrations culminated in 1837, in the Great 
Loyal Meetings of the province's two cities, meetings which 
each mustered seven thousand participants and observers, 
standing patiently under the August sun as orators exhorted 
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them in English and in French to defend their rights from 
whatever direction they might be threatened. 
2 It is notor- 
iously difficult to explain the behaviour of crowds, but it 
is a useful introduction to the history of the constitutional 
associations, which organized many of the biggest meetings, 
to emphasize that the constitutionalists were not the tories 
of 1827 wearing new hats, nor even a handful of ex-reformers 
turned timid in the face of burgeoning popular power. The 
CAs, by their existence and by their vitality, represented 
at best the growth of a local pride and spirit for improve- 
ment in the colony's English-speaking population, and at 
worst, an ugly acceptance of Papineau's axiom that the 
Canadien and Anglo-American cultures could not simultaneously 
thrive Lower Canada. But the constitutionalists also 
showed the multiplicity of aims and ideals which would always 
make local opinion an unreliable instrument in the hands of 
minorities which sought to erase the French culture from 
British North America. 
ii 
The constitutional associations founded in 1834-35 
(there were at least nineteen of them across Lower Canada)3 
represented not so much a coherent movement for change as a 
disjointed appeal for normality. Normality to them was not 
a static ideal, but an adherence to the social and political 
vision of the Select Committee report of 1828, which with 
all its inconsistencies had still offered orderly change in 
a cordial atmosphere. Then the republicanism of Bourdages, 
the anticlericalism of Papineau, the vicious rhetoric Rodier 
directed against the Irish, jolted the sense of well-being 
of the colony's English-speaking communities. And through 
it all Britain, the inexperienced whigs in power, sat 
quietly by and observed, trying ineffectually to cajole 
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the Canadiens back into the spirit of 1828, while giving 
British colonists ample cause to fear that conciliatory mane- 
ouvre was a prelude to cowardly surrender. By the end of 1834, 
there was hardly a single friend to the British colonists on 
the majority side of the Assembly. The anti-patriote reaction 
in the colony took the form of huge petitions to the King and 
Parliament in the spring of 1834, election campaigns of 
unprecedented vigour in the autumn of the same year, and the 
creation of constitutional associations to fight the patriotes' 
propaganda where-ever it appeared, especially in the townships, 
among the working classes of British origin in Quebec and 
Montreal, and in London itself. 
4 
The constitutionalists were a new coalition of groups 
which had been on the political scene for some years. In the 
townships, to be sure, they were often just the voices of 
infant settlements discovering both the will and the ability 
to speak collectively on political subjects: to protest, for 
instance, against being refused a school in Potton township 
"as a political cow-hiding for being Tories., 
5 In American- 
settled townships people established CAs to justify rejection 
of the liberal autonomists with whom, until 1834, they had 
largely been in harmony. The Mechanics' Constitutional Union 
of Quebec also showed the roused self-awareness of a growing 
community, and everywhere the CAs allowed men who had opposed 
Dalhousie to explain their support for Aylmer. But in the 
cities, the constitutional movement was at first composed and 
led by men of experience in colonial affairs, men who had been 
part of an influential third force in politics during the 
1820s, yet whose distinctive viewpoint, -in the absence of 
organized parties, had usually been obscured behind votes for 
one faction or the other. 
For there was until 1834 what might be termed a third 
option in Lower Canada politics. The first option was to 
erode the symptoms of French-Canadian nationality and to 
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strengthen economic and commercial relations with Britain 
and the north-western United States. The second option, 
that of the separatist Canadiens, was to subordinate all 
economic policy to the entrenchment of power in French- 
Canadian hands. 
6 There was a third force in the colony, 
both British and Canadien, which valued commercial expansion 
and dependence on Britain, saw immigration as part of the 
colony's life-blood, yet valued no less the distinctive 
aspects of French-Ca, ian society -- the religious structure 
which promoted stability, the civil law with the family as 
its cornerstone, the habitants' genial civility which was 
thought of as distinctly French. An understanding of the 
third force is necessary to help dispel the impression that 
Lower Canada was made up of predictably-composed groups with 
a few renegades and stragglers. For instance, Andrew Stuart, 
generally counted by historians among the "tories", penned 
the era's best defence of the seigneurial system and 
enlivened the legislative session of 1834 with a rousing 
attack on Jonathan Sewell. 
7 The Protestants of Montreal 
twice in 1836-37 made broadly-based demonstrations in favour 
of good relations with the Catholic church, and the Montreal 
Committee of Trade chose a Canadien as its head throughout the 
rebellion years. 
8 Granted, the tremors of November 1837 and 
the profound shock of the second rebellion in 1838 herded 
colonial society into two hostile camps of British and French; 
but the frightening, hopeless dichotomy observed by Durham did 
not wholly extinguish those who sought to build bridges, not 
ramparts; it pruned but did not uproot the third option, as 
the flourishing of English-speaking reform sentiment after 1841 
made clear. 
The achievements of the moderate group are almost all 
bound up intimately with the name of John Neilson, editor of 
the Quebec Gazette during much of the period, and a member of 
the Assembly from 1818-34. Neilson was driven by his twin 
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beliefs in British expansion and Canadien social conservatism. 
His affection for Scottish society was based on readings and 
childhood memories, reinforced by infrequent visits to his 
Ayrshire home after 1815; his love of French Canada was rooted 
in happy experiences as an incomer, and as husband (after 1797) 
of a well-to-do Canadienne. His interests and sentiments were 
partly those of the English-speaking commercial class, and 
partly those of the seigneurial class; and his career was 
stamped by his steadfast refusal to admit that there were 
contradictions in the two roles. 
Neilson's social vision may stand with some changes as 
typical of the ideas of the third force in provincial politics. 
The group supported the status and moral authority of the 
clergy; it was anxious to extend education through the 
seigneuries, where it appeared most defective. The third 
force promoted the agricultural associations which tried 
disseminating up-to-date knowledge to revitalize the flagging 
farm economy. It campaigned vigorously against the old 
narrow system of patronage, but it took for granted the 
continuance of British sovereignty, restrained in the manner 
proposed by the Select Committee of 1828. It was fiercely 
opposed to interference in the civil law of the habitants 
on the mere grounds that those laws were unfamiliar to 
British colonists. The third force, far from endorsing the 
view that immigration was the enemy of survivance, felt it 
would not threaten the cultural integrity of either immigrants 
or original inhabitants. Neilson's stubborn rejection of 
every measure based on the existence of cultural distinctions 
was characteristic of his whole career. - He epitomized, and 
for a time after 1831 he led, the movement of Lower Canadians 
who would neither kow-tow to the Chateau nor clamour for the 
panaceas glibly demanded by the patriotes. 
9 
- 209 - 
iii 
Four things changed in Lower Canada between the disaster 
of Dalhousie's last election and the unity shown by all 
classes of British colonists at the end of 1834. First, 
the implementation of many recommendations of the Select 
Committee of 1828, and the passage of Parliamentary Reform 
in Britain itself meant that British liberals in the colony 
felt more warmly towards Britain; as Andrew Stuart said in 
1835, 
It was only when the grey hairs came on his head 
that he found out that the moral energies of 
Britain were tenfold more powerful than her army 
and navy.... Britain was an instrument in the 
hand of Providence for the good conversation and 
civilization of the world. 
10 
Second, the patriotes had become much more rancorous towards 
British colonists; the campaign to make the Legislative 
Council elective occupied much of the attention of ministers 
in England, but colonists were more apt to look at such 
unpleasant propaganda as the popular editor Ludger Duvernay's 
poem for a national feast-day, which included the lines, 
Peut-etre un jour, notre habitant paisible, 
Se lassera du pesant joug d'un roi, 
21 s'ecria,.... mais de sa voix terrible: 
sortez d'ici;... cette terre est ä moi. 
11 
Third, the attitude of the Colonial office gradually hardened 
against the extreme demands of the patriotes, and the des- 
patches of Lord Stanley in particular convinced the more 
conservative British colonists that Britain could once again 
become a salutary force for establishing prosperity and 
harmony. And fourth, the Canadas, closely linked by geography 
and trade, were rapidly 
filling with British-born immigrants. 
Soon the Canadiens might simply be outvoted or, better still, 
smoothly assimilated 
by increased daily contact between the 
races and the multiplication of opportunities that economic 
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growth seemed to proffer. British colonists retained much of 
the "garrison mentality" that had made them truculent and 
wary since the Napoleonic era, 
12 but now their feelings 
became more complex, for they were a besee ged garrison 
receiving strong reinforcements, a fact which did not escape 
Papineau, who redoubled his efforts to make them feel 
insecure. 
The shift in British colonists' feelings was not a sign 
of general social improvement. Neilson might prophesy in his 
columns that Papineau's excesses would backfire and "the 
orderly and loyal character of the people will acquire new 
lustre; " but Aylmer could see more clearly, and reported to 
Stanley at the end of 1833, "In fact that change in the 
sentiments of Public Men which has been brought about by the 
violent & unconstitutional Proceedings of the House of 
Assembly, has not hitherto... extended to the great mass of 
the Electors". 
13 The test came on the Ninety-two Resolutions, 
the grand remonstrance of Papineau's followers against the 
Legislative Council, the executive, and the Colonial Office 
under Lord Stanley. This calendar of grievances came forth 
with a challenge to the British government: the public 
salaries, now sixteen months in arrears by failure of supply 
bills, would never be paid until Britain overturned the 
constitution by making the Legislative Council elective. 
Yet resistance to Papineau was mounting. In a long and 
thoughtful leading article on political parties at the start 
of 1833, Neilson cast off his professional optimism and 
warned that "tyranny, oppression, and rapine" would follow 
the complete domination of either party. ' A month later, a 
crowd of 1500 turned out in Montreal to approve a loyal 
address to the Crown. Aylmer was embarrassed by the mounting 
anti-French sentiment among the English and American 
settlers; "I regret these meetings because they tend to 
foster & keep alive national prejudices. " Then came the 
Ninety-two Resolutions, opposed by 24 members in the Assembly 
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of 88 -- seven Canadiens and all but seven of the members of 
British origin. 
14 
The upsurge of partisanship took an unexpected turn at 
a public meeting in the township of Megantic. This meeting 
was inspired by Robert Layfield, a local figure with a grievance 
against the bureaucracy. (He considered Andrew Cochran had 
cheated him in a land deal. )15 Layfield's meeting criticized 
the bureaucracy, but unexpectedly fell far short of endorsing 
the Assembly's resolutions. Loyal meetings were held at 
Sherbrooke and Stanstead in the townships, and in Trois 
Rivieres. The high point of the spring protest was one huge 
assemblage at Montreal, the famous meeting at Tattersall's 
hotel which culminated in a petition with 12,000 signatures. 16 
Papineau fought back quietly perfecting through corresponding 
committees the electoral machinery for the general election 
which must be held before the end of 1834. 
This election outstripped even that of 1827 for violence. 
Papineau had this time little difficulty in selecting his 
targets: men who had not gone with him to the full extent of 
the Ninety-two Resolutions must be rejected as tories. Neilson 
turned down a safe retreat with promises of clerical and 
seigneurial support in the county of Lotbiniere, to stand his 
ground and be swamped in less than three days polling in Quebec 
County. 
17 In the town of Quebec four incumbents were available 
for re-election. George Vanfelson of Lower Town had voted for 
the Resolutions and swept back easily against the prominent 
merchant but political novice George Pemberton. Thomas A. 
Young's record of steady hostility to the bureaucracy and 
the Bank of Montreal was wiped clean by his single vote against 
the Resolutions. Up the hill, John Duval looked around and 
dropped out early, campaigning instead for the other incumbent, 
Andrew Stuart. Here there was a tremendous battle to wrest 
the lead from the "resolutionists", but Stuart narrowly lost 
and the six seats of Quebec town and county returned no 
members of British origin. In the surrounding countryside 
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things went hardly better, though a Quebec businessman and 
landowner, J. J. G. Clapham slipped past Layfield in M6gantic. 18 
The political complexion of the townships changed very little; 
at Sorel, James Stuart's old seat, the son of a local seigneur 
stood as a constitutionalist and was defeated in an exciting 
campaign with a murder trial as its sequel. 
19 One of the 
wildest campaigns was in Two mountains, part of the turbulent 
old County of York. The poll opened first in the Scottish 
settlement of St. Andrew's by the Ottawa River, then moved to 
St. Eustache with a 300-vote majority for the constitution- 
alists Brown and Globensky recorded on the poll-books. But 
in the two days' voting at St. Eustache the patriotes took 
every vote, while frustrated supporters of Brown and 
Globensky, up to 200 in number, were forcibly kept from the 
hustings. On the second night the constitutional candidates' 
house was attacked and burned; on the third day an angry 
crowd of about 400 men from St. Andrew's was driven back by 
a hail of stones. Rumours that the patriotes were arming 
themselves induced Brown and Globensky to withdraw while 
they were still ahead. Their opponents were promptly declared 
elected. 
20 
In the West Ward of Montreal there was a contest to match 
even the close-run fight in Quebec's Upper Town. (The East 
Ward, by contrast, saw Leslie an easy winner over a young 
Irishman, Sydney Bellingham; in Montreal County, Papineau 
dislodged a compliant incumbent to ensure his own return for 
at least one riding. ) The West Ward was a showpiece for 
both parties; immigration had made it a racially balanced 
riding where Papineau and Robert Nelson, - member from 1827-32, 
could test the new-found unity of British and Irish voters. 
But the constitutionalists had changed their tactics. Gone 
were the patrician candidates who could dismiss defeat with 
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a genteel shrug and return to their business desks. The 
highest of this group were already in the Legislative 
Council; the lesser ones stepped aside to let the constit- 
utional party appeal to Demos. Samuel Gerrard remarked 
guardedly to Ellice on the two candidates, William Walker 
and John Donnellan, that "the better class of the society 
is far from being partial to either of these two, and will 
only vote for them to try to throw out Papineault, and to 
prevent a division of the votes., 
21 Walker was a political 
novice; Donnellan was of obscure but evidently humble 
origins. 
22 
The voting proceeded intermittently from 29 October to 
17 November. From the earliest days polling was close; Walker 
and Donnellan led at times. The near-unanimity of English- 
speaking voters was no doubt largely made possible by the fact 
Walker stood well over to the reforming side of his "party" -- 
he advocated complete provincial control of revenues except 
for a small civil list; and he opposed the British American 
Land Company as a monopoly. He adopted the "spirit and senti- 
ments of the numerous petitioners of 1827" and, distinguishing 
between the political evils the patriotes portrayed and the 
social disparities he himself perceived, called for "a social 
reform, which can only be accomplished by an oblivion of past 
differences; and a relinquishment, on either side, of dubious 
pretensions.... Let us endeavour to constitute ourselves one 
people. " This goal could not be won, he insisted, by the 
efforts of a party resisting every innovative idea from Europe 
except the one reform which would enlarge its own power, 
election of the upper house. 
23 
Papineau fought back with every weapon he possessed. His 
arsenal included both a mob and the returning officer, 
Dr. Lusignan, who referred disputed points to the lawyer he 
trusted best, Papineau himself. But this corruption at 
the heart of the polling process was soon eclipsed. On Friday, 
1 November rioting began. On Monday the tally system was 
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resorted to; Lusignan retreated into a house and took votes in 
lots of five alternately at different windows. After more 
riots Lusignan, without the required consent from Walker and 
Donnellan, suspended the polls from day to day from 14 to 18 
November. The climax came on a Sunday night, when a gang of 
roughs hired by the town council to keep order sacked several 
buildings including English's tavern, the constitutional 
candidates' headquarters. On the following morning voters 
resorting to the polls found nothing but a final ignominious 
proclamation from Lusignan, professing to find his life in 
danger and refusing to take any more votes. The proclamation 
declared, on the basis of fragile majorities from the hastily- 
terminated voting, the election of "Citizen Papineau" and 
24 
"Citizen Nelson". 
The constitutionalists' chagrin at failing to rid the ward 
of Papineau was matched by rage at the way his victory was 
stolen; at Quebec, the British felt betrayed by their total 
exclusion from the representation, but exhilarated at how close 
they had come to victory in a struggle decided on origin. 
And in each city the surge of excitement of the British 
inhabitants could not be stemmed by defeat. Three simultaneous 
public dinners for Neilson, Stuart, Pemberton and Young turned 
into celebrations with demands for a constitutional association 
to ensure that the united spirit of the electoral campaign 
should not be dissipated. At Montreal, a meeting to consider 
the watchmen's role in breaking up English's tavern turned 
into a second enormous meeting at Tattersall's. "This 
election" cried James Hastings Kerr on the eve of Stuart's 
defeat, "will be an era in the history of the Province, for 
from this day forward the British are united and determined 
to stand their ground, and resist the attempts of the other 
party to force us from the Province. " These meetings at 
Quebec's Albion Hotel on 17 November and at Tattersall's in 
Montreal three days later marked the birth of the constitutional 
movement and the flourishing of an opposition to Papineau based 
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on his own tatics of appealing to racial origin and making 
spirited declamations to the British Parliament and public. 
25 
iv 
The united spirit of British colonists derived from the 
growing importance of their communities, but it would be a 
mistake to suppose it was rooted in arrogance. No less 
important was fear. While the Minerve hysterically inquired 
how soon the Colonial Office would revive in Lower Canada the 
tragic policy of deporting the Acadians in 1755, the British 
inhabitants were as apprehensive of the results of a complete 
victory for Papineau. "At all events" said a Scottish 
immigrant, "as we have made this our home, we will resist all 
attempts to drive us from it. "26 The Canadiens, feeling the 
constriction of declining agriculture, shaky international 
commerce and a changing cultural demography, translated 
their own frustrations into rhetoric designed to ensure 
that the British colonists felt the same apprehensions even 
more acutely. 
The venom of patriote propaganda has been too often 
disregarded in the explanation of how Lower Canada slipped into 
political turmoil; and yet (leaving entirely out of con- 
sideration the question of how far that venom was provoked) it 
was probably the largest single factor in pressing the British 
colonists into a single political movement. Until 1834 the 
anti-French propaganda of the English hardly ever went beyond 
saying that the French would never prosper while they resisted 
change and harassed the imperial power; the patriotes on the 
other hand systematically spread the view that the British were 
a bane on the colony and oppressed its original inhabitants, 
and that they would become worse as they became more numerous. 
Robert Nelson's remark that the Irish were an insignificant 
minority like "Germans and Niggers" had an echo in Judge 
J-B Rolland's declaration that "He would not subscribe for 
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a Church for Irishmen, but he had subscribed for one for 
the blacks., 
27 Papineau continued to invoke the name of 
O'Connell, but O'Connell's countrymen in the colony counted 
themselves among the allies the Speaker had betrayed. 
The apprehensions of British colonists were sharpened by 
their perception of the patriotes' organization. On the one 
hand was the staunch unity of the Canadiens, not as a republican 
party but as a nationality. A strong suspicion among the 
traditional elites that Papineau was over-reaching himself 
failed to translate itself into an electoral force against 
him. Lusingan's subservience to Papineau convinced many 
that the rights of the local minority were held at the whim 
of a party. If this was frightening, it was also infuriating, 
for Papineau appeared to be the keystone of the whole patriote 
structure. His most able lieutenants were expendable; any 
who showed undue interest in office were cut adrift, and the 
sharp division of 1834 cost the Assembly almost the whole of 
its shadow civil service, the important chairmen of standing 
committees. A majority of these opposed the Resolutions 
and were defeated at the polls. James Leslie and B. C. A. Gugy 
of Sherbrooke were the only committee chairmen of stature to 
survive the elections. When it was proposed to send Papineau 
to London in 1835, the leading radical in St. Charles County 
said he would rather have Dalhousie back than lose Papineau 
for a single session. "D'ailleurs parmi les patriotes, un 
grand nombre nest-il pas retenu par le grand nom, les 
grands talens, l'immense influence de M. P. " and even the 
constitutionalist Gugy might become speaker in the confusion 
of Papineau's absence! 
28 Papineau's durability made men 
despair of ever returning to politics based on local issues 
in place of the politics of races and personalities and of 
power pursued for its own sake. 
Hand-in-hand with fear went a nagging sense of the 
ingratitude of the Canadiens. This harkened back to the 
Constitution of 1791 and the way it had been used to perpetuate 
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the civil law and land tenure of the pre-conquest era. The 
Canadiens had been given power to ensure that social change 
would be smooth and equitable, but not to smother change 
altogether. The genius of British constitutional liberty 
had been perverted to preserve the social rigidity of the 
old regime. The most startling aspect of the Canadiens' 
ingratitude, British colonists believed, was their blindness 
to the sources of colonial prosperity, especially in the 
towns. "If the rule were adopted of refusing them employ, 
and encouraging the emigrant, ten years would drive them 
from their homes, and replace them by the English. " A "Scotch 
Catholic" wrote to the Montreal Courier commenting on the 
prejudice of two of his Canadien friends, who professed to 
believe that the "Foreigners ... would do away with the 
French laws and customs, and crush and treat as slaves the 
French Canadian part of the population" -- yet one of these 
held a government job at B300 a year, and the other earned 
nearly treble that sum in dealing with British-born merchants. 29 
At the founding meeting of Quebec's constitutional association 
of mechanics the chairman, a shipbuilder, claimed to hire 
more men in a season than Papineau and all his followers 
combined. Most shipbuilders could afford to "strike" for a 
season, but "what would the poorer class of Canadians do? " 
To this a voice called out, "They would have to turn members 
of Parliament. , 
30 
There was a further line of economic argument, more 
finely honed at Montreal, which saw ingratitude and 
impracticable pride in the whole legal system of the colony. 
Commerce might, in some branches and for certain periods, 
seem relatively secure, but businessmen are notorious for 
seldom feeling the security which inspection of their 
balance sheets might inspire in the uninitiated. 31 What the 
Montreal merchants felt most acutely was the lack of facilities 
for investing their profits in real estate. But the heavy 
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seigneurial dues payable when land changed hands, the lack 
of register offices for titles and mortagages, and the 
alleged reluctance of the Canadien to borrow for improve- 
ments led to a steady bleeding of capital out of the colony 
to be invested in-the dull security of the British funds. It 
also discouraged the influx of foreign risk capital. In 1835- 
36, the abolition of the Bank of the United States created a 
temporary glut of capital, the owners of which investigated 
Lower Canadian township lands and even seigneuries, but 
generally took their dollars elsewhere. This wasted opportunity 
for a windfall of capital sparked the campaign for registry 
offices led by the Montreal lawyer William Badgley, but 
neither the loss of American sales nor Badgley's pamphlet 
campaign was really central to the question any longer. That 
had reached a more or less final shape in 1829, when the 
defeat of Valli res' registry bill confirmed most British 
colonists in their impression that the patriotes were happy 
to stifle investment and encourage fraud. 
32 
So it was apprehension more than arrogance that welded 
the disparate elements of the British community into an 
appearance of solidity after the election of 1834. Unhappily 
for the constitutionalists, much of their story can be better 
told under the heading of the causes of their disunity; the 
positive side of the story can be shortly related. Superficial 
unity was preserved for more than a year, but there was steady 
pressure from within to turn the associations into organs for 
social change rather than for constitutional stability. The 
British whigs' failure to give clear answers to the colonists' 
first mass petitions in 1834 triggered a. restlessness which 
the CAs ill managed to contain. The main associations at 
Quebec and Montreal were active until the end of 1838. 
The separate "Constitutional Union of Mechanics and Tradesmen" 
at Quebec and the more ephemeral unions in the countryside 
generally lasted long enough to elect executives for 1836. 
Together, the MCA and QCA collaborated in two ventures which 
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are worthy of note: the sending of delegates to brief the NACA 
and the Colonial Office in 1835 and 1837-38, and the creation 
of a sort of constitutionalists' parliament, the Select General 
Committee which met twice in 1836. The modest success of 
Walker and Neilson in 1835 and the achievements of Moffatt and 
Badgley in 1838 have been noted earlier; the chief accomplish- 
ment of the Select General Committee seems to have been to 
force an open split in the QCA on the question of reuniting 
the Canadas. The British colonists could pretty generally 
agree on what was wrong in the colony: they were far from 
accord in seeking cures. 
33 
V 
The forces dividing constitutionalists were as interest- 
ing as those uniting them. They united in fear for the 
present; they divided on their visions of the future. From 
the middle of 1835, when the associations were scarcely six 
months old, Neilson was trying to gloss over divisions in 
the executive of the QCA. 
34 The Britons of Lower Canada were 
not the genteel blend of economic liberalism and political 
caution that had backed Dalhousie; the new movement was the 
sum of the discordant traits of the mass. The creation of 
constitutional associations provided a forum for the views 
of factions within the minority. Through addresses and 
petitions, the middle-class spokesmen for different points 
of view could appeal for support to the crowd. The feelings 
of a crowd can hardly be deciphered except by straws blowing 
in the wind, especially when no laws are broken, no culprits 
interrogated. But it is significant that as one large 
parade passed points of interest in Montreal, the longest, 
loudest applause was given for Adam Thom, who as editor of 
the Montreal Herald was an outspoken advocate of cultural 
confrontation. More hints are conveyed in the mottoes 
stitched onto banners carried in these parades, which ranged 
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from the whiggish to the bloodthirsty. 
The tamest of the banner's simply re-iterated the basic 
precepts of the petitions of 1834. "May men of all classes 
and creeds, and from all countries, unite in the improvement 
of the Province" said one. Some were conspicuously Irish, 
bearing harps, shamrocks, slogans in Gaelic, and in one case 
the legend, "O'Connell's cry -- the Queen and old Ireland! " 
The old-style moderate reformers were well-represented by 
slogans like "Walker and the Constitutional Reformers", "A 
Reformed Council - Not an Elective One"; "No Sinecures - 
no Pluralities" and, succinctly, "Reform - not Revolution". 
Others were explicitly anti-patriote or anti-French. "Our 
two great objects - Registry Offices, and the Abolition of 
Feudal Tenures" struck two main features of the land question. 
"Unshackle British enterprise, then Lower Canada will prosper" 
echoed a popular theme of the recent election campaign. 
Others were blunt and unpleasant. "Canada won by the blood 
and treasure of Britons" marched in front of an affirmation 
that "Britons die, but never surrender"; "Canada must not be 
lost or given away" moved in procession with "Britons will 
never be the Slaves of Traitors. " It is impossible to trace 
individual banners to specific people or groups; but it is 
worth observing that at Quebec, where the educated middle- 
class had a separate CA from the "mechanics and tradesmen" of 
humbler origins, the "mechanics" showed conspicuously more 
warmth and colour in their militarist and anti-French 
rhetoric. 
35 
The middle- and upper-class leadership of the CAs no 
doubt reflected the views of the crowd in distorted proportions, 
but the diversity itself was fully present. English, 
Americans, Irish and Scots brought to Lower Canada all the 
diversity of opinion in the English-speaking world, and many 
of the immigrants, notably the Scots, were unwilling to abandon 
the old fights despite the pressing nature of the new one. 
Individual leaders found themselves forced into resignation 
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-- symbolic or real -- from the movements they had helped 
to found, and the CAs gradually became pressure groups for 
changes quite alien to the loyal petitions of 1834. Four 
issues pierced the original solidarity: attitudes towards 
the local bureaucracy and Britain; church establishments; 
the merits of republican institutions; and the role of 
French Canadians in the colony's future. 
Officially, the constitutional associations spoke only 
through the resolutions of their general meetings, which 
generally became mass demonstrations with more than a thousand 
participants. But in the pages which follow, constitutional 
opinion is taken to include the reports of committees, speeches 
given at CA meetings, private correspondence of constitution- 
alists, and newspaper reports and articles. The English- 
language press, especially at Montreal, was more interesting 
than there is room here to discuss. John Neilson of the 
Quebec Gazette, Robert Armour of the Montreal Gazette, and 
Adam Thom of the Montreal Herald were conspicuous in the CAs; 
Robert Weir, the hard-drinking young Glaswegian paper-merchant 
who owned the Herald, was prominent in at least one fringe 
group. William Walker was closely connected until early 1836 
with the Morning Courier, a paper which seems to have replaced 
the old Canadian Courant and short-lived Daily Advertiser in 
catering to the American community at Montreal. The Herald 
and Gazette copied liberally from each other, but the Courier 
went its own way, and it was probably the efforts of its 
editor, Dr. Barber, to speak authoritatively on all matters 
before the CA's executive that led a general meeting in 
February, 1836, to deny strenuously that any newspaper had the 
authority to speak for the organization. 
36 
vi 
The constitutionalists divided first on the question of 
how to confront the obvious short-comings of the local 
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bureaucracy. Although there were a few part-time officials 
and sons of bureaucrats in the QCA, the major administrative 
families -- the Sewells and Rylands, Davidsons, Caldwells 
and Hales -- were missing, and would not have been welcome. 
The original document of the constitutional movement, the 
"Declaration of the causes which led to the formation of the 
Constitutional Association of Quebec" (issued in December, 
1834) criticized the judiciary and alluded to the Executive 
Council as a body too small and "too defective" to advise 
the Governor effectively. The equivalent document from the 
MCA admitted that the Executive Council had only "feeble 
claims" to public confidence, said the Legislative Council 
still had too many placemen, and held up the Sewell family 
to "public reprehension" for its accumulation of offices. 
The branch CA of Frampton, south of Quebec, listed reforms 
in the representation, in the judiciary, and in the two 
Councils as its prime concerns. The St. Francis District 
CA, meeting at Richmond, carefully dissociated itself from 
support for Lord Aylmer's government. In the early history 
of the CAs, no voices were raised against Andrew Stuart's 
dictum that in any dispute between the government and the 
Assembly the constitutionalists must remain perfectly neutral. 
Even the patriote Morin accused the constitutionalists of 
trying to become a fourth estate; he did not assume they 
were an arm of the executive or the Legislative Council. 
37 
But impartiality could only persist while the Legislature 
was not in session. It became impossible for constitution- 
alists to remain aloof when the Assembly attacked certain 
officials. At Montreal the Gazette sanctimoniously remarked 
that bureaucrats guilty of wrongdoing should not be protected 
simply because they were upholders of the British connexion. 
The Courier thought this stance inadequate, and denounced 
Armour, Thom and Neilson as tories because they refused to 
join the campaign against Caldwell, the inoffensive old 
Judge Bowen, and the hated commissioner of Crown Lands, 
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William B. Felton. The Courier published long excerpts from 
the proceedings against Felton, including a swingeing critique 
of his published self-defence. 
38 
The cases against Felton and Bowen split the QCA. The 
chief antagonists were B. C. A. Gugy, son of the sheriff of 
Montreal and MPP for the Anglo-American county of Sherbrooke, 
and Thomas Cushing Aylwin, son of Quebec's high constable. 
The QCA's founding meeting criticized unwarranted harassment 
of the judges, and in October, 1835 Neilson and the Courier 
argued in print the merits of attacking the bureaucrats. 
In March, 1836, Aylwin made a full-scale public attack on 
Gugy who had "carried on in a manner that would disgrace 
the Spanish inquisition. " Gugy quit the executive of the QCA 
within the week. But even Aylwin must have realized he had 
gone too far, for his strong speech defending bureaucrats from 
the Assembly contained the interjection that "the officials... 
had done a great deal of harm in this country. "39 
If the constitutional associations were lukewarm on the 
bureaucracy, they had little doubt about their allegiance 
to Britain. References to self-reliance were infrequent and 
oblique. Even the Montreal Courier would go no further 
down the road to annexation to the United States than to 
observe tartly that "Some honest people seriously think that 
the scheme would be an advantage to the community, and many 
knaves imagine that it might be profitable to themselves. " 
In unguarded moments leading individuals might flirt with 
annexation but the official pronouncements on the subject 
had nothing to say in favour of annexation. 
40 This was 
expedient, for the value of the constitutional associations 
lay in their showing Britain that a large and respectable 
body in the troubled colony of Lower Canada was content with 
the British connexion. It was the politic deference to the 
status quo, ironically, which inhibited the constitutionalists 
from proposing concrete reforms in the body they considered 
most defective (next after the Assembly), the Executive 
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Council. British statesmen could justly complain that it was 
all very well to say the Britons in Lower Canada wanted reforms, 
but they had never said what they would consider acceptable. 
41 
On Aylmer's recall the constitutionalists of Quebec 
followed the lead of the city's Board of Trade by addressing 
the Governor directly with praise for his administration and 
f ears that the motives behind the recall "tend to convey the 
impression that His Majesty's ministers are prepared to 
sacrifice the rights and interests of the inhabitants of 
British and Irish origin... to the misrepresentations and 
clamour of a designing party. " Gosford got a chilly reception. 
The Courier was the only constitutional paper to predict a 
good outcome from the whigs' enquiry, 
42 
and in most other 
constitutional quarters suspicion had changed to hostility 
by the end of October, 1835. The decisive question was the 
contingent expenses of the Assembly. Glenelg correctly 
perceived that if there were no contingencies there would be 
no session, and he was determined to make one last effort 
to conjure up the first supply act since 1831.43 The QCA 
drew Gosford's attention to the fact that the ninety-two 
resolutions pledged the Assembly to pay from its contingencies 
the cost of its corresponding committees (partisan at best, 
revolutionary at worst) but Gosford was not deflected from 
carrying out his instructions. The furore was quickly heard. 
At Montreal, a group of radical Britons from outside the 
constitutional association formed the British Rifle Corps, 
and re-formed as the British Legion when Gosford suppressed 
the original body. The Quebec constitutional mechanics 
called for Gosford to be impeached for spending public money 
without a supply act or fair prospect of obtaining one. 
The Mississquoi Constitutional Association formally joined 
the call for impeachment, as did a new club of "Church and 
King" tories at Montreal, the Doric Club. Again only the 
Courier rose to Gosford's defence, denouncing his critics 
for "Toryism, the secret spring of their disreputable 
, 44 conduct. " 
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By the time of this exchange there was more fodder for 
debate. Gosford's camouflage had been stripped off by the 
publication in Upper Canada of parts of his instructions from 
Glenelg. These were markedly more cautious than the equi- 
vocations given to the Assembly by the Governor and Chief 
Commissioner himself, and buoyed the constitutionalists' hopes, 
especially on election of the Legislative Council and the 
disposal of Crown lands. 
45 Other incidents contributed further 
to the constitutionalists' feeling that they had more breathing 
room. Gosford closed the session with a speech deliberately 
courting their good opinion. The close of the colonial 
Parliament in March, 1836, began an upswing in the 
constitutionalists' morale. From that time forward, the 
imperial connexion gave confidence, not concern, to the CAs 
of Lower Canada. 
vii 
The unity of the movement was the first casualty of 
this optimism. From acting like an oppressed minority, the 
constitutionalists began to behave like an oppressed majority 
-- indignant of the way they were treated by a small fraction 
of King William's subjects, but confident enough of eventual 
victory to quarrel over the form that victory should take. 
During 1836 public controversy raged at Montreal over the 
question of church endowments, a natural topic for controversy 
in a colony where the Catholic and Anglican churches had 
considerable property endowments from the state yet much of 
the middle-class social leadership was Presbyterian. The 
general disruption of the Kirk in Scotland was preceded by 
a similar quarrel among Presbyterians in Lower Canada over 
whether they should try to share the proceeds of the clergy 
reserves with the Church of England. 
46 Voluntarism was a 
useful stick with which to beat both Anglican bureaucrats and 
the Catholic Canadiens, and within two months of Walker's 
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triumphal return from England he was struggling to retain 
his seat on the MCA's executive committee against an anti- 
Anglican, anti-Canadien faction which he believed was in 
league with the Upper Canadian reformers. The executive at 
the end of February, 1836 lumped clergy reserves in with the 
"feudal" tenure and absence of registry offices as some of 
the grievances Gosford was condemned for upholding. The 
Doric Club countered by denouncing all attempts to meddle 
with the reserves. Walker in private correspondence with 
Neilson observed that voluntarism could only work where 
education was widely diffused, and recorded in April the 
intransigent behaviour of three members of the executive who 
were "going to form a Society for the protection of religion 
& liberty, as if that needed to be protected here. " They 
were trying to eject Moffatt, McGill and Walker from the 
MCA, describing them as "tories -- seeking to perpetuate 
abuses in Church and State. " Eventually the Anglican George 
Moffatt did resign his seat in the executive committee, 
complaining that he could not tolerate the stand of the 
general committee of the MCA on Church establishments. The 
association had not been created to "meddle with ecclesiastical 
affairs"; the clergy reserves were for the "Protestant Clergy 
in the broadest sense", that is, including Presbyterians; 
he could not approve of despoiling the clergy even for "the 
laudable purposes of general education. Nor am I less averse 
to interfere with the Roman Catholic Clergy. " Moffatt was 
too valuable a member to be kept ouside the MCA for long, 
but for the time being his departure encouraged the 
voluntarists. 
47 
In August the voluntarists launched from the Courier 
office a petition which was strongly anti-Canadien and anti- 
establishment. The petition garnered a meagre 2,000 
signatures and suffered the ignominy of having several 
individuals strike off their names after signing. The 
leading Presbyterian voluntarist was Adam Ferrie, who in 
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September started the Religious Liberty Society whose 
prospectus declared that "All arguments in favor of exclusive 
religious establishments... founded upon the peculiar 
circumstanced of the Parent Country, are wholly inapplicable 
to that of British America" and asked, "Is the population of 
the British American Colonies composed of the same elements, 
is it activated by the same spirit, as that of the old 
country? " The answer offered was that Britain only wanted 
the colonies to buy her manufactures, and anything inhibiting 
economic development, such as clergy reserves and Catholic 
clergy-owned seigneuries, was anti-British. Ferrie chaired 
the founding meeting of the Society, at which leading 
participants included a Presbyterian cleric, the Rev. Henry 
Esson; John Redpath, Benjamin Holmes, and two patriote MPPs, 
Leslie and Dewitt! British precedents were declared "wholly 
inapplicable to British America, in which the state of 
society is... in almost every respect identical with that of 
the United States. " The Society's temporary influence was 
strong enough to make Walker lament that "the Constitutional 
Party is scattered to the winds. " Yet by year's end an 
attempt by Ferrie to denounce the executive of the MCA at 
the annual meeting was a total failure, and no more was heard 
of the iniquities of church establishments as attention turned 
once more to Britain's efforts to quell the republican tide 
running from the Assembly at Quebec. 
48 
viii 
The Religious Liberty Society brought to the fore another 
tear in the fabric of constitutionalism -- a lack of unanimity 
even on the relative virtues of republican and monarchical 
forms of government. The Latin tag gracing the head of every 
issue of the Courier was a line from Seneca, "Optimus est 
Reipublicae Statut, ubi nihil deest nisi licentia pereundi. " 
The constitutionalist Farmers' Advocate at Sherbrooke declared 
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at the end of 1835 that "We are no enemy to true Republicanism, 
and we know full well that very many inhabitants of the 
Townships are favourable to Republican Institutions. " In one 
of the decade's best descriptions of the forces arrayed 
against Papineau, the young secretary of the Gosford Commission 
wrote to a friend in London, "I do not like the English 
party.... They, of the two parties, are by far the best 
disposed to sympathize with Republican Institutions. " The 
constitutional MPP for M6gantic was a warm admirer of the 
British radical J. A. Roebuck, and in 1836 called a meeting of 
Megantic electors to scrutinize his own conduct in the 
Assembly. This unusual proceeding suggested a relationship 
between electors and representatives almost as remarkable 
as that enunciated by the constitutionalist MPP for Stanstead 
in 1837, that the representative must not "subvert the order 
of Government without express instruction from his constitu- 
ents. "49 
And prescriptive legitimacy, the bulwark of Dalhousie's 
supporters, was scarcely mentioned. The name "constitutiona- 
list" itself was ambiguous, for it was used by both parties 
in the 1827 election and appeared in the Ninety-two Resolutions 
in a commendatory sense. 
50 No doubt prescription still 
lodged in the bosoms of a few tired old bureaucrats, and the 
lower forms of political journalism continued to harp on 
Britain's rights of conquest, but the middle-class leadership 
of the constitutional associations struck more modern notes. 
The Montreal Gazette hailed the nascent MCA as "our Convention" 
for upholding British institutions; Andrew Stuart referred to 
"our full rights as British subjects" and Aylwin went so far 
as to refer to the "natural rights and liberties" of the 
subject. John Duval stressed the popular legitimacy of the 
British connexion -- "the throne of England is the people's 
choice". The Courier took pains to distinguish the Upper 
Canadian radicals (who were friendly to commerce as well as to 
popular sovereignty) from the patriotes, who obstructed 
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everything British. The CAs' executives themselves were 
answerable to the members at annual meetings and subject to 
election by ballot. 51 
The selection of delegates to the Select General Committee 
in June, 1836, also bore out T. F. Elliot's remark that British 
Lower Canadians would be at ease with republican practices. 
Members were drawn from the province on the basis of 
representation by (constitutionalist) population, and by 
February, 1836, each of the civic wards of Quebec had a 
"vigilance committee", charged with the task of registering 
all the inhabitants. Voting for SGC delegates at Quebec 
was by show of hands in each ward vigilance committee, and 
the same probably happened at most of the other eighteen or 
more vigilance committees which nominated forty delegates 
in all from Rimouski to Beauharnois, from Two Mountains to 
Mississquoi. 52 The SGC met twice in 1836, called for 
Gosford's recall in June, demanded the reunion of the 
Canadas in November, and named Andrew Stuart, George Moffatt 
and Alexander Gillespie as the constitutionalists' official 
spokesmen in London. The SGC was not a great success, but 
the principles on which it was chosen made it apparent 
that the middle-class leaders of the CAs had learned to per- 
fection the game of enlisting numbers in the quest for 
legitimacy. 
If the constitutionalists were moving towards popular 
institutions, they had a single opinion of Papineau's 
version of democracy. The MCA's general committee put it 
best in November, 1835: 
Both forms of government [republicanism and monarchy] 
have their advocates; each can be sustained by 
powerful arguments derived from history and reason.... 
The Association numbers amid their ranks, many of 
the children of Republican America, who... are 
proud of her institutions. Enrolled in the 
Association is a very large body of individuals... 
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who, witnessing the effect of despotism to degrade, 
and of freedom to elevate and ennoble, willingly 
join in the declaration that the source of power 
is in the people.... 
But whilst the Association record their conviction 
that the intelligence of a people is the guarantee 
for the proper use of the elective principle, they 
appeal to history, in particular to the progress of 
the Republics of South America,... to bear them out 
in the assertion that, when a population is 
unlettered and unenlightened, to entrust them with 
the unrestricted use of political power would... 
retard the progress of rational freedom. 
53 
Education must come first, or liberty was a curse. The 
Assembly's demand for payment of its contingencies was the 
first step to unicameralism; the emasculation of the 
Legislative Council would be another stage. And as for the 
"convention nationale" hinted at in the 41st resolution, a 
canadien lawyer told a general meeting of the QCA in March, 
1836, that "such a measure would be destructive of the first 
principles of Government, for when the people were called 
together with the countrouling power... there was nothing 
but brute force that could prevail. " Neilson pointed to 
Spain and Napoleonic France as examples of democracy gone 
astray among people not yet ready for it. Pure democracy 
was not the government of the United States, but of France 
for a time, the time of "a National Convention and a 
Committee of Public Safety... and the Guillotine.... That 
was a pure democracy., 54 French-Canadian political philosophy 
and political competence were on trial -- popular sovereignty 
(properly checked) was not. In 1837 the constitutionalists 
struggled successfully to get an Irish working-man elected 
in a riding whose most respectable businessman had failed 
to be elected three years before; not only the professional 
and bureaucratic dlites had rejected Papineau's programme for 
Lower Canada. 55 
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ix 
The fourth division in the constitutional movement, 
and the one which finally drove off leaders such as Neilson 
and Walker, was the place of the French Canadians in the new 
order which must follow the upheaval Papineau was bent on 
creating. Constitutionalists generally deplored the economic 
lassitude of the French Canadians, and seigneurial tenure 
came under heavy attack, although there was enough British 
seigneurial influence in the CAs to ensure that this issue 
never came to a head. The Quebec executive split almost 
equally on the issue early in 1836. Privately most of its 
members seem to have been content to leave the tenure alone, 
and no doubt concurred with Walker of Montreal, that 
seigneurial tenure was not, in itself, a cause of the 
agricultural crisis in Lower Canada. A bare majority of the 
executive pressed this view but encountered the fear 
expressed by George Pemberton, that stronger words would offend 
the Montrealers and "greatly injure the cause we both advocate 
and afford a great source of triumph to our adversaries. " 
The QCA in December, 1836, encouraged extinction of seigneurial 
burdens but only by private compact between seigneur and 
censitaire. 
56 
It was one thing to brand nearly half the population 
of the Canadas as politically and economically incompetent; 
it was quite another thing to remedy the situation. This 
was particularly true because the constitutionalists, with 
their roots tapping the lowest levels of the British colonial 
community, were firmly attached to the sorts of civil 
privileges which the Canadiens were using to further their 
own views. The anti-French and pro-republican faction at 
Montreal put abroad through the Courier schemes for what 
Walker called "a democratic form of Government to be vested 
solely in the educated... to the exclusion of the Canadians, 
who are to be deprived of civil rights and their language & 
institutions extirpated. " As the Courier pressed the cause 
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of this impatient faction, Neilson taunted its editor, 
Nothing common about him, not even common sense. 
He is a liberal illiberal, a voluntary involuntary 
religious support man, a majority minority man of 
the true school, whose rule of right is 'numbers', 
according to which rule in this Province he is 
avowedly wrong. 
57 
"In this Province". But what was that province but the art- 
ificial creation of an Act of Parliament whose authors had 
been confounded by the survivance of French Canada? The "loyal 
Reformers of St. Armand", the Mississquoi CA, met a few miles 
from the American frontier and lamented that "the boundary 
line, which separates the Townships from a foreign state is 
less distinct, than that, which separates them from a portion 
of this Province", a fact which "loyal subjects of His 
Majesty... ought to use all their power to remedy. " At 
Sherbrooke the CA's executive committee called for the town- 
ships to be made a separate province under Britain, or part 
of a British North American federation. 
58 But there was a 
simpler solution, one which appealed to the democrat as well 
as the bigot, to everyone, in fact, to whom the local civil 
law, "repudiated by the people from whom it was derived", 
59 
was a nuisance or a burden. The solution was reunion of the 
Canadas, the mere erasing of the imaginary line dividing 
Upper from Lower Canada, Montreal from its commercial hinter- 
land, Lower Canadian Britons from the majority status they 
craved. The Montreal press had never really given up the 
issue after 1822, and the Courier, Herald and Gazette all 
revived it in the mid-thirties. The Select General Committee 
hesitated to endorse reunion in June, but had no reluctance 
to do so in November, 1836, by a large majority including 
Stuart and Young of the QCA. 
60 Neilson put up a stiff fight 
in the Gazette, and the Mercury was not converted, but there 
seemed no getting around Aylwin's reasoning, that the 
Assembly's obstructions proved that the British constitution 
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worked only in British hands. Since constitutionalists 
cherished their elective institutions, they must take their 
majority where they found it -- in the growing settlements of 
Upper Canada. 
As long as the great lakes above emptied their 
waters through this magnificent channel into the 
Atlantic -- so long would the interests of the 
Provinces of Upper and Lower Canada be combined; 
and not only in local affairs would their interests 
be combined, but likewise in all the great and 
important objects of legislation. 
61 
As the patriotes steadily lost ground by their political and 
economic obstruction, the Constitutional movement opportunist- 
ically concentrated more and more of its energy on lobbying 
for reunion, the only measure that would square the circle 
of stimulating economic development without diluting the 
colony's already substantial doses of popular sovereignty. 
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Chapter 9 The Special Council of Lower Canada, 1833-1841 
i 
The constitution of 1791 died in Lower Canada at the end of 
August, 1837. Gosford's long-delayed enlargements of the 
Executive and Legislative Councils were disregarded by the 
patriotes, who shut down the Legislature by refusing to 
proceed to business until all their demands had been met. 
The number and size of public meetings grew and, as in 1827, 
prominent men risked and lost their commissions in the 
militia and magistracy by taking a leading part in condemning 
the government. For a remarkably long time the Lower 
Canadians of all origins persisted in their dignified custom 
of breaking each other's heads only during elections, and 
leaving meetings unmolested in the political off-season. 
This pattern was broken in November, when the Doric Club 
clashed violently with Les Fits de la Liberte. In quick 
succession afterwards two arrested patriotes were rescued 
by an armed force, and major clashes occurred in the 
Richelieu Valley as Sir John Colborne's troops became 
involved in Attorney-General Ogden's pre-emptive strike 
against the rebellion, which was expected to break out as 
soon as the St. Lawrence froze. The harassment of loyal 
Canadiens and British farmers before the revolt, the 
atrocities of the patriote rebels and the retribution of the 
loyal volunteers were an ugly sequel to the mounting mistrust 
of preceding years. But when a sullen peace was restored, 
the colony still had to be governed and legislated for; and 
the instrument which evolved for this purpose was the 
Special Council of 1833-41.1 
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The Special Council invites thorough investigation. 
Its achievements were important, and were watched with 
care and interest in its own time. Its legislation 
showed interesting links with the past and the 
subsequent history of the colony. Its constitution was 
a major blow to the prevailing British policy of trying 
to govern through representative assemblies wherever 
such bodies existed, and as such was regularly referred 
to during the whigs' abortive attempt to suspend Jamaica's 
constitution the next year. 
2 Nonetheless, historians 
have been reticent about the Special Council, except for 
occasional disapproving remarks by writers whose subject 
matter compelled them to notice the more prominent 
ordinances. Only one writer has treated it in detail; 
Antonio Perrault, editor in the 1940s of the French-Canadian 
Revue du Sarreau, marked the centenary of the Council's 
demise with a summary of its work, and drew attention to 
several ordinances which had survived more or less intact 
in the Civil Code or the Revised Statutes of Quebec (1941). 
Apart from this the article is chiefly a compendium of the 
Council's proceedings. The article deserved a wider 
distribution than the Revue du Barreau could give it; but 
even if it had been widely studied, its strongly legalistic 




The collapse of Britain's conciliatory policy was fore- 
shadowed by the coercive Ten Resolutions in March, 1837, but 
not fully acknowledged until the colony's leading reformers 
were known to be in revolt. The whigs greeted this news 
with open expressions of firmness but : Huch inward confusion. 
The ministers' original plan was to make a few careful and 
- 236 - 
specific enactments because Lord John Russell feared the 
creation of special powers in the colony might lead to lurid 
and tyrannical measures like secret trials and torture. But 
Lord Howick argued that colonial revenues should only be 
appropriated by a colonial authority and confusion would 
result if the Governor could do nothing without instructions 
from home. Moreover, the me4re under consideration seemed 
to presume that the constitution of 1791 would be restored, 
something which could no longer be taken for granted. 
Howick recommended instead giving limited legislative auth- 
ority to the Governor and a small council. Howick was opposed 
by the more liberal wing of the cabinet (Russell, C. P. Thomson, 
J. C. Hobhouse and Lord Cottenham) and a compromise was 
worked out, based on the old Quebec constitution of 1774, to 
permit the Governor to legislate with a council of at least 
seventeen members. Lord Durham later insisted on Howick's 
plan for a more compact council. 
Although Durham followed Howick's scheme intermittently 
during the summer and autumn of 1838, the Council worked 
for three years on the compromise plan which had been 
cabinet policy for a scant six days. This came about for 
two reasons. First, Howick forced the government to focus 
its attention not on the interim conduct of legislation, but 
on the steps to be taken to draft a new constitution. 
4 
Second, policy was deeply affected and probably inspired 
from sources which had hitherto carried little weight in 
the counsels of imperial policy, the North American 
Colonial Association, and the Constitutional Association of 
Montreal. The Act suspending the constitution passed by 
Parliament in February, 1838, was virtually a transcript of 
the one proposed by George Moffatt and Robert Gillespie; it 
included only two additional provisions, probably put in to 
satisfy Russell: the Council was to consider only laws 
proposed by the Governor, and its acts were invalid after 
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November, 1842.5 
Durham rejected advice to go straight to the colony by 
way of New York; he preferred to wait for the St. Lawrence 
to open in spring, and land in state at the gates of his 
castle. Glenelg accordingly instructed the Administrator, 
Lieutenant-General Sir John Colborne, to summon a Council 
at once and enact necessary measures, particularly to renew 
expiring Acts. Colborne was to warn his Councillors their 
appointments were temporary, since Durham would probably 
want an entirely new board. Colborne replied that he 
expected to have by mid-April a Council of "Gentlemen of 
Character and respectability, who have sufficient influence 
in their districts to warrant their being selected. " 
Gleneig had simply told him to appoint at least five British 
subjects; Colborne contemplated a Council of twenty, care- 
fully selected to represent all districts in the Province. 6 
Colborne and his advisors agreed with Moffatt and 
Gillespie that since the Council was the only Legislature 
they had, it should function like a truncated Parliament -- 
this would, apart from anything else, enhance its appearance 
of legitimacy. The Montreal Gazette strongly criticized 
the Governor's exclusive right to introduce laws and to choose 
or dismiss Councillors at will: if these provisions were 
frequently used, the Governor might just as well legislate 
by edict. 
7 The intentions of the Colonial Office are 
unclear; no objections were made to Durham's despotic use of 
the Council, but Colborne was sent a copy of the standing 
rules of procedure of the Legislative Council of the Cape 
Colony, with the suggestion he might wish to conduct his 
own Council in the same quasi-parliamentary fashion. 
Colborne, as a military figure who trusted most of the 
constitutionalists, was happy to let the Council give 
advise as well as consent on legislation. Laws were 
proposed not only by Colborne but by his law officers, the 
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Executive Council, and members of the Special Council itself. 
As soon as Colborne learned he was to summon a Council, 
his advisors prepared lists of prominent men of all parties 
untainted by rebellion. From these lists he first excluded 
judges and officials, and then selected twenty-two names 
roughly apportioned on the same territorial basis as the 
88 seats in the former Assembly. 
8 The division of the 
Council according to origin was also carefully watched, for 
Colborne realized that to "suit the times" there must be 
Canadiens in attendance. Such members were not impossible 
to find. Examples of co-operation between French and 
British Canadians are a small footnote to what was happening 
in the Legislature and among the masses, but they emphasize 
that origin was of less importance than political behavior 
and, despite Papineau, there had been efforts to strengthen 
ties between the upper middle classes of both origins. 
9 
French Canadians, by birth or adoption, dominated the first 
Special Council. Half the names were British and half 
French, but the British included the francophile Neilson 
and James Cuthbert, seigneur of Berthier, a zealous Catholic 
with a canadienne wife. The exclusion of rebels and the 
strong disposition to use the Council for general measures 
of commercial reform and public improvement meant that the 
anti-British, anti-commercial element which had captured 
the people's confidence in 1834 would have no place in the 
new authority. A considerable number of places went to 
prominent Britons, though many of these, like the wealthy 
merchant W. Walker of Quebec and P. H. Knoulton from the 
Townships had never been prominent in politics. Peter 
McGill, Samuel Gerrard, the lawyer Turton Penn, John Molson 
and Moffatt himself had all been leading constitutionalists. 
To this list of traditional leaders might be added two 
French Canadians, retired fur-traders and members of the old 
Legislative Council, Toussaint Pothier and Pierre de 
Rocheblave. 
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A more nebulous middle ground was taken up by men like 
Neilson, Cuthbert, and a third retired fur-trader, Jules 
Quesnel. Although the disaffected branded them tories, they 
were really remnants of the moderate third force. And 
there were four men whom even the most unfair critics had 
to acknowledge as reformers. These included two members for 
the Trois Rivieres district, Joseph Dionne and Etienne 
Mayrand, and two from the Quebec district, Amable Dionne, 
who voted for the Ninety-two Resolutions as MPP for 
Kamouraska in 1834, and Marc Laterriere, who had supported 
the same cause. (LaterriZre, however, never occupied his 
seat in the Council. ) 
10 These appointments indicated the 
extent to which Colborne sought a Council which would 
represent the loyal men of influence of all political 
persusasions. If the Council appeared to be packed with 
"torfies", this was partly because of the patriotes' relentless 
attack on the political centre in the years leading up to 
the rebellion. 
11 
The creation of the Special Council marks the reappea- 
rance in this narrative of James Stuart. He was still the 
most able lawyer in Lower Canada. He had brooded over his 
dismissal from the attorney-general's office by Aylmer and 
immediately after the revolt of 1837 he set out with 
T. C. Aylwin to join forces with William Walker at Montreal 
to defend the captured rebels! But Stuart joined the 
Special Council as one of the members from Quebec. Durham 
made him Chief Justice in the autumn of 1838 and Colborne 
excluded him from the Council; he returned under Poulett 
Thomson in 1839 and thereafter proved "a host in himself" 
in assisting the Governor. 
12 
The twenty men who answered Colborne's summons to the 
Council chamber in the ancient Chateau de Ramezay at 
Montreal, were as representative a body as could be assembled 
without admitting the disaffected, or resorting to elections 
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among a populace many of whom had just laid aside their arms 
for a season. The Canadien Councillors numbered rather too 
many seigneurs, retired fur-traders and Legislative Councillors 
to earn the trust of the people, who had been taught to 
despise anyone who accepted office under the government. 
But early fears that Colborne's Council would be simply a 
pliant instrument of coercion proved groundless. 
If Colborne's Council was a distorted reflection of the 
Legislature it replaced, Durham's hardly existed at all. 
The man for whom the special legislative authority was 
designed requires scant mention in a study of its use. This 
is due partly to the fact that his administration lasted 
less than six months, but also to the restricted view he took 
of the Council's role. Shortly after Durham arrived he 
dissolved Gosford's Executive Council and Colborne's Special 
Council. The former he replaced with three men from his 
entourage and two local officials; the Special Council was 
neglected until 28 June, when Durham had the required oath 
administered to his chief secretary, Charles Buller, and to 
four soldiers including the military secretary, Colonel Couper, 
and Durham's brother-in-law, the Hon. Charles Grey. Grey 
left some valuable reflections on the confusion which 
surrounded the summoning of this council and the extreme 
reluctance of the military figures (except for Couper) to be 
dragged into politics. Durham's Council served no purpose 
at all except to meet the formalities of the Act under which 
Durham governed. Grey never could understand why he had 
been appointed, and tried to resign in August; but Durham 
merely said that if he and Generals Clitherow and MacDonnell 
were now to withdraw, 
it would make it very difficult for him [Durham] 
to go on.... I told Colonel Couper, however, that 
I should certainly not be satisfied to be called 
upon as a Member of the Special Council to sanction 
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an Act which I might only hear for the first time 
when assembled to pass it, and begged him to manage 
that if I was to be called upon again, I might 
know beforehand what was proposed to be done. 
But this Council met only once more, almost on the eve of 
Durham's departure, with Grey and MacDonnell present and 
Buller's younger brother sworn in to replace Clitherow. 
13 
The abrupt end of Lord Durham's mission came about 
because of one of his ordinances, a measure deporting 
prominent rebels to Bermuda without trial. The dormant 
threat to Durham's mission had always been that some blunder 
would disarm his friends and give fatal ammunition to his 
enemies at home. The Bermuda ordinance was this blunder, 
and Lord Brougham and the House of Lords compelled the Govern- 
ment to disallow it. The debates gave the impression that 
Durham had exaggerated the Council's powers. These 
proceedings were universally deplored in the colony, but 
Durham took great umbrage; sick, over-worked, abused at home 
and exasperated by Lower Canada, he declared that his mission 
was destroyed. His departure was not retarded by Sir John 
Colborne, who told Couper that "The affairs of both Provinces 
have now become altogether military", and added with 
unaccustomed acerbity that Durham should cancel his projected 
trips to Washington and New York, for Canadians would not 
want him to "pass through the United States, however 
gratifying that reception might be to him. "14 
As soon as Durham was gone, rebellion broke out anew. 
Colborne at once convened his old Council, adding to it 
George Moffatt and the senior member of the Montreal Bar, 
Dominique Mondelet. This preserved the racial balance of 
the Council without broadening its political complexion. Less 
than a year later Colborne made several new appointments. 
An imperial Act (2 &3 Vict. cap. 53) broadened the Council's 
powers in the summer of 1839, and also raised the minimum 
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number of Councillors to twenty, and the quorum from five 
to eleven. This may have been a reaction against Durham's 
cavalier treatment of the Council; it may also have been 
a response to Robert Gillespie's proposal that the Council 
should be enlarged to sixty, "comprehending some of the most 
respectable and loyal French Canadians as well as the British 
Inhabitants... to deliberate with open doors. "15 Gillespie's 
purpose was seemingly to help forestall the return of 
representative government by giving the Special Council 
greater legitimacy in the eyes of Parliament. The Colonial 
Office gave no special countenance to this proposal, but 
Colborne enlarged the Council by half in the summer of 1839. 
The passivity and bitterness of canadien feeling after the 
second revolt was crushed can be gt%ged from the fact that 
only one new French-Canadian accepted a seat -- Jean-Baptiste 
Tache, yet another retired fur-trader, but a notary with 
the useful credential that he represented Rimouski in the 
Assembly from 1834-37. He probably accepted the Special 
Council seat (which he never occupied) to expiate the faux 
pas of his brother Etienne-Pascal, who had led a small 
disturbance at Montmagny in 1838.16 
Before the enlarged Council could meet, Colborne was 
replaced. He had tried to leave Canada in 1836 and again 
during the summer of 1838; but on Durham's departure he had 
become Governor-General, and he obviously enjoyed his role. 
Sadness tinged his usual laconic style as he informed 
colleagues of his departure. 
I have no doubt that the object of Ministers is to 
allay and propitiate by sending out a Nova Facies, 
and recalling the person who has been compelled to 
have recourse to the severe measures which have 
been adopted. I was fully prepared for this 
course at the commencement of my Reign; and was 
convinced that after I had performed all the 
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detestable duties which circumstances imposed 
on me, I should be removed. 
To the proposal that he should remain as Commander in Chief 
only, he replied, 
Can you imagine a more painful situation than 
for the present Governor of these Provinces to 
relinquish his post, to remain in Canada under 
the command of his successor to witness the 
gradual introduction of the milder sway which 
must naturally succeed the Iron Ageýof last 
year and to receive the maledictions of the 
disturbers of Society who have been repressed. 
17 
So his government was relinquished to the ebullient new 
man, Charles Poulett Thomson. Thomson's first responsibility 
was to secure the Canadas' assent to the union of their 
legislatures and executives, and he accordingly summoned 
the Special Council, the only appropriate body in the lower 
province. He might have followed Durham's course and 
dismissed the old council, but he realized that as the 
British government was well known to favour reunion, no 
credibility whatever would attach to the voice of a body 
chosen after the imperial policy was announced. The resolu- 
tions on reunion were therefore framed, debated and passed 
by members already appointed by Colborne. 
18 Thomson did 
subsequently change the Special Council's complexion. He 
appointed Henry Black of Quebec, whom Colborne had passed 
over in 1838 because he was a judge. Thomson also selected 
Provincial Secretary Daly, and Attorney-General Ogden; and 
when Durham's Solicitor-General (Andrew Stuart) died in 
1840, his successor C. D. Day went into the Special Council. 
These few appointments reversed Colborne's policy of 
excluding officials; Thomson had little affection for 
Durham's idea of choosing and dismissing ministers at the 
behest of a legislature, but he did like the thought of 
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having officials in the Legislature who were obliged to 
support the Governor's policy or leave office. This hold 
over the officials was authorized by Russell's despatch of 
16 October, 1839, stating that henceforth the Crown should 
exercise its dormant prerogative of appointing key colonial 
officers only during pleasure. Early in the spring of 1840, 
Colborne's old aide-de-camp remarked to his former chief 
that some of Thomson's measures were passing by narrow 
majorities, in which Daly and Ogden played a conspicuous 
role. "These placemen with Lord John Russell's Dispatch 
before their Eyes, voted... with the Majority. After all, 
next to a Proclamation of Martial Law, this is the most 
effectual mode of carrying on Government. ""19 
The parliamentary character of the Special Council's 
proceedings was fostered by Colborne and not fundamentally 
changed by Thomson. The rules followed by the appointed 
Council at the Cape of Good Hope were revised by Colborne 
to remove much that allowed publicity and delay, but 
retained the framework of Westminster procedure. Until 
August, 1839, the Governor did not have to publish ordinances 
before they passed, and the journals and proceedings were 
only published at the end of each session. The speed with 
which ordinances could pass was undoubtedly dictated by the 
frequent need to check disorder, but the secrecy before 1839 
prevented public discussions. In practice, the lack of a 
strong, loyal canadien press meant that the abolition of 
secrecy strengthened the more extreme sections of British 
opinion. But secrecy did not prevail absolutely even under 
Colborne, or during Thomson's short session in the autumn 
of 1839. Editors had a habit of finding out about and 
commenting on the objects, if not the details, of important 
ordinances, and when Thomson pushed through his reunion 
resolutions, Neilson published the substance of them at once 
in his Gazette and the Colonial Office first learned of them 
from Robert Gillespie. 20 
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Attendance was always high and once a member accepted his 
seat he generally occupied it during substantial parts of 
every session, except for Tache, Laterriere, and a Townships 
member who was replaced after 1838. James Stuart missed 
two sessions after Durham made him Chief Justice, because 
Colborne refused to let him displace Cuthbert as chairman 
of the Council. The Governor no doubt saw advantage in 
having a French-speaking Catholic as his surrogate in the 
Council Chamber. But Cuthbert's role was modified; he took 
a considerable part in debates and voted regularly in divisions 
in the spring of 1839. Stuart renewed his claims to the 
Chair when Thomson arrived, and Cuthbert was at last dis- 
placed. The combative Chief Justice completed the process 
of reducing the chairman to virtual equality with the other 
members. 
21 
Divisions frequently took place in the Special Council, 
but it would be difficult to assign precise partisan labels 
to anyone except Neilson, on the liberal or nationalist side 
of any question affecting the canadien laws and culture, 
and McGill, Moffatt and Penn who were usually consistent 
for the opposite side on similar measures. Early gestures 
were made to reassure the canadien Councillors. In the ninth 
meeting, De Rocheblave and Berthdlemi Joliette, the self-made 
seigneur of L'Assomption, quietly insisted that French and 
English should have equal status in the Council's proceedings 
and papers; Colborne agreed at once. When an ordinance was 
discussed suspending habeas corpus, however, Quesnel, 
Faribault and Mayrand solemnly withdrew, explaining that they 
were too closely related to many prisoners to be able to 
deliberate impartially. They returned the next afternoon. 
The vote on a measure for improving navigation upstream 
from Trois Rivieres separated members by district, regardless 
of origin. Finally, de Rocheblave withdrew briefly in 
December, 1838, when ordinances were rushed through nullifying 
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the factious judgements of two Canadien judges; but he was 
back in his seat the next morning. 
22 
Under Poulett Thomson, a sharper spirit prevailed; the 
introduction of civil officers brought legislative draftsmen 
into direct argument with the body dissecting their drafts. 
Furthermore, the moderation of the constitutionalists was 
eroded by their impatience to push through favourite measures 
before the Council was replaced by the less predictable 
legislature of the united Canadas. Thomson eventually called 
Moffatt "the most pig headed, obstinate, ill tempered brute 
in the Canadas., 
23 The Special Council had worked admirably 
in time of crisis; it responded poorly to better times and 
a civilian Governor, and might easily have broken down 
completely if allowed to last another year. 
During the sessions members worked hard; most of their 
names are sprinkled through the journals. The workings of 
the council become much clearer after 2 March, 1839, when it 
at last began to refer ordinances to sub-committees. These 
small working parties handled much of the detailed or 
contentious material, and their reports emphasized that the 
Council's authority was not unreservedly at the disposal of 
the legal draftsmen. The burden of sub-committee work was 
borne by three men. Old Samuel Gerrard, ex-president of the 
Bank of Montreal, had been a quiet advocate of public 
improvements for decades; now in his seventies, he could 
lend a hand to shape many long-desired measures. The second 
of the trio was John Neilson; the third was Jules Quesnel, 
son of a French poet, a retired fur trader and now a Special 
Councillor at 52. Like Neilson, Quesnel combined liberal 
inclinations with a strong affection for the French 
Canadian culture. One must suspect these two of com- 
plicated motives; while they turned the handle of the 
legislative mill, grinding out the program of the Montreal 
merchants, they held a watching brief for the interests of 
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French Canada, and like Cuthbert they voted against the union 
in 1839. But with Gerrard, these two were the backbone of 
the Special Council even after it voted for reunion, their 
names dotting the journals as movers, seconders, and sub- 
committee members, and as frequent objectors when the 
Council seemed to show that, however busy and useful it might 
be, it was after all a partisan and non-representative body. 
24 
iii 
The conventional image of the Special Council as a 
homogenous body issuing a few arbitrary and unpopular edicts 
is contradicted not only by its way of doing business, but 
also by the mass of useful legislation it produced. Its 
ordinances (so called to distinguish them from laws with the 
sanction of a representative Assembly) can be divided into 
four categories. First, the Council passed well-known 
ordinances to arrest, restrain, and punish the instigators of 
revolt, and to inhibit further outbreaks by such measures as 
impounding arms. Second, it spent a good deal of time simply 
renewing Acts passed under the old legislature's inefficient 
system of temporary laws. (Many ordinances of the later 
sessions gave permanent status to Colborne's temporary 
legislation, sometimes making technical adjustments in the 
process. ) Third, there were routine measures, parts of any 
legislature's work, including voting supply. Fourth, many 
ordinances authorized measures of social and economic reform 
and reconstruction. Two of these categories invite little 
comment. The renewals and technical amendments occupied 
considerable time and represent almost one-eighq of the 197 
ordinances, but they and the routine ordinances raised few 
important political issues, especially since the Council was 
denied authority by Parliament to vote salaries other than 
those voted by the Assembly in 1832. It will therefore be 
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necessary to notice in detail only some legislation which 
was a specific response to the revolt, and the measures of 
reconstruction. 
25 
The sources of legislation were varied. Colborne kept 
Gosford's Executive Council, which drafted some important 
legislation for him; but it was quite partisan and Colborne 
once commented that he hoped several of its drafts would be 
"so modified and improved as to afford satisfaction generally 
in the Province;, 26 The law officers and heads of departments 
contributed their share of legislation, and James Stuart was 
a tireless draftsman, even before Durham made him Chief 
Justice. He does not seem to have had warm relations with 
Colborne, but Thomson took advantage of his unrivalled 
knowledge of French and English law. Stuart also worked with 
Thomson's English legal advisor. 
27 
Banking ordinances either 
came directly from the president of the Bank of Montreal, 
Peter McGill, or were amended at his suggestion. Ordinances 
emanating from the Colonial Office were not guaranteed a 
welcome; repeated efforts to pay the arrears due to the old 
Assembly's agent, Roebuck, failed even to find a mover. 
After the rising in 1838, the Colonial Office tried to force 
the council to create tribunals for political trials. 
Moffatt and most of the French Canadians battled McGill and 
Penn and persuaded Colborne to withdraw the measure. He 
informed the Colonial Office that trial by Court Martial was 
more acceptable than unprecendented new tribunals. 28 
Many ordinances, and particularly measures for public 
works, were inspired by the mercantile interests of Montreal. 
Gillespie and Moffatt had made it very clear in London that 
economic measures and legal reforms, not suppression of the 
revolt, were the chief reason for creating a special 
council. It should, they repeatedly told Glenelg, be 
authorized to amend the laws of mortgage and dower, create 
registry offices, reconstruct the judiciary, revive and 
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improve the defunct corporations of Quebec and Montreal, 
abolish feudal tenure, especially in Montreal, and deal with 
a host of internal improvements, notably the St. Lawrence 
canal. 
29 In general the British colonists left it to the 
Governor and the law officers to punish those most responsible 
for the outbreaks, and to fix the exact terms of the three 
dozen ordinances which the rebellion elicited. 
One ordinance which aroused some comment was the 
measure paying all the civil salary arrears. Although the 
public servants themselves had been paid in August, 1837, 
the money had been loaned by the British government, not 
drawn from the provincial treasury. When Colborne's first 
Council appropriated the requisite hundred thousand pounds, 
the Montreal Gazette expressed surprise that the money had 
not been allowed to remain on loan to the province! 
30 
A measure at the end of 1838 caused grave concern. This 
was, in the words of a contemporary, the "stroke that put 
down the insurrection on the bench" raised "by the patriote 
judges in support of their compatriots in the field. " The 
description was apt. Elzear Bedard and Philippe Panet, judges 
at Quebec, defied the ordinance suspending habeas corpus, 
issuing a writ for a political prisoner, imprisoning the 
gaoler and trying to imprison several soldiers who hid the 
prisoner. In so doing they struck down a legislative 
enactment, a procedure which was beyond their authority as 
two judges sitting in vacation. Bedard and Panet reasoned 
that habeas corpus was part of the criminal law of England, 
established in the colony by the Quebec Act of 1774 and so 
beyond the reach of the Special Council. Colborne's law 
officers and most of the other judges reported in favour of 
the ordinance; the "patriote" judges' ruling was a clear 
mockery of Parliament's intentions when it suspended the 
colonial constitution, and when Colborne was convinced that 
Parliament had not erred he promptly took the advice of the 
- 250 - 
Executive Council and suspended the two judges. He later 
suspended ValliZires at Trois Riviares in identical 
circumstances. 
Colborne next sent the Special Council a bill authori- 
zing appointment of acting judges, and an ordinance declaring 
that the province's habeas corpus act was the local ordinance 
of 1784, not the English Act of 1679. (These ordinances led 
to Pierre de Rocheblave's emotional exit from the Council 
chamber. ) The suspension was energetically defended in 
Neilson's Gazette, which berated the judges for showing the 
world that French Canadians could not govern themselves and 
were in fact making authoritarian government "necessary in 
Lower Canada. " Lord Normanby had grave qualms about the 
incident and tried to reassure Bedard that he was merely on 
leave of absence; but Colborne, and afterwards Thomson, stood 
by the suspension. There was no official recanting until 
Vallieres was named Chief Justice of Montreal in 1842.31 
The Council also offered opportunities for carrying out 
the constitutionalists' aim of rationalizing the province's 
system of roads and waterways. At the end of the first 
session Colborne requested the Council to suspend its ordin- 
ary rules of procedure to consider a petition from the 
Montreal Committee for Trade for a new survey of Lake St. 
Peter. This broad, shallow stretch of the St. Lawrence above 
Trois Rivieres was one of the obstacles to efficient use of 
the port of Montreal. The rules were suspended, the petition 
considered, and five hundred pounds voted for the survey. 
32 
Montreal was Colborne's capital primarily for military reasons, 
but the work of the Special Council clearly favoured it at 
the expense of the rival port of Quebec. 
On the Special Council's first meeting, the Montreal 
Gazette fired off a salvo against the provisions of its 
constitution which forbade it to raise new taxes, and 
therefore offered little hope of clearing up the long and 
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unjustifiable backlog of legislation on education, canals, 
harbours, and the general encouragement of commerce and 
agriculture. 
33 Colborne's first temporary Council managed 
to pass in three weeks four measures of great interest to the 
Montreal Merchants. No. 14 granted a new charter to the Bank 
of Montreal; No. 25 gave corporate status to the Bank of 
British North America, a new institution to supply the 
lamentable want of exchange facilities between the main 
colonial cities and the commercial centres of New York and 
London. Ordinance No. 26 provided B500 for the survey 
of Lake St. Peter, and No. 23 authorized a loan of L40,000 
to push forward the development of Montreal's harbour. 
Durham published on 28 June, 1838 his intention to proceed 
with various public works, but nothing came of the promise. 
Colborne's second session did no more than grant L20,000 
to continue existing projects. Another of Colborne's 
important acts was to wind up the old custom of managing 
public works through ad hoc boards of commissioners, by 
instituting a Board of Works. This body, the ancestor of 
the modern Department of Public Works, was set in operation 
by Thomson before the reunion. 
34 
Meanwhile, pressure was increasing on the Colonial 
Office to permit the Council to create new taxes. Durham 
deplored the "laudable forebearance" of Parliament in 
restricting taxing powers. He was particularly irked by 
the Council's inability to create municipal bodies with 
taxing powers. Late in January, 1839, Colborne instructed 
the Executive Council to prepare ordinances on a number of 
subjects including public works. "With returning tranquillity, 
it is justly expected that the measures to which I advert will 
be speedily carried into effect preparatory to the changes 
of a more difficult nature, which may be proposed for the 
permanent government of this Province. " He transmitted to 
London a month later the Executive Council's report, strongly 
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endorsing its request that the Special Council should have 
enlarged powers. 
35 When Lord Normamby presented a Bill to 
amend the powers of the Special Council, he drew heavily on 
these despatches to defend the increased authority; his bill 
permitted the Special Council to create only such taxes as 
would be paid directly to the commissioners or local 
authorities for the works specified in the taxing ordi- 
nances; the Council was still forbidden to create general 
revenue taxes. Despite a new attitude of cautious scrutiny 
in the House of Lords, the Act passed virtually intact. 
Colborne had already been privately assured of the powers 
he wanted, and legislated much more aggressively for public 
works during the third session of his Council. 
Poulett Thomson arrived to take up the Governorship in 
mid-October 1839. At first he expressed horror at Colborne's 
prolific expenditures: 
I have not a sixpence in the Treasury, and no means 
of raising anything for any public purpose. It is 
impossible almost to believe the mismanagement of 
Sir John Colborne in all money matters. He threw 
away money right and left upon the most absurd 
undertakings.... I have had to legalize 
expenditures of his... to the extent of 50,000L! 
Nearly half the revenue of the Province. 
Thomson's own rate of expenditure did not differ markedly from 
Colborne's, and apart from a few projects such as a prison 
and lunatic asylum completed under Colborne's appropriations, 
Thomson continued all his predecessor's "absurd undertakings", 
and praised himself for it. 
Lower Canada... is not worth the least care or trouble. 
A miserable fringe of worn out land, inhabited by a 
lot of ignorant and illiterate Frenchmen-There is 
not a man, English or French in the Province who has 
a political opinion, or aims at anything but 
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oppressing or vexing the other race. So I go on 
my own with them, and improve their laws and 
their roads after my own fashion. 
36 
Needless to say Colborne had not depleted the provincial 
funds for his private amusement. t; any of the colonists' 
ambitions were made possible through votes of money or loans 
authorized by Colborne's and Thomson's Councils, but the 
St. Lawrence canal was not touched, partly because the Upper 
Canadian end of it was in financial disorder. Apart from 
the public improvements which were authorized, private 
transport ventures -- three railways and the private toll 
roads -- were authorized during Thomson's regime with a 
total authorized capital near three hundred thousand pounds. 
Water transport was improved from the Gulf of St. Lawrence 
to Montreal, and from Lake Champlain to the St. Lawrence. 
Several ordinances were passed banning the old-fashioned 
local sleighs which were notorious wreckers of winter roads; 
toll roads and bridges were built, raising loans on the 
security of future tolls. 
37 The colony did not shackle 
itself with debts as Upper Canada had done -- that had to 
wait until after the union -- but a large part of the backlog 
of public improvements was cleared up with remarkable speed, 
considerable expenditure and some optimistic borrowing during 
the three years of the existence of the Special Council. 
The Council did not merely charter banks and improve 
roads; it also intervened in the fundamental workings of 
civil offices, and in many social and economic relationships. 
It provided the colony's first efficient bankruptcy law, and 
altered the relations of a family with its land by civil code 
amendments related to the registry law. The list of such 
changes defies summary and is much too lengthy to be expounded 
in detail. But it is important to note that the bulk of these 
changes neither defied the will of the people nor spent public 
money for the benefit of minorities. 
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Number and Purpose Sum Loan Notes 
Date voted Authorized 
SIR JOHN COLBORNE 
21 4. v. 38 Montreal common gaol 647 a 
23 5. v. 38 Montreal harbour 
improvements 40,000 
26 5. v. 38 Lake St. Peter survey 500 
85 8. iv. 39 Sherbrooke Court House 3,300 b 
100 ll. iv. 39 Roads and bridges 9,262 
Canals and navigation 10,437 
Hospitals 2,300 
Miscellaneous 2,375 
108 ll. iv. 39 Chambly Canal 30,000 b 
Sub-totals -- Colborne 28,821 70,000 
CHARLES POULETT THOMSON (Later Lord SYDENHAM) 
118 13. v. 40 Extending No. 23 28,000 c 
126 13. v. 40 Extending No. 108 5,000 
163 15. vi. 40 Roads, Montreal district 35,000 d 
169 29. xii. 40 Navigation aids below 
Quebec 5,000 
171 31. xii. 40 Extending No. 163 12,000 
176 21. i. 41 Extending Nos. 23,118 17,000 c 
180 27. i. 41 Roads, Montreal-Chambly 15,000 c, d 
181 30. i. 41 Roads, Quebec district 25,000 c, d 
184 30. i. 41 Court houses and gaols 
throughout Province 50,000 b 
191 6. ii. 41 Public building for civic 
purposes, Montreal 50,000 c, e 
193 6. ii. 41 Temiscouta Road 5,000 f, b 
Sub-totals, Sydenham 55,000 192,000 
TOTALS 83,821 262,000 345,821 
Notes: 
a. Appropriation to cover bills for work already completed. 
b. Not more than 50% to be spent/borrowed during twelve months 
after passing of ordinance. 
c. Authorized to borrowdat interest above legal rate of 6%. 
d. Loan secured on tolls or other similar revenues of completed 
work. 
e. Loan secured on property of the Corporation of Montreal. 
f. Supplemented B 3,000 voted by Colborne's No. 100. 
Appropriations and Loans authorized by Special Council, 
1838-1841. 
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Some of the reforms did meet the needs of the temporary 
crisis. Colborne praised an ordinance to regulate taverns -- 
they were nests not only of vice but of disaffection. Also 
timely was the adoption of a system of police. This was 
recommended intermittently in the decades before the revolts, 
but Durham took the first decisive step towards providing 
regular day and night patrols in the two major cities in 
June, 1838. (Ordinance no. 28). Colborne steadily increased 
the system, frequently using army officers as stipendiary 
magistrates to hasten the provincial police into existence. 
Thomson remarked in his usual kindly spirit, "By the bye, 
the only sensible thing which Lord Seaton [i. e. Colborne] 
did here was to commence the organization of a rural Police, 
which I have greatly extended and shall shortly make general. " 
By 1841 most districts had local police forces. 
38 
Municipal government was seen as another essential part 
of the reorganization of Lower Canada, since a host of local 
improvements could best be advanced by local taxation. Ever 
since Dalhousie's day municipal government had been looked 
upon not only as useful in itself, but as a means of assimila- 
ting the Canadiens to English habits by making them familiar 
with elective politics at a level where "the evil result of 
every lazy or interested choice, could appear upon the voters 
in a palpable and corporeal shape. , 
39 
The Gosford Commission 
and Durham's investigators paid considerable attention to 
municipal government but nothing was accomplished until 
Thomson arrived. Apart from re-incorporating Quebec and 
Montreal with charters imitating English models, he had 
lengthy ordinances drawn up for rural councils. Thomson 
believed that the forthcoming union legislature could not 
be trusted to erect local bodies which would limit legislative 
patronage in the form of roads and bridges. The municipal 
ordinances were passed by the Special Council in December, 
1840. They created rural parish and township governments, 
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but withheld superintending powers in the hands of the central 
government, "partly out of respect for the prejudice of those 
who balked at dangerous democratic innovations", as Thomson's 
biographer wrote, "and partly that the central government 
might hold the leading-strings while the infant municipalities 
learned to walk., 
40 
Not all the government's measures proceeded satisfactorily. 
Enormous energies were spent in trying to rationalize the 
currency system, which was in great disorder because of the 
profusion of foreign gold and silver circulating in North 
America at different rates of exchange. Since specie would 
always migrate to where it was over-valued, and since the 
banks were compelled to redeem their notes in specie (except 
intermittently during the commercial crisis of 1837 and the 
political disorders of 1838, when the patriotes started a run 
on the Bank of Montreal) unilateral action by the Special 
Council could accomplish little. All that really succeeded 
were a law forbiding circulation of spurious copper coinage, 
and another forbidding note issues smaller than one dollar 
(five shillings) which were regarded as Peter McGill's 
private offensive against his fellow Councillor John Molson, 
and Augustin Cuvillier, whose family firms were responsible 
for a lot of the small notes in circulation. 
41 
A more signal failure of the Special Council came in the 
vast field of judicial reconstruction. The courts of the 
Province were gradually grinding to a halt from the practice 
of referring all cases, no matter how small, to the same 
judges; courts were still centred on three towns and the 
occasional appointment of Commissioners for Small Causes 
merely acknowledged the evil without providing a permanent 
remedy for it. An appeal court had long been wanted. The 
most immediate and uncontroversial shortcoming -- local 
justice for small causes -- was swept aside by Colborne, but 
a less happy fate awaited the compendious reconstruction 
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proposed by Chief Justice Stuart. He proposed to separate 
criminal from civil courts; but the new Courts of Queen's 
Bench, with original jurisdiction in criminal trials, would 
double as appeal courts in civil matters. This ordinance 
was highly unpopular among the colony's lawyers of both 
origins, who argued that a suit in the lower court would be 
merely a prelude to a decision at the higher level. The 
ordinance was never proclaimed; it was allowed to die 
quietly in 1842.42 
The Special Council did not achieve all that its 
constitutionalist progenitors desired of it. The judiciary 
was not substantially reformed, and nothing was done on the 
St. Lawrence canal. Several administrative reforms, such 
as the revision of the office of sheriff, were probably pressed 
on Colborne more urgently by the law officers and other 
officials than by the merchants -- the interests of the two 
groups were not identical. But the two favourite reforms of 
British Lower Canadians were accomplished by the Special 
Council. These were the establishment of registries of land 
titles and encumbrances, and the abolition of seigneurial 
tenure on the island of Montreal; these two, together with 
the Council's most famous ordinance, deserve separate 
consideration. 
iv 
The Special Councils of Lower Canada passed 197 ordinances. 
The first of three deserving individual mention is Durham's 
No. 28, which exiled eight rebels to Bermuda and forbade 16 
others to return to Canada on pain of death. Gosford and 
Colborne wisely feared that regular juries would acquit the 
rebels, and Glenelg forbade Durham to create special 
tribunals. Instead the Governor sent Charles Buller and 
John Simpson to Montreal to confer with the leading rebels 
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in gaol. After two meetings eight rebels signed a document 
which scrupulously avoided a confession of guilt, but 
expressed willingness to submit to exemplary punishment in 
return for an amnesty for 140 other prisoners. Durham, 
with the consent of McGill and Gerrard, took the poisoned 
bait. Surely Durham doubted his own measure, for his report 
to Glenelg on 29 June concealed important features of the 
truth; Durham richly deserved the rebuke he later received 
from Melbourne, that "you never transmitted to us any copy 
of their plea of guilty, or of their confession.... The 
prisoners themselves had furnished Roebuck with all these 
particulars, which were immediately conveyed to Brougham. , 
43 
Lord Brougham introduced a hostile Bill which cleverly 
protected Durham from retribution by the prisoners while 
condemning his ordinance as illegal. Durham was already 
in bad odour with Parliament for his expenses and his 
patronage; the ministry might have risked defeat to regularize 
the ordinance, but this would have been no help to either 
Durham or Canada. The ordinance was disallowed. 44 
One piece of business abandoned when Durham hastily 
quit the colony was settlement of the Sulpician's title to 
the seigneury of Montreal. Altogether there were four 
efforts after 1835 to resolve this issue -- one by Gosford, 
one by Buller, a provisional ordinance by Colborne's 
Council, and a final one by Thomson's. A few principles 
were common to all: the Seminary received a corporate 
character, with title to its three seigneuries. In return, 
it had to permit every censitaire in Montreal to commute 
his tenure to a French version of freehold tenure, on 
payment of a mutation fee and arrears of seigneurial dues. 
There were few important differences among the four plans, 
but the most lenient was Colborne's, which was essentially 
Buller's plan as modified by a sub-committee of McGill, 
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de Rocheblave, Neilson, Gerrard and Quesnel. Durham urged 
the Colonial Office to have Parliament enact Colborne's 
ordinance, but Lord Normanby sent it back to Canada with 
Thomson. Under new rules allowing publicity to ordinances, 
the plan whipped up a storm of protest in Montreal, largely 
from the old "religious liberty" faction, and Moffatt and 
John Molson forced through several amendments before voting 
against the ordinance altogether. The seminary was com- 
pelled to sell off a large farm in Montreal, to invest its 
surplus capital in the British funds, and to hold its other 
properties subject to scrupulous fulfillment of its 
educational and charitable duties. The ordinance passed on 
8 June, 1840, and within a year Thomson happily reported 
that large blocks of land had passed into freehold tenure, 
including the property of the most ardent opponents of the 
ordinance. 
45 
The registry ordinance solved another intractable 
problem. There was no simple means for a prospective buyer 
to determine whether a property was mortgaged or encumbered 
by the myriad unwritten claims created by the colony's 
family law. Any debt a man incurred encumbered all his 
property indiscriminately, and a wife's customary dower was 
entailed on her children. If these matters were written 
down at all it was in the secret files of one of the 
province's 250 notaries. The Gosford commission very frankly 
endorsed the constitutionalists' view that patriote lawyers 
and notaries inhibited public registries to protect their 
incomes and deter immigrants from settling in the seigneuries; 
it was "unsafe either to buy real estate or to lend money 
on its security in the Province. " Buller made a weak 
attempt to draft an ordinance cutting through these knots; 
a sub-committee of Colborne's last Special Council agreed on 
the need for an ordinance to register all titles, abolish 
notarial secrecy and customary dower, and to make mortgages 
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"special" to individual pieces of property. Eventually 
Thomson got an ordinance passed on the eve of the Council's 
dissolution. "It is a subject so interwoven with Old 
French Law, and the habits of the people under it, that I 




The Special Council came to an end with the reunion of 
the Canadas on 10 February, 1841. In fact the Council's 
deliberations postponed the union for about a month, since 
Thomson kept it in session to deal with everything he was 
afraid to entrust to the new legislature -- public works, 
the judiciary, and registries. At various times both 
Colborne and Thomson expressed privately a conviction that 
Lower Canada would profit from a further ten years' government 
by such a body, but there were obvious impediments to such 
a course. 
47 The constitutionalists frequently expressed their 
desire to return to representative government, provided there 
would be'an English-speaking majority in both legislative 
chambers; the Canadiens hated the Special Council. In 
Britain, the government and Parliament were committed by 
mid-1839 to joining the legislatures and executives of the 
two Canadas. There was really no question of the Council's 
long surviving the military emergency. 
The Special Council was created by the whigs in 1838 
to avoid the embarrassment of legislating in England for the 
internal affairs of a colony; but the Colonial Office was 
soon carried along by the constitutionalists (and the second 
rebellion) into letting it enact a systematic revision 
of many of the colony's laws and institutions. And although 
close scrutiny was established over all the Council's ordi- 
nances remarkably few were disallowed and after Durham's 
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debacle only one measure was seriously controverted in 
Parliament. The reactionary Bishop Philpotts of Exeter tried 
to have the Sulpician Estates ordinance disallowed, but got 
little encouragement even from other tory Lords. 
48 if 
Durham had retained Colborne's Council he might have dragged 
it down in his fall; but his interlude merely showed that 
the most vocal elements in the colony wanted a strong local 
government and would be furious at further meddling by British 
partisans. After Durham, the British government and Parlia- 
ment did little more than keep an eye on the legality of 
the Special Council's acts; and the colony flourished. 
The return of prosperity after 1838 and the rapid 
progress of improvements under the Special Council should not 
be allowed to obscure the hatred which many Canadiens felt 
for it. The Councillor Joseph Dionne was reported to be 
afraid to travel in his own district; his best friend cut 
him and his horses were mistreated by his neighbours. 
Another Councillor, C. E. Casgrain of Kamouraska, was painfully 
conscious of the contradiction between his election to the 
Assembly in 1830 and his vote to suspend habeas corpus in 
1838. Canadiens bracketed the existence of the Council with 
martial law, mass arrests, and the volunteers' burning of 
rebel villages as odious specimens of tyranny. Poulett 
Thomson had no chance of winning French Canadian support 
because of the peremptory way he summoned the Council during 
the first winter storms of 1839, mustered little more than a 
quorum, and set the members to work on resolutions affecting 
the most serious questions of the colony's constitution. 49 
The anti-unionists thereafter appealed to the Colonial 
Office for the disallowance of twenty ordinances they 
considered objectionable to the rights of the people or the 
interests of the province. But constitutionalists were happy; 
the Montreal Gazette spoke for them four days after the 
Council's demise. 
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Fortunately for the Province, the improvements 
and ameliorations which that body [the old 
Assembly] always declined to sanction, except 
upon their own terms of fundamental opposition 
to the Mother Country, have been accomplished 
by a less popular or democratic Legislature, to 
be sure, but certainly a far more patriotic 
and intelligent one, enjoying the respect and 
confidence of every individual in the country, 
who wished to behold the shackles and barbarisms 
of feudal institutions, entirely, though 
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Chapter 10 Racism, Assimilation, and Reunion of the Canadas 
i 
Every conflict in Lower Canada between the relative newcomers 
and the descendants of the original inhabitants, also brought 
closer the reunion of Upper and Lower Canada. Independence 
was a chimera; after 1830 only three possibilities might have 
allowed Lower Canada to remain separate. A radical ministry 
in London might have emancipated the colonies, leaving French 
Canadians perhaps to retain their existing boundaries; but 
no such ministry came close to taking office. If Britain 
had lost Canada in a war with the United States, there might 
have been a similar result, though the radical Drolet was 
probably closer to the mark when he wrote from exile in the 
U. S. of the horde of vultures who would have turned Canada 
into another Texas "si nous eussions acquis notre ind6pendance 
en 1837 ou 1838. "1 But in any case the Americans were easily 
dissuaded from invading Canada after 1815. Finally, a 
peaceful, local resolution of the conflict between Briton 
and Canadien would undoubtedly have left Lower Canada a 
separate colony, continuing to tread the narrow path where 
economic expansion was compatible with social conservatism. 
But the nervousness and ambition of both sides doomed such a 
reconciliation. As long as French Canada's survivance was 
deemed an asset to Britain's military security in the North 
Atlantic and North America, the balance tilted in favour of 
social conservatism. But agraiian over-population in 
Britain and Ireland, with five years of political disorder 
and two rebellions in the colony, changed the balance 
unequivocally. The Canadiens had long been seen as a clog 
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on commerce; now they were a threat to security as well. 
Whatever interest Britain had in conciliating them seemed 
to blow away with the first puff of smoke from musket-barrels 
along the Richelieu River in November, 1837. 
Massive immigration to the Canadas in 1829-34 made the 
crisis acute. Papineau had plausible reasons to believe that 
the Canadiens could not trust to placid co-operation, and 
this left them with three choices. They could cling to 
their culture and ignore the challenge of Anglo-Canadian 
capitalism, in which case they could become in time a landless 
proletariat, a lower caste. Or they could resolve the 
contradictions, shedding their past and smoothly integrating 
themselves with the newcomers, who had superior contacts with 
the outside world. Third, they could practice social, 
economic and political separatism, sacrificing the material 
advantage of participating in the British market system for 
the emotional satisfaction of preserving cultural continuity. 
The first option was clearly repugnant, and Papineau used 
the spectre of economic subordination to keep his followers 
from becoming complacent. Assimilation was the course 
Papineau's rivals urged on the Canadiens, but pride and 
mistrust led him to reject it. With Adam Thom fulminating 
in the Montreal Herald and Ryland's plots of long ago still 
remembered, how should the Canadiens have reacted to James 
Stuart's vision of a new Canadian nationality, neither 'French 
nor English nor American, or to William Walker's invitation 
to "constitute ourselves one people"? 
2 Were they sincere, 
or were they cunningly inviting the French Canadians to 
leave themselves without protection? And even if these 
offers could be trusted, could a Canadien retain his 
self-respect while accepting the gift of a conqueror, or 
should he strive to ensure that no change was accepted except 
as the free choice of a free people? Many, like Cuvillier 
and Sabrevois de Bleury, were willing to accept the gift, but 
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many more followed Viger in believing it should always be 
rejected. 
3 That left Papineau with the third course -- 
systematic opposition to integration of Lower Canada into 
the political and economic system of the British empire. 
Deeply concerned for the future of his people and regarding 
the newcomers as a Trojan horse, Papineau clung to his 
traditions and shed his upper-middle class followers as he 
trod the road to rebellion and defencelessness. 
ii 
The point should not need to be laboured that assimilation 
was not a racist goal, nor could it have been founded on 
racist assumptions. Yet Canadian historiography tends loosely 
to equate the two. This is partly due to a lax interpretation 
of the word racism. Attempts to distinguish national or racial 
characteristics -- and to say which were better -- are at 
least as old as Aristotle, and Englishmen in the early nine- 
teenth century debated whether institutions or physical 
environment had the greater influence on national character. 
Political stability and material progress were the yardsticks 
used to measure superiority in Britain, "and by these standards 
Britons rated themsevles extremely high, certainly higher than 
the French. Much of this ebullient cultural chauvinism was 
transferred to Lower Canada, and flourished there where the 
two races lived close enough together to be acutely aware of 
each other's faults. But none of the expressions of this 
needed to be racist, for racism entails the belief of one 
group that the other is irretrievably inferior. The assimila- 
tionist, on the other hand, believes that the differences are 
accidental and should be dissolved. 
4 These arguments were 
applied to the Canadian situation in 1971-72 by Peter 
Burroughs, and ought eventually to eradicate the slipshod use 
of the more colourful term "racist. "5 
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But these remarks apply to the Richardson-Moffatt 
school of assimilation thought, which inspired the passages 
of Lord Durham's Report portraying the dull past, shabby 
present and parlous future of la nation canadienne as a 
unique cultural group. It was not only the merchants' 
chauvinistic paternalism that evoked the loathing of the 
patriotes and the frightened state of their followers. 
Adam Thom of the Herald was the favourite of the mob, so 
much encouraged by public adulation that one of Durham's 
informers reported that "the man can't help doing these 
things, and has become so spoilt from habit that he does 
not know now when he sins. " Those "things" included a 
passage in the Anti-Gallic letters proposing that "to be at 
peace we must make our own solitude; we must sweep the French- 
Canadians off the face of the earth. "6 An anonymous pamphlet 
issuing from the Courier office addressed itself even more 
closely to the question of racism and assimilation in 1835. 
After condemning the patriotes and their electors for clinging 
to "all that was mean, subservient, and ignorant", the 
pamphleteer disposed of the prospects for assimilation: 
There cannot possibly exist in nature, morals, or 
politics, a more complete system of antipodes than 
that which chracterizes both English and French 
of every denomination.... They are not to be 
amalgamated. There is no power in the world, 
either moral or physical, that can ever compel 
them to act in unison, or upon one general 
sentiment or principle. 
7 
This contained an environmental, rather than a biological 
explanation of permanent inferiority. Along with the more 
familiar forms of assimilationism, such feelings would 
appeal strongly to the lower classes of British Lower 
Canadians for two reasons. British or Irish origin and the 
experience of recent immigration gave all English-speaking 
colonists an ethnic cohesiveness that could over-ride class; 
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and because of the broad franchise and survival of the land 
tenure and civil law of the ancien r¬gime, the struggle 
against the patriotes could be portrayed as a struggle not 
to establish privilege, but to undermine it. 
In preceding chapters, the story of conflict and man- 
oeuvre between the main cultural groups of Lower Canada has 
permeated the narrative. 
8 But the present study is not 
merely a social history of Lower Canada, it is a study of 
the interplay betwee ncolonial events and British opinion. 
From 1823 to 1839, kanglicization of the French Canadians 
received little more than lukewarm support in influential 
British circles. In 1828 the Canadian question took on a 
constitutional guise, not a cultural one. The liberals in 
the House of Commons championed the discontents of the 
Canadiens as symptoms of corruption and inefficiency at the 
Colonial Office rather than of tensions between incompatible 
social systems in the colony itself. During the 1830s it 
became evident -- Stanley was an early convert -- that 
efforts to treat the issue as one between the oligarchy and 
the people were not getting to the root of the trouble. 
Although British tories continued to fulminate against treason 
and republicanism, the whigs, who knew the problem from the 
inside, were more inclined to blame the strife on the 
ambition of the Canadiens to control the pace of social and 
economic change. The whigs, diagnosing an ethnic cause-to r 
a constitutional disease, compounded a cure which they hoped 
would settle both. Their answer was to reunite the two 
Canadas so that no French Canadian party could ever strangle 
the colony's legislature unassisted. 
Such a policy could pass through Parliament, despite the 
longstanding reluctance to tamper with a colony's internal 
affairs, because a widespread opinion had grown up in Britain 
that the Canadiens were not fit for their representative 
institutions. Lord John Russell introduced the reunion bill 
of 1840 with a typical statement of this wide-spread feeling: 
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while they used all the weapons of freedom... [the 
patriotes] were using those arguments in order to 
establish a gross monopoly in the hands of their 
own race.... The Assembly used the weapons of 
Hampden, in support of the principles of Wentworth.... 
For these evils -- for this evil spirit -- there seems 
no better remedy -- if we agree that Canada shall have 
a free Government. There is no more obvious or 
safer mode of proceeding, in order to put down this 
system of monopoly and exclusion, than to admit the 
inhabitants of both countries to send members to 
one Legislature, leaving the French race to be 
represented by persons of their own opinions, but 
depriving them of that preponderance of which they 
made so ill an use.... and give free scope to 
British enterprise and emigration, without 
subjecting the French to any degree of 
9 
oppression. 
It had ceased to matter to most of British opinion whether 
the Canadiens' struggle was a political protest against the 
composition of the Legislative Council or a systematic 
opposition to improvement. The patriote Assemblymen had some 
constructive plans, chiefly for promoting education, but the 
apparent purpose of their struggle for legislative supremacy 
was virtually achieved by 1820 -- to diminish the significance 
of the colonial administration and to stifle social and 
economic change at the legislative level. But the patriotes, 
sheltering behind their huge electoral majorities, failed 
to carry any significant numbers of English-speaking colonists 
with them. They tried to extort self-government through 
republican forms the British Parliament would never grant, 
and so made an issue of republicanism rather than of mal- 
administration, and of race rather than of reform. By 
drawing Parliament into the fray the patriotes assured their 
own downfall. 
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The most enduring thought in Britain on change in Lower 
Canada was that it was bound to happen. British emigration, 
Upper Canadian ambition, and American competition would 
ensure that no enclave of French-speaking farmers could form 
a viable society on the banks of one of the great river- 
entrances to the continental interior. Edward Ellice put 
this view forcibly to the Select Committee of 1828: 
I should be as adverse as anyone to deal forcibly 
with the prejudices and feelings of the Canadians, 
who certainly are attached to, and imagine themselves 
interested in, the preservation of their present 
system, still, as a matter of necessity, time will 
so deal with them, unless they can accommodate 
themselves to a gradual amelioration. " 
James Stephen told the same committee that "I think that the 
comparative depression of the French, at no very remote 
period is inevitable. They will sink under the weight of the 
English, or of the Anglo-American influences in these 
provinces. "10 The expectation of gradual change emphasizes 
a second point about the attitudes of British statesmen: 
their deep aversion to forcible measures against the Canadiens' 
distinctive cultural characteristics. This of course explains 
the prevailing reluctance in Britain to admit that the struggle 
had racial rather than constitutional roots. Although Durham 
reported after five months in Canada that the disputes were 
cultural, the Gosford Commission in 18 months during quieter GosOrd ('-r-o, h; 5 
times reached the opposite conclusion, and nes- 
w}}e-had seats'in Parliament in 1840 made spirited efforts"-- 
to discourage the notion that remedies to political strife 
could be sought in forced cultural assimilation. 
11 
In 
January 1838, after the first rebellion, both whig and tory 
leaders warned that they contemplated strong measures, but 
would not abrogate the basic cultural and religious rights 
of the Canadiens. This attitude was fundamental to the 
thinking of all but a few hotheads. If social change was 
inevitable in Lower Canada, it was the British government's 
- 271 - 
task, in justice as well as expediency, to see that the 
Canadiens' traditions were let down lightly. 
12 
This reluctance to interfere forcibly explains the great 
interest the Colonial Office showed in the 1830s in schemes 
of federation or of redividing Lower Canada afresh. One such 
plan was actually adopted and drafted into a bill early in 
1837 before Glenelg got cold feet and determined to try 
another attempt at propping up the old constitution. 
13 
Lord John Russell, in recommending the principle of reunion in 
1840, went into detail on the question of federation or re- 
division, ending with the reflection that no matter how new 
boundaries were drawn a small British community would remain 
to be harassed within a larger French one. Russell found this 
harassment entirely understandable, if distasteful from his 
own viewpoint. On this basis Russell denounced Pitt's policy 
of dividing the Canadas, and the unstated assumption was that 
the majority was less likely to oppress the minority, if the 
majority was as self-confident and undefensive as a British 
population could afford to be. No-one in Parliament argued 
against Russell's belief that the union should be effected 
"without subjecting the French to any degree of oppression", 
or with Lord Ellenborough, who expressed relief that "their 
religion, their institutions, and their establishments would 
be preserved inviolable" under the Act of 1840.14 
British legislation on the union fell far short of 
encouraging one race to oppress the other. Horton's bill 
of 1822 had offered Lower Canada a majority of seats in the 
united legislature and guaranteed this would never fall below 
half, even when the population of the lower province lagged 
behind that of the upper. On the other hand this bill 
planned to proscribe the use of French in legislative debates 
after 15 iS-, which Russell's proposals never did. 
15 
The 
Union Act of 1840 established equality of representation, 
which was to the temporary disadvantage of Lower Canada, but 
made only a symbolic gesture against the French language, 
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making English the language of official summons and of record 
in legislative (but not in judicial) proceedings. 
16 The Act 
of 1839 extending the Special Council's powers explicitly 
forbade interference with seigneurial tenure except on Montreal 
Island, and this provision was considered essential by Peel 
as well as the whigs. 
17 Neither Horton's union bill nor 
Russell's Act threatened seigneurial tenure or the coutume 
de Paris, unless the whole majority of British members should 
unite against the large minority of French. Such a coalition 
was as improbable in theory as it proved in practice, for it 
was unlikely that the French would entirely abstain from 
alliances with members of other origins, while at the same 
time making themselves so obnoxious that a large body of 
Upper Canadians could be brought to meddle in the civil law 
of the eastern half of Canada. No such alliance ever existed. 
In the House of Lords in 1840, the Marquis of Lansdowne 
accurately predicted that the English-speaking majority would 
not be unjust, so the French were sure "to make progress and 
gain ground, and thus take a share in the general conduct of 
affairs. " In the same debate Lansdowne and Ashburton 
commented on the viability of bilingual legislatures in 
Holland, Belgium, and Switzerland. In the Commons, there 
were loud and angry denials from the ministerial benches when 
O'Connell denounced the reunion as an effort to annihilate 
the French Canadians as a separate race. 
18 
It is unreason- 
able to assign to all the whigs Lord Durham's view that 
reunion and assimilation would go hand in hand, especially 
since the whigs were unwilling to try the broad constitutional 
concessions which Durham declared an essential foundation to 
his optimistic prediction of smooth assimilation. It seems 
improbable that British statesmen, with the example of Ireland 
always before their eyes, could expect parliamentary union 
automatically to produce cultural harmony, or penal laws to 
bring easy integration, even though Canada's "Ascendancy", 
unlike-Ireland's, would be neither a minority nor a land- 
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owning oligarchy. One must therefore look for other, more 
fundamental causes inspiring Parliament's decision to enact 
the reunion. 
iii 
one obvious purpose of the union was to meet the 
legitimate grievances, and the need for growth, of Upper 
Canada. Russell originally intended to tell Parliament the 
chief advantages of the measure were its giving a seaport 
to Upper Canada and a free government to Lower Canada; 
Hobhouse convinced him that pairing two such disparate goals 
sounded ridiculous, but Upper Canada's interests seldom 
received a better airing in Parliament than when reunion was 
discussed. The upper province had ambitiously pushed forward 
with improvements to the St. Lawrence above Montreal, designed 
to undercut the Erie Canal's dominance of the Great Lakes 
trade. This had run the colony into debt without any 
assurance that the lower stretches of the navigation would 
be improved by the French-Canadian province. Upper Canada 
and the holders of her numerous debentures were anxious to 
have this investment justified by the completion of the 
project -- a completion which would, after all, benefit 
Montreal at the expense of her old rival New York. This 
emphasis on the needs of Upper Canada also drew attention to 
the Canadas as a unit, where the British settlers were already 
a majority, and to the interests of emigration, which had 
passed the Canadas by almost totally in 1838.19 It seemed 
almost unthinkable that a French-Canadian Assembly in the 
Lower Province would ever consent to the measures which 
Upper Canada needed to satisfy her own ambitions. 
An even more compelling reason for the reunion was 
military security. The lively interest which the border 
population of the United States took in the Canadian crisis, 
and the simultaneous skirmishing on the boundary between New 
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Brunswick and Maine, convinced most Englishmen that there 
might be war if the two Canadas were not pacified at once. 
Poulett Thomson believed that no such war could last two 
weeks beyond the meeting of Parliament or of Congress, and 
Lord Ellenborough brooded on the fact that war "to us as to 
them is like the tearing asunder of the same body, so intima- 
tely united are we by Commerce. " But the desire to avoid war 
did not imply a refusal to wage it if necessary; even as 
radical a politician as Roebuck was determined to keep 
British North America out of United States hands, 
20 
and the 
question therefore became the old one faced by Pitt and Fox, 
of deciding what elements in the colony were the strongest 
potential defenders of continuing British hegemony, and which 
the greater threat to British security. In 1791 the French- 
Canadians, numerically so strong, were clearly the greater 
danger and the more valuable ally, and a constitution was 
devised to suit their preferences. A half century later this 
was no longer necessarily the appropriate constitution to serve 
Britain's interests. 
Ellenborough's conduct may be traced in detail to 
illustrate how strategic considerations could influence one 
man's conduct on the Lower Canadian question. Although it 
was common in the 1830s for domestic issues to prejudice 
colonial reforms -- for the state of the Lords, for instance, 
to make elective Legislative Councils unthinkable -- 
Ellenborough shed most of his domestic prejudices in response 
to the threat French Canada posed to peace. In January, 1838, 
he tried to mobilize the tory party against suspending Lower 
Canada's constitution, arguing that only a small proportion 
had rebelled out of a population previously noted for its 
loyal and courageous defence of British interests. His 
opposition was scotched by Peel, who could not risk turning 
the government out. Ellenborough opposed Durham's mission, 
feeling that the information collected by Gosford was far 
more valuable a reflection of social conditions than anything 
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Durham might find out in the heat of crisis. (Gosford, in 
1840, fervently agreed, and abandoned his usual support for 
the government to vote against the reunion bill. ) Ellenborough 
set down in January, 1838, the two classic tory arguments 
which were used against the union: it could not be effected 
on terms of justice to the French Canadians, and would 
therefore create a legitimate standing grievance; and canadien 
agitation would be encouraged by the reformers of Upper Canada, 
since the French would have a solid representation in the 
Lower province which could easily be joined by a few Upper 
Canadians to make a separatist majority. 
21 
When the reunion bill came before the House of Lords in 
1840, Ellenborough took the same basic ground as Lord Seaton 
(Sir John Colborne). The bill had passed the Commons with an 
enormous majority, and opposition to it now would only stir 
up hornets in the Canadas. So Ellenborough disclaimed the 
intention to defeat the bill and bent his efforts to strip 
away provisions which might be considered unjust to the 
French Canadians. He condemned equal representation for 
unequally-populated sections of the united province, and 
sneered at the odd sizes of constituencies in the lower 
province where it might take 6,000 electors of French origin 
to return a member, but only 3,500 British electors. 
Ellenborough leant on Durham's arguments for representation 
by population, earning a condescending reminder from Lansdowne 
that Ellenborough had been among the last-ditchers in the 
Reform struggle eight years before. But Ellenborough was 
adamant: the representation clauses of the reunion bill 
showed the same 
spirit that dictated the penal laws against the 
Roman Catholics of Ireland.... He wished to act 
with those people [the Canadiens] on a broad and 
liberal principle, and not to send them into the 
colonial parliament with angry recollections, 
and feelings hostile... to the connexion with 
this country. 
22 
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Ellenborough, in other words, fervently wished to deny the 
Americans any chance to fish in troubled waters. If this 
peace and security had to be bought at the price of the 
ambitions of British Lower Canadians, then the peace was 
worth the price. 
Ellenborough, in taking this stand, was acting on a 
pessimistic view of the continuing power of the Canadiens, 
and an unduly optimistic vision of the tractability of their 
Anglo-Canadian antagonists. But once Durham had declared 
for reunion, it could hardly be refused. This is presumably 
what two of the ministers who shared responsibility for the 
decision, Russell and Thomson, meant when they wrote that 
the union was adopted because it was Durham's recommenda- 
tion. 
23 Lord Howick's brother, a serving military officer 
close to Durham and his staff, advised Howick in mid-1838 
that "The English party will not be satisfied with anything 
short of a Union of the Provinces -- And that if they think 
they have just reason to be dissatisfied with what is done, 
there will be imminent danger of our losing Canada. " After 
the second revolt he repeated, "There is nothing for it now 
but to govern thro' the British party. "24 Lord Seaton probably 
said many times in private what he wrote to Sir George Murray 
in 1841, that had the reunion "been postponed, or abandoned... 
the Montreal merchants and the British inhabitants of L. Canada 
would have kept the colony in a state of excitement... that 
must have prevented a return to Representative government., 
25 
Edward Ellice was sunk in pessimism after his visit to the 
colony in 1836; two years later he warned Samuel Gerrard that 
the situation was intractable: 
An English ministry governing by means of an English 
Parliament, can never propose the permanent 
establishment of arbitrary govt. It has 
therefore in your case one of two principles 
to decide upon.... either, to admit the English 
population in the U. Province, by means of an 
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Union, to form with that of the L. Province, a 
majority in the joint Legislature, & to govern 
wholly by the Democratic power of the Legislature - 
subject to the little control which in that case 
could be reserved to the Crown - or, to re-establish 
the old system of Gov., in Lower Canada, providing 
absolutely for a civil list, for the independent 
[march? ] of the Executive Gov -& of the 
administration of justice -& deciding summarily 
& permanently on the two or three disputes between 
the races of tenures - registry &c.... In this 
latter case, there will still have to be provided, 
the means of legislating on many matters, common 
to both Provinces. 
But a pure legislative union would be impracticable because 
the consent of both parties could not be obtained, and it 
would be inequitable to impose an "English ascendancy" if the 
French were willing to accept a few essential reforms and a 
federation. 
26 But Ellice's plan for a federation, drafted 
formally in December, 1838, seemed to encourage assimilation 
of both the Canadas with the United States and, after finding 
favour with some ministers, was dropped and replaced by a 
scheme closer to Durham's. To the whigs, the British majority 
of the two Canadas was both a creative force to be encouraged 
and a threatening one to be placated. The Canadiens, 
unhappily for themselves, were seen by many British statesmen 
as neither much of an asset as allies nor of a danger if 
subjected to the "English ascendancy" that Ellice deplored. 
The cabinet had merely to pick the plan which best balanced 
the two forces. It was a comparatively easy choice, as 
Hobhouse foresaw in March, 1839: "We have now several plans 
before us, one from Ellice, one from Mr. Robinson, one from 
Ld. Howick, one from the Colonial Office, one from Russell and 
also Ld. Durham's scheme. I think we shall choose Russell's. " 
Russell's, which evolved further after his appointment as 
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Colonial Secretary in August, 1839, was essentially Durham's 
with two changes. First, it contemplated consultations in 
the colony to ensure that the British colonists were really 
getting what they wanted and the French what they could 
tolerate; and second, it eventually modified the representation 
to give the Upper Canadians immediate parity, thus shedding 
Durham's assumption that Britain could mollify the Canadiens 
merely by enlarging the fund of public patronage and establi- 
shing a faster rotation in the highest offices. Russell's 
measure was not enough to gratify the most rabid British at 
Montreal, but was sufficient to win the co-operation of most 
of the creative forces in the reunited colony. 
27 
iv 
In this brief survey of British politicians' attitudes 
towards change in Lower Canada, it appears that anglicization 
of the French Canadians was at most a secondary policy. 
There was a general, uninformed tendency to regard angliciza- 
tion as something that need not be rushed because it was 
going to happen anyway; and an even stronger feeling that it 
could not be rushed, because that would replicate Britain's 
Irish experience, reviving the worst sorts of narrow section- 
alism; it might also start a war with the United States. 
Assimilation was at most only one of many ends Britain was 
pursuing in resisting the Canadiens in the 1830s and reuniting 
the Canadas in the forties. This does not disprove the 
existence of assimilationists in Britain, and some obvious 
ones can be named -- Ellice in the twenties, and Durham, 
Charles Buller and C. P. Thomson in the late thirties. What 
is striking about the handful of prominent men who gave a 
good deal of thought to the matter and believed the 
Canadiens could be assimilated through the reunion is that 
they stood well over on the reforming side of the whigs, or 
were actually radicals. But most philisophic radicals and 
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O'Connellites, who relished democratic and nationalist 
movements, did not share this aspect of liberal thought. This 
study has not relied on quotations from Durham because he drank 
deeply from the poisoned well of Thom and Moffatt, and 
personal pique may have coloured his gloomy view of racial 
divisions in the colony. A more reliable witness, perhaps, is 
Charles Buller, who championed the Lower Canadian Assembly 
before he went to Canada but returned to England a determined 
reunionist. An exchange in the House of Commons between 
Buller and John Leader illustrated the difficulties liberal 
thought encountered in meeting the Canadian crisis. Buller 
spoke first: 
Those who had looked into the laws and institutions 
which the French Canadians had derived from the 
worst monarchical times of France, must be well 
aware, that instead of leading them on in 
civilization, they were calculated to leave them 
degraded and enslaved. He conceived that the 
French Canadians ought to be treated as British 
subjects, and put in possession of all the 
immunities and rights of British subjects. They 
were at present the poorest class of the community; 
they had been gradually losing their property, which 
had passed into the hands of the British race, who 
were the rich merchants and great proprietors of 
the land, and the governing classes. And was it 
for the benefit of the country that the masses of 
the people should speak a language different 
from that of the governing body and the people 
of property? Or was it not rather the very 
course to reduce the people to slavery and 
thorough degradation? If we would make them 
civilized and free men, we must put them on an 
equality with the rest of the population, and 
we must have them speak the language and be 
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partakers of those institutions which were the 
language and institutions of every free man in 
North America. 
Buller evaded rather too smoothly the appeal to the Canadiens 
of the separatist option, which would also have removed the 
cultural division between the people and the dlites. He 
was answered by another of the philosophic radicals, John T. 
Leader, who retorted that the union would not raise the 
French Canadians, but leave them "completely crushed": 
The hon. and learned Gentleman said, they must 
adopt the language, laws, and religion, too, he 
supposed, of the governing few.... Unless they 
could be convinced that it was a benefit, it 
would be the grossest tyranny, to make them 
English in language, laws, and religion. 
The line of reasoning appeared to be that the beavers, being 
less intelligent than the Indians, had been pushed out; and 
the French, being more intelligent and better organized than 
the Indians, had pushed them out. Now it was the French 
habitants' turn to yield to the Anglo-Saxon. 
The French Canadians, being the weaker, must submit; 
it was a law of nature. That might be very true; 
but it would be a disgrace to that House, if by any 
act of legislation they gave additional power 
to help the strong to crush the weak. 
28 
This was, of course, a question that had puzzled 
British liberal thought for generations; it had led Milton 
and the Parliamentarians reluctantly to the conclusion 
that it was doubtless more just for an enlightened minority 
to compel a majority "to retain... their liberty, than that 
a greater number, for the pleasure of their baseness, compel 
a less most injuriously to be their fellow-slaves. "29 The 
ultimate question for liberals in Britain was whether the 
French Canadians were making their British compatriots share 
a species of slavery, and if so, how to correct the situa- 
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tion. Buller, like Durham, looked at the steady accumulation 
by the British colonists of commercial eminence and owner- 
ship of seigneuries, and concluded that the progress of the 
Canadiens as individuals would be held back by their 
collective conserving of their culture. This was especially 
so since recent efforts at survivance had involved the 
harassment of the more liberal minority by the illiberal 
majority. But there were no clear-cut party lines on 
reunion and assimilation among the radicals and the more 
liberal whigs. Lord Howick, like Ellice, preferred a federal 
union which would leave the Canadiens in control of their 
local institutions after these had been updated by the 
Special Council; on the other hand, Edward Gibbon Wakefield, 
one of Durham's aides in Canada, supported the reunion, then 
went back to Canada to advise the Canadiens on electoral and 
legislative tactics to avoid assimilation. 
30 Not all liberals 
believed in anglicization; and not all the assimilators 
believed their ambitions could be realized merely by reuniting 
the Canadas. But the ardent assimilationists can generally 
be identified as liberals with first-hand knowledge of the 
colony and its troubles. 
This statement involves some paradoxes, including the 
one indicated above -- the distaste liberals felt for 
forcing people to be "free". The basis of assimilationist 
thought was the assumption that British habits and particu- 
larly commercial and industrial enterprise were superior to 
those of other countries, and especially to an archaic 
patchwork like the social, legal and economic structure of 
French Canada. A firm faith in British 'superiority was, to 
British statesmen as well as to Anglo-Canadians, the keystone 
of belief in assimilation of the Canadiens. And if mankind 
were rational -- a good liberal view which tories were less 
eager to share -- then the French Canadians would only have 
to live among a growing British community in order to be 
convinced of this superiority too. Many whigs and radicals 
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believed this in the early nineteenth century, just as Fox 
had done in the late eighteenth. This attitude underestimated 
the strength of the Canadiens' attachment to their own 
culture, overestimated the rate at which Lower Canada would 
fill up with British emigrants, and misjudged the extent to 
which an agricultural society needed to modernize itself in 
order to remain'viable, provided that society did not become 
unduly materialistic and would tolerate the exercise of 
higher economic functions by others. The assimilationists, 
significantly, were conspicuous reformers in British 
politics. Accustomed to reshaping their own institutions, 
they were blind to reasons why Lower Canadians would not 
sacrifice theirs. (Russell never made this mistake, though 
he naturally dispproved of the results of what he considered 
honest but misguided patriotism. ) The assimilationists' 
confidence rested in the over-riding spirit of improvement 
in Britain, and not in any narrow view of British society 
at a single moment; and it was the spirit of improvement 
which seemed most stifled by Canadien particularism. In the 
same way that a Scottish liberal like Adam Ferrie could 
become a staunch francophobe and iconoclast in Lower Canada, 
so it was easy for the assimilationist idea to persist in 
the small band of liberal Englishmen with first-hand expe- 
rience of the colony, while it grew shallow roots, if it 
took root at all, in other sectors of British opinion. 
31 
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Chapter 11 Lower Canada and Imperial Interests 
It has long been fashionable to suggest that the Canadians 
got peacefully in 1849 the self-government for which they 
had rebelled in 1837. On the constitutional plane this is 
largely true. The revolts in both Canadas arose in an 
effort to bestow all legislative and executive power (and 
appointment of the judiciary) on the party which dominated 
the Assembly. After 1849 power was indeed concentrated in 
this way; the relation of colonial government to imperial 
government evolved much the way colonial radicals said it 
must. But relations between the colonial business interests 
and the colonial Assemblies had matured in the fashion the 
imperial government had always wished. By 1849 most of the 
powerful and creative interests in the colony were harnessed 
to the same institutions and ideas, instead of pulling in 
three different directions as popular politicians, prominent 
merchants and official placemen had done before 1837.1 
Two factors brought about this relative social peace. 
The first was the string of reforms enacted by the Special 
Council. Its legislation on seigneurial tenure and registry 
offices had thrust back into the past two of the most 
tangible and yet most emotional grievances of the British 
colonists. In the same way that Horton's Act in 1822 had 
patched up the essential rift between Upper and Lower 
Canada, the Special Council did the little that was essential 
to reconcile the British Lower Canadians to the peculiarities 
of their local civil law. Thereafter prominent men of 
business and finance were much more likely to sit on the 
Reform benches of the Assembly. The second factor for 
- 284 - 
stability was the reunion of Upper and Lower Canada. if it 
deprived the French Canadians of their dominance, it still 
left them in possession of much they had felt worth fighting 
for. This took them into an alliance with the Upper 
Canadian radicals. The reunion had checked the Canadiens' 
veto on change and had opened all Canada to the British 
emigrant, but it was not an irresistible mechanism for 
assimilating the French Canadians, since anglicization 
would require the active co-operation of all English Canada. 
As the British tories foretold, this co-operation was not 
forthcoming. What the tories had reckoned without was the 
strong commercial spirit which inspired at least part of the 
reform movement of Upper Canada, and which pushed through 
measures which the Canadiens had previously strangled as 
part of their harassment of the merchants of Montreal. The 
Canadiens traded voting strength for guarantees of cultural 
survivance, and abandoned obstructive tactics in return. 
Outside politics, canadien capitalism continued to grow while 
in the new Assembly, the reform alliance pushed for political 
emancipation from Britain. The result was, in a relatively 
short period, the collapse of racially-oriented parties in 
the British constituencies of Lower Canada, and further 
reform of the civil code and land tenure laws. 
2 The French 
Canadians successfully resisted outward anglicization, yet 
they permitted the development and expansion of the British 
community in their midst. They gave up the struggle to lead 
the new order, but they did not lose the right to participate 
in it, nor did they shed altogether the aspects of their past 
which they cherished -- language, religion, and possession of 
the soil remained to them. 
This study must end, as it began, by remarking that it 
requires a special effort of historical imagination to 
understand the position of the British Lower Canadians. These 
colonists must not be faulted for knowing their own past much 
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better than they understood the future of societies of European 
origin. To them democracy was a risky, ill-defined theory, 
not an established principle of political life. If they 
indulged in "le reve d'un Empire-nation unitaire, 
3 they were 
as much ahead of their time as the Canadiens -- cultural 
homogeneity was not one of the foundations of sovereignty 
in 1820, or even in 1840.4 If they placed more faith in 
precedents and statutes than did the Canadiens, it was not 
simply because the precedents and statutes favoured them, 
but because British traditions had inspired stability and 
progress in England, while French innovation had plunged 
the Continent into chaos within living memory. If the 
British community supported its local bureacracy against the 
local majority, it was because it felt that bureaucracy was 
part of a vital link with the sources not only of the 
colony's prosperity, but of many of its people. If they 
despised the Canadiens' struggle against a privileged 
minority on the provincial or colonial level, it was partly 
because the Canadiens could be perceived as a privileged 
minority on the national or imperial scale. The British 
colonists of Lower Canada gained a sense of identity and a 
sense of destiny during the 1830s; and they released the 
uglier passions these feelings generated during the rebellions. 
They were as much the prisoners of the Napoleonic era as the 
Canadiens -- the mistrust of the later period was a natural 
legacy of the earlier. But like the Canadiens they were 
helping to create a separate destiny for the Canadas, a destiny 
not dictated by the British government, nor even at all times 
acceptable to it. It was not Britain's-policy to create a 
unified nation-empire. That was the private dream or public 
menace of Lower Canadians, and when bureaucrats or economic 
leaders sought to anglicize the colony down to the firesides 
of the habitants, they exceeded their mandates as agents of 
imperial expansion by threatening the peace and security, as 
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the patriotes threatened the prosperity, of Britain's 
overseas dominions. British colonists were as likely to 
confound as to advance the modest ambitions of the imperial 
statesmen who ruled the empire of which British Lower 
Canadians imagined themselves the servants and the champions. 
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44 BALC, Second Report to the Proprietors (London, 1836) 
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- 322 - 
58 PAC: Durham Mss. vol. 23 pp. 82-97, Kerr to (Buller? ), 
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7 Dec. 1836. 
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(November, 1839) session of the Council are in CO 42/297 
fos. 170 et se q., Thomson to Russell 18 Nov. 1839. 
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13 Feb. 1839. 
42 Ordinances 96,105,137,144,145,165,183 and 190. 
For opposition, see Montreal Gazette 21 Apr. 1840, 
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and are given in full by Christie, Late Province of 
Lower Canada, vol. 5 pp. 164-86. For unreliability of 
canadien juries, see The Arthur Papers, ed. 
C. R. Sanderson, vol. 1 p. 115, Colborne to Arthur 
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